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I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2012, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad catches
wind of an imminent military coup to be launched with the assistance of
a radical student movement-Iranians for Revolution Against Transna-
tional Exploitation ("IRATE"). IRA TE, frustrated with religious repres-
sion and with the perception that foreign companies were "stealing the
wealth of the Iranian people" and "leaving behind nothing but cultural
desolation and despoilment, " occupy Tehran University and several gov-
ernment buildings and begin massive anti-regime protests that turn vio-
lent. The most radical members of IRATE sabotage the pipelines of
foreign oil lessees in an effort to deprive the Ahmadinejad government of
royalties. Foreign petroleum corporations publicly appeal to the Iranian
government for assistance and deploy private military contractors amid
fears of civil war. Iranian oil production ceases, oil spikes to $350 per
barrel, and Western economies collapse into stagflation and malaise.
In early June, Ahmadinejad orders IRATE crushed and the coup
plotters arrested. Thousands of members of IRATE are killed by police
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and loyal military forces of the Iranian government in street battles, and
many more (suspected) protesters and disloyal officers are arbitrarily spir-
ited from their homes and away to military prisons where they are sub-
jected to torture and summary execution. Human rights organizations
decry the Iranian regime's actions, as does the UN Security Council, but
to no avail. By July, with Iranian oilfields now under military occupa-
tion and Ahmadinejad's hold on power secured, Western oil companies
are able to increase production dramatically, and by September, oil prices
have returned to pre-crisis levels.
However, in October, a class of nearly two thousand Iranian
nationals-some of whom have fled Iran and sought asylum in the US.,
others of whom remain imprisoned or in hiding but appear by next friend,
and still others of whom are captioned as 'John and Jane Does "for fear of
retribution against their relatives still located in Iran-file suit against
Texaco, BP, Marathon, ExxonMobil, Shell, ConocoPhillips, DynCorp,
and Xe, as well as named individual executives of those corporations, in
the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas in Houston,
headquarters for many of the defendants.' The IRATE plaintiffs, led by
an army of lawyers employed, in turn, by a consortium of human rights
non-government organizations, including Amnesty International,
Human Rights First, and the American Civil Liberties Union, sue under
the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA "),s allege that the corporate defend-
ants were either directly complicit or, through their connections with the
Iranian government, knowingly aided and abetted the commission of
extrajudicial killing, torture, and other serious violations of international
human rights law. The plaintiffs demand $24 billion-an amount that
represents approximately one percent of the gross revenues earned in 2006
by the defendants collectively.
Outraged petroleum executives disclaim any knowledge of or respon-
sibility for the acts of the Iranian government' and express shock and
2. This scenario is entirely fictional and is not intended to imply any
unlawful, unethical, or immoral conduct on the part of any named or unnamed
corporation or individual but merely to provide context for the building of a
theory in the present Article.
3. The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), which stands as the contemporary
codification of a provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789, provides that "[t]he
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States." 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (codifying Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1
Stat. 73, 77). Thus, for subject matter jurisdiction to vest, three elements must
exist: (1) the plaintiffs must be aliens, (2) the claim must be for a tort, and (3)
the tort must violate the law of nations or treaties of the United States. Id.
4. See John D. Bishop, The Moral Responsibility of Corporate Executives for
Disasters, in BUSINEss ETHics: A PHILOSOPHICAL READER 261, 263 (Thomas I.
White ed., 1993) ("When things go horribly wrong, executives sometimes deny
responsibility on the grounds that they did not know, and could not be
expected to know, the information . . . needed to prevent the disaster.").
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sadness at the brutality of the Ahmadinejad regime. Organizations such
as the National Foreign Trade Council, USA Engage, the United States
Chamber of Commerce, the United States Council for International Busi-
ness, and the American Petroleum Institute echo the argument that
responsibility for the injuries suffered by plaintiffs rests with the Iranian
government, an entity that, they are quick to note, is not under the control
of private corporations or their executive leadership and which has not
been sued." Furthermore, the oil majors warn that if they, as private cor-
porations, are to be exposed to an "onslaught" of liability for violations of
rights committed abroad by foreign governments simply because they pos-
sess "deep pockets'" and are subject to the personal jurisdiction of federal
courts, future foreign investment, particularly in countries with poor
human rights records, will be curtailed sharply. As a result of decreased
foreign investment, warn the oil majors and business associations, for-
eign economic development, democratization, and the protection of
human ights-all dependent on the foreign capital that only major mul-
tinational corporations can provide-will be curtailed.' In a news con-
ference, petroleum executives and the heads of major business
associations, joined by a deputy White House press secretary, call publicly
for the dismissal of what they brand "politically motivated" lawsuits.'
Bill Reinsch, the President of the National Foreign Trade Council, is even
5. These pro-business and anti-ATCA organizations were among a num-
ber who joined in submitting an amici curiae brief to the Supreme Court in a
2004 ATCA case that urged the Court to restrict the jurisdictional reach of
ATCA to prevent American business from bearing the burdens of the failures of
foreign governments to protect human rights. See Brief for the Nat'l Foreign
Trade Council et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339).
6. See Bishop, supra note 4, at 262 ("It is commonplace in discussing
morality that people [and corporations] should not be held responsible for
events over which they have no influence or control.").
7. SeeJohn Ladd, Corporate Mythology and Individual Responsibility, in Busi-
Ni*-ss ETIns, supra note 4, at 236, 244 ("[I]n vicarious liability someone other
than the causal agent is held responsible, often because he has more money!").
8. See GARY CLYDE I-UFBAUER & NICHOlAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING
MONSTER: TH; AIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789 1-2 (2003) (predicting economic
and political outcomes of subjecting U.S. corporations operating abroad to
increased liability under ATCA and stressing that a "nightmare scenario" of
rapid divestment from and that the collapse of democratization in developing
countries is probable unless the applicability of the statute is judicially or legisla-
tively limited).
9. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal
of the judgment against Defendant-Appellant Jose Francisco Sosa at 13-14,
Alvarez-Machain v. Sosa, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003) (No. 99-56780) (contend-
ing that the use of ATCA to allow aliens to seek remedies in U.S. courts for torts
committed abroad, where there is no other connection to the U.S., creates a
legal and political climate hostile to the interests of American business and to
the United States).
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more blunt: "[w]e think the Founding Fathers didn't intend all this ...
[wihat you got is trial lawyers who have seized on [ATCA] as the new
asbestos, filing these hoping to hit the jackpot . . [the oil in all the nice
countries has been found already. ""
In their own news conference announcing the Alien Tort Claims Act
suits, attorneys for the IRATE plaintiffs charge that multinational corpo-
rations "wield more power than many of the world's nations" and use
their "immense wealth and political capital"' to neutralize or co-opt gov-
ernments in developing countries, minimize the costs of doing business,
and generate tremendous profits. By virtue of their wealth and power, the
IRATE attorneys contend, corporations come to be impressed with social
responsibilities-quite independent of the obligations of the host states in
which they operate-to protect and promote human rights. These defen-
dant corporations and their executives, according to counsel for the plain-
tiffs, "ha[d] a moral duty to structure the[ir affairs] to ensure that [the]
risks of disaster[s such as befell the plaintiffs] are discovered and made
known to themselves . . . and then . . . to act on the information. "2
When a corporation breaches its responsibilities to protect the human
rights of the populations in the local communities in which it does busi-
ness, it, "like all other persons, must be forced at times to look at the very
personal tragedies it causes. " Moreover, as the lead attorney pro-
nounced, perhaps in response to the defendants' objections:
Productive organizations, whether U.S. corporations or not, are
subject to moral evaluations which transcend the boundaries of the
political systems that contain them. The underlying function of
all such organizations from the standpoint of society is to enhance
social welfare through satisfying consumer and worker interests,
while at the same time remaining within the bounds of justice.
When they fail to live up to these expectations, they are deserving of
moral criticism. When an organization, in the United States or
elsewhere, [violates its social responsibility], it deserves moral con-
demnation: the organization has failed to live up to a hypothetical
contract-a contract between itself and society."
10. Alan Gomez, Foreign Workers Sue U.S. Companies Under Old Law, USA
Tony, Apr. 2, 2007, at 2A.
. 11. Kevin Scott Prussia, NAFTA & the Alien Tort Claims Act: Making a Case
for Actionable Offenses Based on Environmental Harms and Injuries to the Public
Health, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 381, 381 (2006).
12. Bishop, supra note 4, at 266.
13. See Peter French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, in BUSINEss ETHICS
59, 59 (Michael Boylan ed., 2001) (quoting the lead attorney for the plaintiffs
in the lawsuit against Ford for negligent design of the Ford Pinto).
14. Thomas Donaldson, Constructing a Social Contract for Business, in Busi-
NESS ETHICS, supra note 4, at 167, 186-87.
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The preceding hypothetical scenario is intended not as a
prediction but rather as an illustration of the ongoing social bat-
tle for the power to determine the legal, ethical, and economic
substance of the regime that will govern corporations and specify
their powers and duties with regard to the protection of human
rights.'" The notions that corporations are especially well-placed
to influence human rights practices in the developing world in
which they have operations, and that their acts and omissions
have real human consequences, are empirical facts. By the same
token, the notion that corporations are uniquely capable of ele-
vating living standards, creating jobs, and expanding educational
opportunities is also an empirical fact. Whether corporations
have human rights obligations, and, if so, what, why, in respect to
whom, and at what cost those obligations are to be discharged,
are, however, contested matters. For much of the history of the
modern corporation its object and purpose, as well as its powers
and duties, were widely considered to be settled-except perhaps
in the academy"-by domestic law, custom, and social contract.
The past two decades have witnessed a series of events: Three
Mile Island and Bhopal; revelations of massive corporate fraud at
Enron et al.; ExxonMobil and British Petroleum and other envi-
ronmental disasters;' 7 allegations of corporate complicity in
15. For a general discussion on the sources, nature, domain, subject mat-
ter, and justiciability of human rights obligations tinder international and
domestic legal systems, see generally Jernej Letnar Eerni, Corporate Human
Rights Obligations at the International Level, 16 WII.IAMIFTE J. INT'L L. & Dise.
Rvsoi.. 130, 157-68 (2008).
16. The business and legal academies have been fruitful sites for debate
on the object, purpose, powers, and duties of corporations since at least the
early 1970s. See HENRY G. MANNE & HENRY C. WAi.i.ICH, TiiE MODERN CORPORA-
TION AND SOCIAL. RisI'oNsIsII1ry (1972) (presenting and debating two strongly
opposed theories of the corporation). Arguably, the corporation has been a
contested concept in the academy as far back as the mid-19th century, and pos-
sibly even in the late-18th century. See, e.g., KARl. MARX, DAs KAPITAl.: A CR-
TIQUF OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Friedrich Engels ed., 1848); ADAM SMITH, AN
INQUIRY INTO TME NATURE AND CAUSFS OF THE WFAITIH OF NATIONS (Edwin Can-
nan ed., 1937) (1776). For an excellent development of the intellectual history
of the corporation, see Archie B. Carroll, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Histori-
cal Perspective, in 3 THE ACCOUNTABLE CoRPORATION: CORPORATE SOCIAL RisI'oN-
simnrry 3 (Marc J. Epstein & Kirk 0. Hanson eds., 2006). For a discussion of
the intellectual history of Corporate Social Responsibility, see Archie B. Carroll,
A History of Corporate Social Responsibility: Concepts and Practices, in THE OxFORD
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAl. REsPoNsiniuLY 19 (Andrew Crane et al. eds.,
2008).
17. See NATALIA YAKOVLEVA, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE
MINING INDusTRIEs 21 (2005) (listing over a dozen major environmental disas-
ters over the last two decades and linking them to the breakdown of traditional
understandings of the role and responsibilities of the corporation).
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genocide, rape, and slave labor;18 the rise of the omnipresent
social media; and the gathering transnational strength of the
human rights movement. The episodes have unraveled settled
understandings of corporations to form two contending theoreti-
cal camps with ideologically opposed visions of how corporations
should be structured and held responsible for harms allegedly
connected, however directly or remotely, to their conduct.'"
Both contend upon the terrain mapped out by an emergent
social movement, entitled "corporate social responsibility"
("CSR"). CSR has been described variously as a threat to capital-
ism, a fad, as the essence of the responsible modern corporation,
and even as the key to human survival,20 depending upon various
theoretical commitments and normative judgments. The para-
digm engages a variety of state and non-state actors in contesta-
tion over a host of political and legal projects designed by their
architects to restrain corporations in their pursuit of self-interest
and to hold them accountable to constituencies other than
shareholders for their performance as measured along dimen-
sions other than financial performance, including environmental
protection, philanthropic commitment, and protection of
human rights."
A. Shareholder Theory
The "shareholders" camp, grounded in a theory of the firm
which regards a corporation as a legal creation designed and
managed solely to generate profits for its stockholders, rejects all
claims other than the economic self-interest of the stockholders
or the contractual obligations voluntarily entered into by parties
as subjects appropriately within the ambit of corporate govern-
18. See infra Part II.A.3.
19. See Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Is There an Emerging Fiduci-
ary Duty to Consider Human Rights ?, 74 U. CIN. L. REv. 75, 78-79 (2005) (identify-
ing a wave of corporate fraud scandals, the increasing sophistication of the
human rights movement, and high-profile, negative events, such as Bhopal, as
catalysts for the CSR movement).
20. BRYAN HORRIGAN, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE 21ST CEN-
TURY: DEBATES, MODELS AND PRACTICES ACROSS GOVERNMENT, LAW AND BUSINESS
3-4 (2010).
21. The modern CSR movement is generally traced to the mid-20th cen-
tury, although its antecedents reach back to antiquity. See HoWARD R. BOWEN,
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BUSINESSMAN 14 (1953). For an introduction to
the intellectual history and principles of the CSR movement, see generally I
CORPORATE SocIm RESPONSIBILITY: CONCEPTS, ACCOUNTABILITY AND REPORTING
(Jos6 Allouche, ed., 2006).
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ance." CSR means nothing more to adherents of shareholder
theory than assuring that the corporation is run in such a man-
ner as to maximize profit lawfully;" moreover, should managers
consider the "public or social interest" in the discharge of their
duties, they would not only be derelict in their duties to (and
even stealing from) the shareholders, but would risk surrender-
ing their firms to public control.24 If indeed a compelling social
interest is claimed that would require the firm to abstain from
acts or omissions otherwise in its own interest, this interest ought
to be subjected to proof in the democratic political process and,
if validated, vindicated by government through legislation.2 5
Shareholder theory and its followers accept only fiduciary
responsibility to owners and legal compliance as fundamental
principles of corporate governance. In the United States at pre-
sent, shareholder theory has maintained its legal primacy, ani-
mating corporate law and specifying the powers and duties of
corporations and their employees in such a manner as to facili-
tate efficiency and profitability.2" Thus, so long as a firm remains
within the "rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open
and free competition, without deception or fraud[,]" 27 it is
legally free to ignore all other objectives save maximization of
shareholder wealth.2 8
B. Stakeholder Theory
In marked contrast, the "stakeholders" camp is committed
to a vision of the firm as not merely a legal fiction but rather as a
moral organism with social and ethical responsibilities2 9 that
22. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to
Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG.., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32, 126.
23. ANDREW CRANE & DIRK MATTEN, BUSINESS ETHics: A EUROPEAN PER-
SPECTIVL 186 (2004).
24. 3 FRIEDRicH A. HAYEK, LAw, LECISLATION AND LineRry: THE POLITICAL.
ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE 82 (1979).
25. See Friedman, supra note 22, at 126 (rejecting the devolution of gov-
ernmental responsibility to act in the social interest onto business as
undemocratic).
26. Craig Ehrlich, Is Business Ethics Necessary?, 4 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J.
55, 57 (2005).
27. Yoshiro Miwa, Corporate Social Responsibility: Dangerous and Harmful,
Though Maybe Not Irrelevant, 84 CORNELi L. REv. 1227, 1227 (1999).
28. For a detailed elaboration of shareholder theory, see RonmRT HESSEN,
IN DEFENSE OF THE CORPORATION (1979). For a thorough discussion of the
intellectual history and the principles of shareholder, or "classical," theory, see
JAMES J. BRUMMER, CORPORATE REsP ONSIIITY AND LEGITIMACY: AN INTERDISCI-
PLINARY ANALYSIS 101-20 (1991).
29. See, e.g., YADONG Luo, GLORAL DIMENSIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE 199 (2007) (identifying economic, legal, ethical, moral, and philanthropic
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extend far beyond the interests of shareholders to include other
constituent groups such as employees, customers, suppliers, non-
governmental organizations, local communities, and even, in
conjunction with issue-areas such as the environment, disease
and corruption prevention, and human rights, the community of
nations.s' Legitimate objects of the corporation include not
merely profitability but sustainable growth, equitable employ-
ment practices, and long-term social and environmental account-
ability." Whether because of an implied social contract" or
because of moral imperatives, where the drive for profit butts
up against its non-pecuniary responsibilities, a corporation,
according to stakeholder theory, must balance these obligations
in a manner that safeguards the welfare of society." Stakeholder
dimensions of stakeholder theory); JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER,
Centesimus Annus of the Supreme Pontiff on the Hundredth Anniversary of
Rerum Novarum 50-51(1992) ("[T]he purpose of a business firm is not simply to
make a profit, but it is to be found in its very existence as a community of persons
who in various ways are endeavoring to satisfy their basic needs . . . . Profit is a
regulator of the life of a business, but . .. other human and moral factors must also
be considered . . . ."); Fred D. Miller, Jr. & John Ahrens, The Social Responsibility
of Corporations, in BUSINESS ETHIcS, supra note 4, at 202 (arguing that firms must
consider the moral dimensions of their actions).
30. Thomas M.Jones, Andrew C. Wicks & R. Edward Freeman, Stakeholder
Theory: The State of the Art, in THE BLAcKwEi, GUIDE TO BUSINESS ETHICS 19, 21
(Norman E. Bowie ed., 2002). For an in-depth presentation of the stakeholder
theory and its expression through the CSR movement, see Ruth V. Aguilera et
al., Putting the S Back in Corporate Social Responsibility: A Multilevel Theory of Social
Change in Organizations, 32 AcAD. MGMT. REv. 836 (2007).
31. SeeJohn M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embel-
lish: Theory Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31J. CORP.
L. 1, 1-2 (2005) (elaborating the theoretical underpinnings of stakeholder
theory).
32. John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice, in BUSINESS ETHICS, supra note 4, at 89,
92 (presenting the social contractual basis for stakeholder theory, which main-
tains that because firms are permitted by society to aggregate great wealth and
power and to become social giants that affect the lives of millions, they are
bound by an implied agreement to exercise such power for stakeholders as
beneficiaries).
33. See, e.g., John R. Boatright, Ethics and Corporate Governance: Justifying the
Role of Shareholder, in THE BlAcKwELL GUIDE To BUSINESS ETHICS, supra note 30,
at 38, 53 (contending that "all individuals have some rights that they should not
have to bargain [with corporations] for . . . .").
34. Stakeholder theorists contend that, in most instances, such balancing
is in fact possible. See, e.g., THOMAS DONALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL
BUSINEsS 12 (1989) (contending that stakeholder theory can simultaneously
"stand the tests of rational consistency and compatibility with fundamental
moral precepts .. . in complex factual surroundings . . . ."); Norman E. Bowie,
Introduction to THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO BUSINESS ETHICS, supra note 30, at 2
(holding that the "obligation of business ... is to consider, weigh, and balance
the needs of the firm's stakeholders").
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theorists are distributed along a continuum ranging from those
who envision CSR to require little more than engaged philan-
thropy and legal compliance to those who believe firms should
actively aim to contribute to global welfare even at the expense of
shareholders. But they all agree that corporations are obligated
to add social, in addition to financial, value, and that they are, or
should be, held accountable-whether economically, politically,
or legally-for the faithful discharge of their social, ethical, and
moral responsibilities.
C. Theoretical Debate in the Era of Corporate Social Responsibility
Shareholder theorists brand stakeholder theory as an "amor-
phous and ill-defined construct, born of good intentions, but
doomed to fail for its breadth, its emphasis on people rather
than profits, and its inability to direct the day-to-day behavior of
managers."" They make similar claims about CSR." Stake-
holder theory does not assign relative weights to the interests of
the various constituencies that claim a stake in the firm, nor does
it provide a mechanism for ascertaining precisely which individu-
als and groups are entitled to stakeholder status or a detailed
ethical argument for its normative claims." Moreover, if the law-
ful pursuit of profit by a firm generates externalities or "social
costs" that offend various would-be constituencies, stakeholder
theory has not explained why the appropriate response is not to
turn to the political process to amend the law and create a legal
obligation for the firm to internalize the purported harms it cre-
ates," rather than to claim a "stake" in the firm as the basis for
35. See CRANE & MAT-TEN, supra note 23, at 43-63 (developing a typology
and continuum of stakeholder theorists' views on CSR and corporate citizen-
ship). For a thorough presentation of stakeholder theory, see generally PATRI-
CIA H. WERHANE, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND CORPORATIONs (1985). For an
intellectual history and taxonomy of shareholder theories, see BRUMMER, supra
note 28, at 144-64.
36. Jones et al., supra note 30, at 25.
37. In part because it is so wide-ranging and broadly encompassing a
social movement, it has recently been criticized for a lack of definitional preci-
sion and an incapacity to be reliably measured. SeeJ. (Hans) van Oosterhout &
Pursey P.M.A.R. Heugens, Much Ado About Nothing: A Conceptual Critique of CSR,
in THE OXFORn HANDROOK OF CORPORAT SOCIAL Rv.SroNsaIL-ty, supra note 16,
at 197.
38. See DoNALDSON, supra note 34, at 45-47 ("No serious attempt has
been made by defenders of the [stakeholder] model to devise a principle for
making trade-offs between the interests of shareholders, suppliers, employees,
consumers, members of the general public, or anyone else who might qualify as
a stakeholde. Furthermore, the stakeholder model lacks any explicit theo-
retical moral grounding.").
39. Boatright, supra note 33, at 50, 55.
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standing to charge a breach of some ill-defined moral or ethical
responsibility.40
For their part, stakeholder theorists claim that shareholder
theory is afflicted by an "ethical tunnel vision"4 1 that leads ineluc-
tably to "corporate Neanderthalism"4 2 of the sort that triggered
the implosion of corporations such as Enron, WorldCom, Tyco,
and Arthur Andersen. Moreover, CSR is neither static nor one-
size-fits-all: rather, the social responsibility of firms increases as a
function of their increasing social power and in correlation with
the evolution of international moral expectations."3 Accord-
ingly, shareholder theory is a morally repugnant mode of govern-
ance, particularly for powerful firms." What is more, according
to proponents of stakeholder theory, shareholder theory is less
economically profitable than the latter paradigm. Because the
environment in which firms operate is far more complex than
the simplified reality assumed by shareholder theory, a manage-
rial focus exclusively on duties to shareholders diverts attention
and energy away from other groups-employees, customers, sup-
pliers, communities, etc.-whose participation with the firm in
the creation of value and satisfaction with their treatment by the
firm are both vital to the firm's success or failure. In other
words, to be profitable, firms cannot merely serve the short-term
ends of shareholders but must satisfy the longer-term needs of a
wide array of stakeholders."
Although at least one commentator has suggested that it is
possible to harmonize shareholder and stakeholder theories to
create a "convergent stakeholder theory," the fundamental nor-
mative distance between these two schools of thought can be dif-
ficult, in practice, to bridge."6 At the same time, neither theory
40. See Kent Greenfield, Saving the World With Corporate Law?, B.C. L. SCH.
LEGAL STUD. Rigs. PAPER SERIES NO. 130 at 1, 11 (2007) (suggesting that the
tendency to "create benefits for itself by pushing external costs onto others"
merits describing the corporation as an "externality machine").
41. Miller & Ahrens, supra note 29, at 196-97.
42. DONALDSON, supra note 34, at 45.
43. THOMAs DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, TIEs THAT BIND: A SOCIAL
CONTRACTS APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS 15 (1999).
44. Boatright, supra note 33, at 38.
45. Jones et al., supra note 30, at 19.
46. Theorizing in the field of CSR is almost exclusively descriptive and
oriented toward the building, rather than the heuristic testing, of hypotheses.
See, e.g., John L. Campbell, Why Would Corporations Behave in Socially Responsible
Ways? An Institutional Theory of Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 946 (2007) (arguing that there is a causal relationship between regulation,
NGOs, behavioral norms, and discursive patterns without modeling this rela-
tionship); Andreas Georg Scherer, Guido Palazzo, & Doroth6e Baumann, Global
Rules and Private Actors: Toward a New Role of the Transnational Corporation in
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offers specific and detailed guidance to aid and indemnify man-
agers facing complex legal, ethical, and moral challenges and
charged with the duty to make decisions under conditions of
multidimensional uncertainty. For much of the first two decades
the struggle between the two paradigms of corporate govern-
ance, and, in turn, the evolution of the CSR movement, was
fought within the academy. However, the wave of corporate
scandals in the first few years of the third millennium and the
increasing sophistication of the international human rights
movement combined, within the past ten years, to: (1) draw the
battle out of the academy and into new arenas, both judicial and
legislative, (2) to energize those who would displace the share-
holder model in favor of a stakeholder approach to corporate
governance, and (3) as a consequence of the terrain on which
the battle is being fought and the substance of the demands
being levied, to heighten the stakes.
D. The Conflict over the Question of Corporate Responsibility
for the Protection of Human Rights
In the recent phase of ideological and political contestation,
the champions of shareholder theory and a rather narrowly con-
strued understanding of CSR are, naturally, many (but emphati-
cally not all) corporations and their shareholders. On the other
side of the equation, a broad spectrum of nongovernmental
organizations ("NGOs")-"pressure groups," charities, religious
groups, interested individuals, and other entities organized
around specific themes such as the promotion and protection of
human rights, labor rights, indigenous rights, women's rights,
and the environment-are the major proponents of stakeholder
theory and of a much more expansive view of the obligations
owed by corporations to constituencies under the rubric of
CSR.o
Global Governance, 16 Bus. ETHICS Q. 505 (2006) (surveying varying theories of
CSR and suggesting that a systems-level theory and analysis of the potential of
global governance regimes is necessary to explain and predict the strategic
interplay between profit motives and human rights).
47. See CRANE & MATT.EN, supra note 23, at 345 (describing the civil society
groups that have organized to advance stakeholder governance and a broad
conception of CSR). The contemporary CSR "community" consists of a wide
variety of entities, including
CSR professionals within for-profit companies; . . . another new class
of outsiders who consult with companies and audit their nonfinancial
reports; . . . executives at pension funds, insurance companies, and
other institutional investment organizations who believe in socially
responsible investing . . . like-minded independent investment manag-
ers to whom institutional portfolios may be entrusted; those who work
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The vastly divergent interests, normative commitments, and
worldviews of many corporations on the one hand and human
rights NGOs on the other-illustrated and perhaps even carica-
tured by the hypothetical scenario supra-might seem to compel
the conclusion that conflict is inevitable and cooperation is
impossible, especially in the emotion-laden and politically sensi-
tive issue-area of human rights. This conclusion might appear all
the more logical in light of the salience of CSR to the interna-
tional human rights movement-it has moved to the forefront of
its agenda.48 This conclusion is also logical in view of the pri-
mary strategies chosen by NGOs: litigation, application of politi-
cal pressure upon regulators within the transnational and
domestic governance spheres, and legislative attempts to either
reform corporations as quasi-public entities with human rights
obligations akin to those of states or to dissolve them alto-
gether.49 Indeed, the perspective that NGOs and corporations
occupy such different normative universes and missions "that
they will never be able to work together"o5 0 and that partnerships
for and on behalf of NGOs ... and government officials worldwide
whose mandate covers social and environmental issues.
Conley & Williams, supra note 31, at 5. Although some corporations have
embraced CSR as their preferred model of governance, they are in the minor-
ity, and fewer still of these have implemented strategies consistent with the core
principles of the CSR movement. Moreover, because they are the exception,
this Article simplifies reality for the sake of theory generation and assumes a
dichotomy between corporations and NGOs so as to relax that assumption in
order to game the strategic interaction between corporations truly committed
to CSR and NGOs in Part III. Finally, a fuller description of reality might posit
a trilateral bargaining situation with corporations, NGOs, and the state arrayed
against each other; again, the project of theory building requires some simplify-
ing decisions, and future research might well treat the strategic actions as trilat-
eral or even multilateral. Still, NGOs have discovered in recent years that "in
many cases businesses are important tools that can be more effectively har-
nessed for social change than governments," which has meant that the dyadic
interaction often predominates. Jone L. Pearce, Foreword to GLOBAIZATION AND
NGOs: TRANSFORMING BUSINEss, GOVERNMENT, AND SocIETY xiii (Jonathan P.
Doh & Hildy Teegen eds., 2003).
48. Scott Greathead, The Multinational and the "New Stakeholder": Examin-
ing the Business Case for Human Rights, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 719, 724
(2002).
49. See infra at Part II (discussing NGO strategy). Indeed, the behavior of
NGOs toward corporations on the subject of CSR for much of the past decade
has been described as an "attack." Pearce, supra note 47, at xi.
50. A. Rani Parker, Prospects for NGO Collaboration with Multinational Enter-
prises, in GLOBALIZATION AND NGOs: TRANSFORMING BUSINEss, GOVERNMENT, AND
SOCIETY, supra note 47, at 81, 91.
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between the two are impossible has undernourished theory and
practice.5 '
Despite the seeming intractability of and disparity between
these diametrically opposed normative visions of corporate
responsibility for the protection and promotion of human rights,
an analysis of the strategies available to corporations and to
NGOs, augmented by the use of game theory, reveals that not
only is cooperation possible but that a process of self-regulation
achieved through negotiation and dependent upon self-inter-
ested cooperation can yield the simultaneous outcomes of corpo-
rate profitability and protection of human rightS52 almost
51. See, e.g., Frank Den Hond & Frank G.A. De Bakker, Ideologically Moti-
vated Activism: How Activist Groups Influence Corporate Social Change Activities, 32
AC(An. Mcw-r. REv. 901, 901 (2007) (noting that the CSR strategies of NGOs and
the potential for partnerships have been left "largely ... unattended" by the
academy due to the seeming incommensurability of the objectives of NGOs and
corporations). Without an understanding of the strategic relationship between
corporations and NGOs, it has been difficult to develop theories as to why cor-
porations should choose to behave in a socially responsible fashion, and as a
consequence research has remained largely descriptive and normative. See
Campbell, supra note 46, at 946 (surveying research and concluding that "little
theoretical attention has been paid to understanding why or why not corpora-
tions act in socially responsible ways" and that "much of the literature on [CSR]
has been more descriptive or normative than positivist in tone" until as recently
as perhaps the last two years). Id. Most studies have been limited to examina-
tions of the effects of CSR on corporate financial performance and have
neglected to investigate the antecedents of corporate CSR strategies until quite
recently. Id.
52. The human rights canon consists of an expanding number of treaties,
declarations, and principles protective of the rights of individuals and groups
against deprivation by states and, in some instances, non-state actors. While the
specific parameters of the "human rights" regime are contested, with human
rights NGOs seeking ever to expand the canon to include affirmative obliga-
tions to provide social welfare, and other actors-such as states and corpora-
tions-seeking to confine it to negative obligations of non-interference, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights captures many principles that are uni-
versally regarded as an irreducible and nonderogable core of human rights to
which all persons are entitled by natural law, including the rights to life, liberty,
security of person, due process of law, freedom from torture and from arbitrary
detention, and political participation. See Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
Many subsequent human rights treaties and declarations are elaborations
and extensions of the Universal Declaration, while others seek to append new
and often contested claims of rights. Among the rights most likely to be directly
or indirectly violated by corporations are non-discrimination, life, liberty, physi-
cal integrity, civil freedom, and freedom from slavery and forced labor. See
INT'l. COUNCIL ON HUMAN RiGHTS, BEYONn VOL.uNTARISM: HUMAN RIGHTS AND
TH DEwvtLoING INTERNATIONAL LicAL OiLIGATIONS OF COMPANIES 15 (2002).
In light of this, and to maintain definitional neutrality and avoid unproductive
debate over the distinction between political and civil rights on the one hand
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universally deemed desirable -by both NGOs as well as the
most-self interested of corporations.
Accordingly, Part II will identify and analyze the strategies
employed by NGOs and corporations in the battle over whether
and to what extent corporations should bear responsibility for
violations of human rights. Part III will, with the assistance of
game theoretic modeling, present the strategic interactions
between these two parties, determine payoffs and optimal strate-
gies for each party, and identify any strategic equilibria. Part IV,
followed by a Conclusion, will explain and contextualize the find-
ings, propose a pre-theory of the commensurability of corporate
profitability and human rights, and suggest directions for future
research that will advance the theoretical debate beyond simple
characterizations of NGOs as good and corporations as evil.
II. THE BATTLE OVER CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
A. The NGO's Movement to Formalize CSRfor
Human Rights Protection
NGOs" have devised and implemented five primary strate-
gies to formalize a broad conception of CSR for human rights:
(1) Negotiate, (2) Litigate, (3) Regulate, (4) Legislate, and (5)
Delegitimate.
and social, economic, and cultural rights on the other, the term "human rights"
as used in this Article refers generally to the body of rights recognized in the
Universal Declaration and subsequent treaties with broadly representative
memberships that elaborate these rights, including the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, those articles of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights that recognizes rights to life, bodily
integrity, and freedom from torture and arbitrary detention, and the Conven-
tion on the Prevention of Torture. For a discussion and analysis of the various
debates surrounding recognition of and enforcement of what are asserted as
human rights, see William Bradford, Beyond Reparations: An American Indian The-
ory of Justice, 66 OHIo ST. L.J. 1 (2005).
53. See AMNESTY INT'L, HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES FOR COMPANIES Jan.
1998), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ACT70/001 (not-
ing that the proposition that human rights form the "bedrock principles" of
civilized society and must be protected is not objectionable to any state or cor-
poration in principle).
54. Although the hundreds-and potentially thousands-of human
rights NGOs are by no means a monolith, there is a common core of shared
beliefs about the preferred state of the world and about desired outcomes
regarding the protection of the human rights of individuals and groups that
unifies them and channels their energies along a common vector. Den Hond &
De Bakker, supra note 51, at 902. Thus, for sake of parsimonious theory build-
ing they shall be aggregated into a single "entity."
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1. Negotiate: Corporate Codes of Conduct
In the early 1990s, human rights organizations and other
NGOs, despite no legal rights to ownership of the firms they
targeted and no popular mandates, began nonetheless to assert a
claim to stakeholder status solely by virtue of their capacity to
mobilize public opinion and influence government.55 As self-
styled stakeholders, defined broadly as "group [s] or individual [s]
who can affect or [are] affected by the achievement of the organ-
ization's objectives[,J" 5" NGOs defined their mission as the
achievement of defacto influence upon corporate conduct for the
purpose of transforming corporate practice along a series of rele-
vant dimensions. Because no explicit criteria existed to deter-
mine whether NGOs were entitled to stakeholder status or what
considerations that status accorded them, in practice, the NGOs
that made the most "noise" through the orchestration of success-
ful media campaigns (or "assaults," depending upon point-of-
view) and consumer boycotts5 7 were eventually called out of the
picket lines and into partnerships by targeted corporations'*
interested in staving off further injury to their reputations,
thereby relieving the market pressures on their bottom-lines.
Further, in some cases cooperating corporations gained a com-
petitive advantage over rival firms that did not bring NGOs in
from the cold."'
NGOs demanded, as a condition of these partnerships, that
corporations embrace the notion that responsibility for promo-
tion and protection of human rights is incumbent not only upon
states and host country officials but also upon corporations and
their executives." To demonstrate and formalize this commit-
ment, NGOs demanded that corporations adopt voluntary "cor-
55. Boatright, supra note 33, at 43.
56. R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STrATEaIc MANAGEMENT: A STAKFHO.DER
APPROACH 46 (1984).
57. See CRANE & MATTEN, supra note 23, at 346-47 (discussing successful
consumer boycotts of the Shell Corporation's Brent Spar oil platform led by
Greenpeace).
58. Conley & Williams, supra note 31, at 12.
59. See Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Product Labeling
Schemes: The Limits and Possibilities of Promoting International Labor Rights Through
Private Initiatives, 30 LAw & PoY'v INT'L Bus. 111, 114 (1998) ("MNCs submit to
codes of conduct . . . as a result of pressure from consumers, investors, the
media, and non-governmental organizations.").
60. See Su-Ping Lu, Note, Corporate Codes of Conduct and the FTC: Advancing
Human Rights through Deceptive Advertising Law, 38 Coi.um. J. TRANSNAT'i L. 603,
613 (2000) (contending that engagement with NGOs is an "asset in public rela-
tions with consumers, employees and investors/shareholders").
61. See DONALDSON, supra note 34, at 67.
BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL
porate codes of conduct" ("CCCs") that elaborated internal
guidelines and standards for behavior putatively more protective
of human rights and the environment than existing governmen-
tal laws and regulations.12 Many CCCs contain voluntary report-
ing provisions under which a corporation pledges to report to
the public, via a corporate website or its annual report, on the
state of its human rights, environmental, and labor rights prac-
tices." Some NGOs hail the public reporting provisions of CCCs
as creating greater transparency and thus enhanced opportuni-
ties for stakeholders to ensure that reporting corporations
uphold their obligations."
CCCs have spread like wildfire. At present, "[o]ne would be
hard-pressed to find any major corporation today that did not
make some claim to abiding by a code of conduct that com-
prised, at least in part, adherence to human rights standards.
Indeed, more often than not, such adherence to codes is
trumpeted by major corporations."6"
Perhaps predictably, the number of organizations devoted
to assisting corporations in meeting their responsibilities under
CCCs has mushroomed as well, resulting in a "sea of competing
frameworks and guidelines" 6 from which corporations must
select in attempting to secure an organizational "stamp of
approval" at tolerable cost. Specific guidance and blueprints for
CCC construction are available to industries ranging from coffee
to hospitality, bananas, textiles, and mining. Documents such as
the Global Sullivan Principles and the MacBride Principles serve
62. See Bob Hepple, A Race to the Top? International Investment Guidelines
and Corporate Codes of Conduct, 20 Comp. LAB. L. & PoL'vJ. 347, 357-60 (1999)
(discussing the negotiation and drafting of CCCs).
63. Another informal and voluntary mechanism, known as Certified Man-
agement Standards ("CMS"), operates in much the same way by committing
corporations to codify and adhere to certain management practices, such as the
ISO 14001 environmental management standard and the SA 8000 labor stan-
dard, that are deemed socially desirable. For purposes of this Article, CCCs and
CMSs are treated as functional equivalents. For a discussion of CMSs as a volun-
tary approach to transforming corporate conduct, see generally Ann Terlaak,
Order Without Law? The Role of Certified Management Standards in Shaping Socially
Desired Firm Behaviors, 32 AcAD. MGMT. REv. 968 (2007).
64. CRANE & MATTEN, supra note 23, at 61 ("Transparency is the degree to
which corporate decisions, policies, actions, and effects are acknowledged and
[communicated] to relevant stakeholders.).
65. David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of
Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT'L
L. 931, 953 (2004).
66. Abdallah Simaika, Note, The Value of Information: Alternatives to Liability
in Influencing Corporate Behavior Overseas, 38 CoiuM. J.L. & SoC. PROBS. 321, 346
(2005).
2012]1 157
158 NOTE DAME JOURNAL OF IAW' ETHICS & PUBLIC POLI(CY [Vol. 26
as general templates that relieve firms from reinventing the com-
pliance wheel.17
Still, despite the human rights, critics of CCCs note that par-
ticipation rates remain low: only a small fraction of the 50,000 or
more multinational corporations explicitly include respect for
human rights in their codes of conduct, and among those that
do, few scrupulously honor their commitment." Advocates of
CCCs had anticipated that the same techniques that moved cor-
porations to adopt CCCs would induce them to comply, and that
violations could be successfully minimized and addressed with
the threat and use of shame-based punishment." However, as
others have noted, without a legal obligation to adopt CCCs it is
perhaps difficult to understand why a corporation that has not
yet been subjected to media assault or boycotts, whether by virtue
of its size or its stealth, would feel compelled to create and imple-
ment a CCC.
Further criticisms have been leveled at CCCs and the firms
that adopt them. Some commentators describe the human
rights obligations in CCCs as underdeveloped and abstract, par-
ticularly in comparison to more robust conceptions under devel-
opment in intergovernmental fora." Others fault the lack of
effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. While
NGOs are actively engaged in monitoring, the entities best situ-
ated to gauge compliance are corporations themselves. How-
ever, as a general rule corporations are biased and unlikely to
report conditions accurately7 1 and are subject to few, if any,
effective sanctions for failing to do so." Still others have ques-
tioned whether certification and compliance is redundant,
67. Id. at 345.
68. See Daniel Litvin, A Strategy for Business and Human Rights: Raising
Human Rights Standards in the Private Sector, 139 FOREIGN Pot'v 68, 69 (2003)
(assessing firm compliance with CCC provisions on human rights).
69. See Peter A. French, The Hester Prynne Sanction, in BUSINEss ETHICS,
supra note 4, at 276, 281-84 (describing the mobilization of shame to alter cor-
porate behavior as the "Hester Prynne Sanction" after the protagonist of
Nathaniel Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter).
70. Williams & Conley, supra note 19, at 86-87.
71. See Simaika, supra note 66, at 344 ("Although many MNCs routinely
provide information through websites or other reports ... there are no require-
ments pertaining to the type or quantity of information supplied . . . [and]
[a]ny information supplied . . . is also difficult to verify because ... the corpora-
tions are single-handedly gathering and disseminating the data.").
72. Julia Fisher, Note, Free Speech to Have Sweatshops? How Kasky v. Nike
Might Provide a Useful Tool to Improve Sweatshop Conditions, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 267, 286 (2006). For a critical examination of the coherence and utility of
CCCs and an analysis of their effects on corporate conduct, see JANET DINE,
COMPANIES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RiGHTs 226-49 (2005).
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expensive, and insufficiently rewarding of "superior" corpora-
tions genuinely committed to honoring CCCs yet inadequate and
ineffective in the case of "laggard" corporations that are not so
committed." NGO frustration with outcomes associated with
CCCs has led some to conclude that voluntarism alone is inade-
quate and that legislation mandating corporate disclosure of
compliance information is necessary to mobilize shame as an
instrument to steer corporations back into compliance. 7 4 Still
others have lost faith in voluntarism entirely, opting in favor of
litigation.
2. Litigate: The Alien Tort Claims Act
By the early 2000s, NGOs had lost hope that CCCs and mon-
itoring efforts alone could bring social sanctions to bear upon
corporations sufficient to compel them to behave in a manner
more protective of human rights. Accordingly, NGOs, with the
assistance of the U.S. plaintiffs' bar and inspiration from legal
scholars,75 changed strategies and substituted the imposition of
judicially enforceable liability for violations of purported human
rights as a means to buttress CCCs and reform corporate con-
duct. With ATCA7 ' as the basis for jurisdiction, resort to litiga-
tion to adjudicate claims brought by alien plaintiffs alleging the
commission of human rights-based torts by or with the complicity
of corporations subject to the personal jurisdiction of U.S. fed-
eral courts-a tactic never before employed-became the pri-
mary instrumentality of this new strategy.7 7 NGOs anticipated
that such suits would yield significant monetary damages for
plaintiffs, which, in turn, would create a deterrent effect causing
73. See, e.g., Terlaak, supra note 63, at 978-80.
74. See Simaika, supra note 66, at 346-47 (discussing proposals for legisla-
tion that would create a central database and require corporations to submit
compliance data electronically as a means of enhancing compliance and mak-
ing the use of shame more effective).
75. See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, Coporations and Human Rights: A Theory of
Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 488 (2001) ("If states and international
organizations can accept rights and duties of corporations in some areas, there
is no theoretical bar to recognizing duties more broadly, including duties in the
human rights area.").
76. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
77. See Donald J. Kochan, No Longer Little Known But Now a Door Ajar: An
Overview of the Evolving and Dangerous Role of the Alien Tort Statute in Human Rights
and International Law fuisprudence, 8 CHAP. L. REv. t03, 111 (2005) (noting that
the first use of ATCA to gain jurisdiction over corporations for torts committed
against aliens abroad was the product of "some lawyers th [inking] out of the
box").
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corporations to alter their practices and provide a higher stan-
dard of care to potential victims of human rights violations."
ATCA, which grants federal courts subject matter jurisdic-
tion in tort, provided an alien plaintiff can demonstrate a viola-
tion of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States, was
used successfully only twice prior to the 1980 case of Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, when two Paraguayan citizens successfully sued a for-
mer Paraguayan police inspector general for the torture and
murder of a relative.7 9 Between 1980 and 2002, various jurisdic-
tions allowed suits alleging genocide, summary execution, tor-
ture, and other serious human rights violations to proceed
against state actors and some natural persons with ATCA as the
basis for jurisdiction."o However, it was not until 2002, when the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld subject matter jurisdic-
tion in the case of Doe v. Unocal Corp.,"' and held that under
existing international law, corporations and other non-state
actors could be found liable in tort for committing or for aiding
and abetting breaches of international human rights standards,
including forced labor, murder, rape, and torture, 82 committed
78. See Igor Fuks, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Future of ATCA Litiga-
tion: Examining Bonded Labor Claims and Corporate Liability, 106 Cotum. L. Rvv.
112, 116-18 (2006) (suggesting that post-litigation, a corporation will be more
risk-averse and more likely to pressure its host government to uphold human
rights in order to prevent future liability).
79. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
80. In Kadic v. Karadiid, the court concluded that ATCA dispensed with a
state action requirement in limited circumstances, such as when the plaintiff
alleged piracy, slavery, and war crimes. 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995).
Although the case expanded the set of potential subjects of ATCA claims, it did
not explicitly draw corporations into the jurisdictional ambit of ATCA, and it
did not dispense with a state action requirement in regard to claims of "lesser"
violations of human rights. Id.
81. In Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 939-42 (9th Cir. 2002), plain-
tiffs-fourteen Burmese villagers-alleged that, in the course of constructing a
pipeline the plaintiffs opposed through their village, Unocal induced the Bur-
mese government to engage in a series of human rights violations, including
forced labor, murder, rape, and torture, in order to facilitate the completion of
the pipeline. Id.
82. The distinction between direct commission of violations of human
rights andl aiding and abetting violations by third parties either in joint venture
with the corporation or acting as agents on its behalf is a technical point of law
that is beyond the scope of the present Article. It is sufficient to note that the
language of ATCA does not expressly provide for aiding and abetting liability.
For a discussion of this distinction, see generally Daniel Diskin, Note, The Histor-
ical and Modern Foundations for Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort
Statute, 47 ARaz. L. Rtv. 805 (2005). The vast majority of claims allege corporate
aiding and abetting rather than direct commission of harms. Id. Similarly, the
legal issues of whether a parent corporation can be held liable for the acts of its
subsidiaries, as well as what precisely constitutes "joint action" or "ratification"
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by state agents with whom they were in conspiracy or from whom
they had received significant aid or support.8 3
Encouraged by the Unocal decision NGOs hailed as a
"remarkable victory not just for the plaintiffs involved, but for the
effort to hold corporations responsible for their participation in
atrocities abroad and at home in the name of shareholder prof-
its,"84 NGOs turned to ATCA as their "chief weapon in a 21st-
century battle over corporate responsibility"" and filed scores of
suits against corporations for a host of alleged violations of inter-
national human rights law."6 However, significant doctrinal
uncertainty over precisely what torts were actionable under
ATCA developed over the decades following Filartiga. Courts and
commentators divided, with some suggesting that only the most
serious violations of human rights-murder, slavery, rape, tor-
ture, and forced labor-were within the jurisdiction of federal
courts, while others took a much more expansive view, maintain-
ing that new torts could be judicially discovered as international
law evolves through custom," a position that, if unchecked,
could have led to a "veritable cornucopia of international law
violations.""
by a corporation of a state's actions, while of great consequence in individual
cases, are well beyond the scope of the present Article.
83. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 961.
84. See Mark D. Kielsgard, Unocal and the Demise of Corporate Neutrality, 36
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 185, 189 (2005) (quoting attorneys from the Center for Con-
stitutional Rights, a human rights NGO).
85. Patti Waldmeir, An Abuse of Power: US Courts should not Punish Compa-
nies for Human Rights Violations Committed Over-seas, FIN. TIMEs, Mar. 14, 2003, at
12.
86. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karad2it, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (genocide);
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (torture);
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (crimes against humanity); Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp.
2d 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (summary execution); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., No. 96 CIV. 8386(KMW), 2002 WL 319887 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002) (arbi-
trary detention); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
(same). Additional suits have been filed against Abercrombie & Fitch, BP,
Chevron, Coca-Cola, Del-Monte, Dole, Drummond Coal, DynCorp, Exx-
onMobil, Ford, Freeport-McMoran, Inc., The Gap, The J.C. Penney Co., Levi
Strauss, Newmont Mining Corp., Nike, Occidental Petroleum, Pfizer, Rio Tinto,
Shell, Siemens, Southern Peru Copper Co., Target, Texaco, TotalFinaElf,
Union Carbide, Unocal, and several others. See, e.g., Diskin, supra note 82, at
807 (listing cases and providing detailed citations).
87. For a detailed discussion of the various doctrinal approaches to
ATCA, see Prussia, supra note 11, at 396-98.
88. In re South African Apartheid Legislation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 548
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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Worse still from the NGO viewpoint: as of 2004 plaintiffs had
not prevailed in pre-trial arguments in a single case of the more
than thirty-eight filed, alleging violations ranging from environ-
mental degradation, to forced labor conditions, collaboration
with the Nazis, profiting from apartheid, production of danger-
ous drugs, and corporate collusion with brutal and repressive
military and paramilitary forces." Twenty-three had been dis-
missed on jurisdictional or prudential grounds,"' others had only
uncertain futures, and not a single corporation had been found
liable."' The only beacon of hope, a $20,000,000 settlement in
December 2004 in the Unocal case, was soon darkened by a case
heard by the Supreme Court in 2004 that severely restricted the
utility of ATCA to human rights NGOs.
With Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 2 the United States Supreme
Court, in its first-ever pronouncement on ATCA, curtailed its
scope to breaches of international law norms that are as definite
and generally accepted as the 18th-century paradigm that Con-
gress embraced and expressed in enacting the statute-specifi-
cally, piracy and violation of ambassadorial and diplomatic safe-
conduct." Although the Court did not suggest that human
rights NGOs had yet twisted federal courts into "debating clubs
for professors willing to argue over what is or what is not an
accepted violation of the law of nations,"94 the holding was
immediately hailed by corporate counsels as a "sound rejection"
of the way NGOs had been using ATCA."
However, the Sosa decision did not reduce the risk of litiga-
tion faced by corporations to zero. While the Court created a
narrower basis for liability, and noted that Congress remains pos-
sessed of the power to withdraw subject matter jurisdiction over
ATCA claims entirely by amending or eliminating ATCA," at the
89. See Sandra Coliver, Jennie Green & Paul Hoffman, Holding Human
Rights Violators Accountable by Using International Law in U.S. Courts: Advocacy
Efforts and Complementary Strategies, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 169, 209-13 (2005)
(examining and cataloguing cases); Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Bal-
ances: The Bush Administration's Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV.
Hum. RTs. J. 169 (2004) (same).
90. Williams & Conley, supra note 19, at 82-83 (surveying litigation histo-
ries of human rights ATCA cases and grounds for dismissal of such cases).
91. See Simaika, supra note 66, at 337-39 (updating the status of outstand-
ing ATCA claims as of 2005).
92. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
93. Id. at 724.
94. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 827 (Robb, J.,
concurring).
95. See Kochan, supra note 77, at 104 (quoting Daniel Petrocelli, counsel
for Unocal).
96. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731.
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same time it rejected the still narrower proposition advanced by
several business organizations and the Bush Administration that
the underlying causes of action must be established by Congress
before they are cognizable in federal courts. 7 Moreover, the
Court also recognized that the causes of action that can be heard
under ATCA may well continue to be extended by "further inde-
pendent judicial recognition" whenever a customary interna-
tional law norm becomes sufficiently definite, clearly applicable
to private actors, universal among civilized nations, and
obligatory."
In short, although corporations were relieved of some
degree of ATCA liability as a result of the Sosa decision, the Sosa
Court expressly reserved to the federal judiciary the power to
adjudicate international human rights claims against corpora-
tions and to re-extend the scope of potential corporate liability
should NGOs be able to satisfy the conditions of definiteness,
applicability, universality, and the obligatory nature of the tort(s)
in question. Recognizing that Sosa did not affect the general lim-
itation on corporate liability for which they had hoped and which
they had initially believed to have been created, business organi-
zations rushed to lobby Congress, seeking legislation that would
limit the scope of ATCA by statute-a fact that "hearten [ed]
those activists who still harbor hope of enhanced remedies.""
Post-Sosa ATCA cases, however, have failed to generate more
cogent and consistent standards for and sources of laws creating
corporate liability for human rights violations. This is particu-
larly true when the allegation is not that corporate defendants
were directly liable but that they aided and abetted or conspired
97. See Fuks, supra note 78, at 120-21 (outlining the Bush Administra-
tion's position on ATCA).
98. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729.
99. Simaika, supra note 66, at 339. Some commentators read Sosa even
more favorably for prospective plaintiffs and suggest that Congress could rem-
edy residual deficiencies in ATCA by amending it or by enacting a new statute
that would create a cause of action and impose specific substantive legal liability
on corporations for human rights violations committed abroad either directly
or indirectly by governments acting in concert with corporations. See, e.g.,
Anthony Bernard, Note, Holding Corporations Liable in the United States for Aiding
and Abetting Human Rights Violations Abroad: A Statutory Solution, 78 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 615 (2010). An ATCA case recently filed by the American Civil Liberties
Union with the help of the Yale Law School Human Rights Clinic alleging com-
plicity by a subsidiary of the Boeing Corporation in the commission of kidnap-
ping, arbitrary detention, and torture while rendering a terrorist suspect on
behalf of the CIA in the War on Terror bears watching as one that might
destabilize the current jurisprudential equilibrium. See Complaint, Mohamed v.
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. C
07CV2798), 2007 WL 1623289.
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with government tortfeasors.""' Doctrinal confusion persists, and
the prospect that federal courts may find that ATCA does not
permit indirect liability looms large."" To date, of over fifty cor-
porate ATCA cases filed, only three have been tried, and the
plaintiff has prevailed in but one,o 2 with verdicts for corporate
defendants establishing restrictive substantive limits on indirect
liability,"" requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate exhaustion of
domestic remedies as a precursor to subject matter jurisdic-
tion, 104 and otherwise eroding the utility of ATCA litigation as a
strategy. At best, the future of ATCA legislation and that of anal-
ogous legislation in foreign jurisdictions as a strategic approach
to enhancing corporate accountability for human rights is and
will remain uncertain. 0 5 Accordingly, it is unsurprising that
100. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582
F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 2009). For an analysis of recent doctrinal developments
in ATCA, see generally Bernard, supra note 99.
101. SeeJudith Chomsky, Will the Real ATS Please Stand Up?, 33 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 461, 474 (2010) (reviewing recent ATCAjurisprudence and
concluding that judicial contraction of the cause of action created by ATCA is a
real possibility).
102. In Jama v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, plaintiffs-
aliens detained in an INS facility pending adjudication of their asylum status-
prevailed at trial in a suit against the defendant corporation that operated the
detention center for the INS alleging inadequate living conditions, torture, and
other human rights violations. 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 386 (D.N.J. 2004). For an
examination of the procedural and substantive history of corporate ATCA cases,
see Beth Stephens, Judicial Deference and the Unreasonable Views of the Bush Admin-
istration, 33 BROOKJ. INT'L. L. 773 (2008).
103. See Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1092-95 (N.D.
Cal. 2008); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2007 WL 2349336, at
*15-18 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2007) (finding Chevron Corporation not liable
under aiding and abetting, conspiracy, or agency theories for torture commit-
ted by the Nigerian military).
104. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 824 (9th Cir. 2008) (hold-
ing that ATCA claims "are appropriately considered for exhaustion under both
domestic prudential standards and core principles of international law.").
105. See, e.g., Chinane I. Keitner, The Politics of Corporate Alien Tort Cases,
PviiE. L. Riv. ONINE (forthcoming 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1876746
(suggesting that "advocates concerned with modifying future corporate behav-
ior might achieve better overall outcomes by focusing on strategies beyond
AT[CA] litigation."). Although a handful of other states have implementing
legislation similar to ATCA, results have been as poor from the NGO point of
view in those jurisdictions. See, e.g., Peter Muchlinski, Corporations in Interna-
tional Litigation: Problems ofJurisdiction and the United Kingdom Asbestos Case, 50
INT'L & Comur. L.Q. 1 (2001) (describing doctrinal and other obstacles to using
international law to litigate human rights and environmental claims in the UK);
see also PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAw (2d ed.
2007) (same). For a detailed examination of the domestic incorporation of
international legal norms in domestic courts to address alleged violations of
international human rights by corporate defendants, see generally Robert
BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL
NGOs began to turn outward at the turn of the millennium in an
attempt to transcend the limitations of state sovereignty and of
domestic legal regimes. 106
3. Regulate: "Soft Law"
Although ATCA litigation in U.S. courts is presently insuffi-
cient to generate the level of corporate regulation sought by
NGOs, ATCA is a far more potent legal weapon than is available
to human rights NGOs in the judicial systems of virtually every
other nation, and Congress and the federal judiciary retain the
power to expand corporate ATCA liability. For this reason, and
because many multinational corporation ("MNCs") are head-
quartered or do significant business in the U.S., the U.S. remains
the litigation forum of choice for NGOs. However, with MNCs
astute enough to shift resources and operations beyond the
reach of U.S. jurisdiction, particularly if ATCA liability is
expanded, MNCs might well relocate their citizenship to more
abuse-tolerant jurisdictions where they are free to operate with
much greater disregard for human rights. The threat that MNCs
will slip into a legal "black hole"'07 to evade duties to protect
human rights spurred NGOs to create a "new governance"
regime designed to transcend the short-armed reach of domestic
legal orders, overcome the regulatory vacuum created by the
absence of a global sovereign, and propound declarations of uni-
versal norms protective of human rights whether through the
political process, market pressure, or judicial enforcement.
The "new governance" paradigm recognizes that in the era
of globalization the power to regulate-once the sole province of
states-is now fragmented, diffused, and contested.' 08 Because
state regulation and corporate self-regulation have failed to
achieve NGO objectives regarding corporate human rights prac-
tice, advocates of more effective regulation have labored to weave
together various social, cultural, and political movements-in
McCorquodale, Towards More Effective Legal Implementation of Corporate Accounta-
bility for Violations of Human Rights, 103 Am. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 288 (2009). For
a discussion of the doctrinal and political uncertainty surrounding the future of
ATCA litigation, see Donald J. Kochan, Legal Mechanization of Corporate Social
Responsibility Through Alien Tort Statute Litigation: A Response to Professor Branson
with Some Supplemental Thoughts, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INTL'iL L. 251 (2011).
106. For an examination of the NGO shift from law toward regulation,
see Christiana Ochoa, Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Compliance: Lessons
from the International Law-International Relations Discourse, 9 SANTA CLARA J.
INT'L L. 169 (2011).
107. Fuks, supra note 78, at 132-33.
108. See Williams & Conley, supra note 19, at 101 (describing the effect of
globalization on state regulatory power vis-a-vis corporations).
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particular well-funded and well-organized NGOs, labor unions,
civil society associations, etc.-that seek to affect both the "char-
acter and independence of [corporations] and the power of
nation-states to regulate these entities."'" NGOs and a wide array
of private entities have seized upon the relative weakening of
nation-states to insert themselves into the regulatory process and
draw that process out of the direct control of states into transna-
tional fora where, by strategically deploying information, they
"generate compilations of best practices, codes of conduct, and
templates for everything," including corporate responsibilities
for the protection of human rights.'"' Although they lack the
power that states enjoy to coerce corporations through binding
law, NGOs have produced several important declarations of
human rights norms with the character of "quasi-regulations" or
"soft law" that may well transform the expectations of consumers,
investors, states, and even corporations regarding corporate con-
duct in the issue-area of human rights. The most important of
these declarations are the Global Compact,'' the Norms, the
Global Reporting Initiative, and the Framework.
a. Global Compact
In a 1999 address to the World Economic Forum in Davos,
Switzerland, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan
launched a UN initiative designed to induce corporations to
reject complicity in human rights violations.'' 2 The resulting
Global Compact ("Compact") created an informal alliance of
corporations, UN agencies, NGOs, and other civil society organi-
zations to "embrace, support and enact, within their sphere of
influence," nine human rights, labor, environmental protection,
and anti-corruption principles.'" Human rights protection
figures prominently in the Compact: Principle 1 states that
" [b] usinesses should support and respect the protection of inter-
nationally proclaimed human rights," while Principle 2 requires
109. Larry Cati Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The
United Nations' Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Har-
binger of Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 37 Coi.um. Humt. RTS.
L. Rx. 287, 309-10 (2006).
110. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information
Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MIH. J. INT'l. L. 1041, 1057 (2003).
111. United Nations, The Ten Principles of the Global Compact, THI- GL.O1AI.
COMPACT, http://www.uinglobalcompact.org/AboitTheGC/TheTenPrinci
ples/index.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
112. Press Release, Security-General, Secretary-General Proposes Global
Compact on Human Rights, Labour, Environment, in Address to World Eco-
nomic Forum in Davos, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/6881 (Feb. 1, 1999).
113. See The Ten Principles of the Global Compact, supra note 111.
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that corporations "make sure that they are not complicit in
human rights abuses.""'
Although the Compact principles lack detail, the Compact,
launched in July 2000, stands as the world's largest corporate citi-
zenship initiative, with more than 4,858 companies from over
100 countries, and 136 of the Financial Times Global 500, having
declared their membership as of March 2011.1i5 At the very
least, corporate members that have acceded to the Compact can-
not in good faith claim to be acting consistent with Principles 1
and 2 if they enter into business relationships with states that sys-
tematically engage in massive human rights violations. In fact,
they may be encumbered with the duty to divest from such
nations, at least until their human rights practices improve.
What is more, although the Compact and its Principles do not
possess the status of international law because they are not yet
evidence of the custom of states nor are they the product of
international treaty," 6 the Compact has induced corporations to
voluntarily accede to a body of principles identified, dissemi-
nated, and promoted primarily by NGOs. By using their increas-
ing powers of moral suasion and establishing information
networks to guide corporations toward compliance with the
Compact,"' NGOs envision producing a "new kind of actor-the
114. Id.
115. See United Nations, UN Global Compact Participants, THE GLOBAL COM-
PACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/index.
html (last updated July 28, 2011) (providing a list of prominent members
including BP, Royal Dutch/Shell Group, Total, Allianz, Volkswagen, Siemens,
Hewlett-Packard, Nissan Motors, Unilever, BMW, Toshiba, NEC, Nokia, Bayer,
Indian Oil, Volvo, L'Oreal, Pfizer, Novartis, Coca-Cola, Cisco Systems, BHP Bil-
liton, Lufthansa Group, Electrolux, Gap, Xerox, Hindustan Petroleum, Henkel,
and Westpac Banking); see also United Nations, UN Global Compact Bulletin, THE
GiOBAL COMPAcr, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/NewsAndEvents/UNGC
bulletin/june_2011.html (June 10, 2011) (stating that as of March 2012, the
Global Compact has received 8,338 Communications on Progress from more
than 5,000 members).
116. A discussion of the sources of international law and of the process
whereby customary international law is formed and recognized is well beyond
the scope of the present Article. It suffices to note simply that the principle of
state consent forms the basis for the contemporary international legal order
and that the voluntary acceptance of obligations by non-state actors such as
corporations, while evidence of the development of custom, is not dispositive of
the question even where such obligations are intended by the non-state actors
to be legally binding. For a discussion on the effects of declarations by corpora-
tions such as the Compact on the formation of customary international human
rights law, see Jan Arno Hessbruegge, Human Rights Violations Arising from Con-
duct of Non-State Actors, 11 Bure. Hum. RTs. L. REv. 21, 37-38 (2005).
117. Over 200 NGOs have advocated creation of an "International Right
to Know" ("IRTK") monitoring and transparency program that would require
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potentially 'socially responsible corporation'-that may adhere
to these [principles] not because of the manipulation of incen-
tives, but rather because of a new self-understanding."' " In
effect, NGOs hope to resocialize corporations and transform
their characters so that compliance with the Compact is per-
ceived to be within the corporate self-interest.
However, critics of the Compact fear that its reach and its
influence have both been overstated. Seventy-four percent of the
Financial Times 500 global corporations have not yet become
members,'"' and several Compact participants-including Coca-
Cola, BHP, Shell, L'Oreal, and Cisco-have been the subject of
ATCA litigation or public boycotts over policies and actions
alleged to violate the Principles.' 2" In view of practice subse-
quent to membership, some suspect that corporations have
latched onto the Compact primarily as a marketing tool to
"bluewash" their reputations or images and pacify stakeholders,
as well as to shield continued bad conduct regarding human
rights. Moreover, many corporations have declined to accept
membership in the Compact out of a fear that alleged noncom-
pliance with its Principles will result in litigation. UN officials
corporations headquartered or raising capital in the U.S. to disclose informa-
tion about their overseas human rights practices and submit such information
to a central database maintained by the U.S. Department of State. By making
the process of monitoring and the deployment of shame in response to bad
corporate practice more efficient, the IRTK project, according to NGOs, will
enhance the success of other projects such as the Compact. See, e.g., IRTK CAM-
PAIGN, INTERNATIONAi RIGHT To KNow (2003), available at http://www.earth
rights.org/sites/default/files/publications/international-right-to-know.pdf.
118. Williams & Conley, supra note 19, at 102-03 (quoting Michael Bar-
nett & Raymond Duvall, Power in International Politics, 59 INT'l.. ORG. 39, 61
(2005)).
119. Prominent nonmember corporations as of March 2011 include
AMP, Bank of China, Boeing, British Airways, British American Tobacco,
Canon, Chevron Texaco, China China Mobile Communications, Chinese Petro-
leum, Chubb, Citigroup, Coles Myer, Dell, Dow Chemicals, DuPont, Exxon
Mobil, FedEx, Ford Motor, General Electric, General Motors, Halliburton,
Hilton Group, Hitachi, Honda Motor, Hyundai Motor, ING Group, Johnson &
Johnson, Kingfisher, LG Electronics, Life Insurance, McDonald's, Microsoft,
Mitsubishi, Motorola, National Australia Bank, PepsiCo, Procter & Gamble,
Reliance Industries, Samsung Electronics, Sharp, Sinopec, Sony, Spirit, Target,
Telstra, Toyota Motor, Vodafone, Wal-Mart, Walt Disney, Whirlpool, and Wool-
worths. For a list of all participants, see TM, GLOBAl. COMPACr, supra note I11.
120. Several corporations, including Coca-Cola, that are non-members of
the Compact are members of the Business Leaders Institute on Human Rights
("BLIHR"), an organization dedicated to "find[ing] practical ways of imple-
menting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in a business context" and
"to implement[ing] these practices in our own organizations, sectors and value
chains around the world." See BUSINESs LiADERS INITIATIVE ON HUMAN RICTHTS,
http://www.blihr.org (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
2BEYOND GOO) AND EVIL
responsible for administration of the Compact are nonplussed,
stating that "the Global Compact is neither a regulatory mecha-
nism nor a seal of approval for the performance of those partici-
pating in it" but noting also that a "study by the consulting firm
McKinsey & Company . . . found that, in several important
respects, the Global Compact has already been a significant force
for positive change.""2 ' At the very least, all agree that the Com-
pact has not generated the transformative effects its sponsors
anticipated.
b. The Norms
In 1998, the UN Subcommission for the Protection of
Human Rights ("Subcommission"), a specialized agency of the
United Nations system, established a working group to examine
the conduct of MNCs.' 2 2 After five years of debates, the Subcom-
mission approved the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transna-
tional Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard
to Human Rights, known as the "Norms."'2 1
Substantively, the Norms assert that corporations are
charged with human rights obligations no matter where they
operate, including duties to refrain from engaging in or "bene-
fit[ting] from war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide,
torture, forced disappearance, forced ... labour, [and] hostage-
taking." 24 Moreover, the Norms propound a far broader set of
"obligations" than the duty to refrain from committing the most
serious human rights violations; other provisions would require
corporations, as part of their human rights practices, to act
affirmatively to "contribute to [the] realization" of such rights as
"the rights to development, adequate food and drinking water,
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health,
adequate housing, privacy, education, freedom of thought, con-
science, and religion and freedom of opinion and expression,
121. Kielsgard, supra note 84, at 202 (quoting letter from John Ruggie,
Special Advisor to the Sec'y Gen. and George Kell, Exec. Head of the Global
Compact, Office of Sec'y Gen., to Michael Posner, Executive Dir. Of Human
Rights First (June 22, 2004)).
122. United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm'n on the Promo-
tion & Prot. of Human Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Norms on
the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enter-
prises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2
(Aug. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Norms].
123. United Nations, Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Draft Provisional Agenda and
Adoption of the Report, 52, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/L.11 (Aug. 14,
2003).
124. Norms, supra note 122, 3.
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and shall refrain from actions which obstruct or impede the reali-
zation of those rights."12 5
Procedurally, the Norms require the incorporation of their
provisions into all MNC contracts and require disclosure of infor-
mation regarding compliance.' 2" They prohibit corporations
from doing business with natural or legal persons who do not
"follow these or substantially similar norms" unless corporations
electing to do business with such entities "[successfully] work
with them to reform or decrease violations." 12' The Norms cre-
ate a monitoring network consisting of states, NGOs, and UN
specialized agencies, and require corporations to be responsive
to complaints about violations of the Norms lodged by "non-gov-
ernmental organizations, unions, individuals and others"; 121
moreover, the Norms call upon states to "establish and reinforce
the necessary legal and administrative framework for ensuring
that the Norms . . . are implemented" by corporations within
their jurisdiction.' 2 1 In effect, the "entire population of the
globe" 3 1 can report violations in the event of which Paragraph
18 obligates corporations to "provide prompt, effective and ade-
quate reparation to those persons, entities and communities that
have been adversely affected by failures to comply with these
Norms.""'
Conceptually, the Norms import the "stakeholder" theory of
the corporation wholesale, dismissing the shareholder model of
governance entirely and defining stakeholders to include "stock-
holders, other owners, workers and their representatives, as well
as any other individual or group that is affected by the activities
of transnational corporations or other business enterprises."1 12
So long as an individual or entity can claim to be "substantially
affected by the activities [of a given corporation] "-a low thresh-
old that excludes almost no claimants-stakeholder status is
established. Accordingly, the set of potential stakeholders who
are entitled to exert governance rights over corporations, by
operation of the Norms, is extensively broadened to include
125. Id. 1 12.
126. Id. 15.
127. United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm'n on the Promo-
tion of Human Rights, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Commentary on
the Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and Other Busi-
ness Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/
2003/38/Rev.2 I 15(c) (Aug. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Commentary on Norms].
128. Id. I 16(b).
129. Id. 1 17.
130. Backer, supra note 109, at 385 (citing Norms, supra note 122).
131. Commentary on Norms, supra note 127, 1 18.
132. Id. 22.
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"consumer groups, customers, [g]overnments, neighbouring
communities, indigenous peoples and communities, non-govern-
mental organizations, public and private lending institutions,
suppliers, trade associations and others."' The putative effect
of the Norms in derogation from the shareholder model, which
has long dominated the theory and practice of corporations, is
profound and unprecedented.
Taken together, the procedural and conceptual effects of
the Norms are difficult to overstate. Corporations are no longer
regarded as primarily private economic entities subject to public
regulation by states: on the contrary, the Norms cast them as
quasi-public entities with social, cultural, and political objectives
no less and perhaps even more important than their economic
objectives. In effect, the Norms purport to transfer the source of
authority to regulate corporations from states to NGO-led inter-
national civil society and then proclaim that the primary purpose
of corporations is no longer to maximize profits but to function
as important public agents co-equal to the state in terms of the
power and the obligation to protect and promote human rights.
Ironically, the great transformation of corporate regulation from
the private to the public realm and the shift in purpose from
private to public has been championed by private entities-
NGOs-who are at least as lacking in democratic accountability
and in public representation as the corporations they have
targeted.114
Legally, the Norms' proposals to alter the source of author-
ity for corporate regulation and the social purposes of corpora-
tions have important implications. The Norms, although farther
afield from the voluntarism of the Compact, 3 5 are nonbind-
ing,'3 6 and yet they challenge existing corporate theory and prac-
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Backer, supra note 109, at 387 (noting the irony of the
Norms' monitoring scheme that "[u]s[es] one portion of a large community of
transnational non-state actors to perform a critical role in the disciplining of
another portion of that community, without subjecting the monitors themselves
to the same sort of discipline"). For a detailed criticism of the procedural and
conceptual effects of the Norms on corporate governance and on the publiciza-
tion of corporate purpose, and an argument that the Norms "perver[t] ... the
corporation's function" and lead to an "abdication of responsibility by the state"
in favor of unaccountable, anti-democratic NGOs, see id. at 356-74.
135. Many commentators regard the Norms as occupying a middle
ground between the voluntarism of the Compact and the hard law desired by
NGOs. See Hessbruegge, supra note 116, at 37-38 (gauging commentators'
assessments of the legal force of the Norms in relation to the Compact).
136. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights has determined that the
Norms currently have no legal standing, despite claims from proponents that
the Norms simply codify existing international law. Tracy M. Schmidt, Com-
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tice. While the Norms' prohibitions against the most serious
violations of human rights, such as extrajudicial killing, torture,
and forced labor, are almost universally held to be restatements
of existing international law, the proclaimed affirmative corpo-
rate duties to promote development, health, education, and gen-
eral welfare are generally regarded by states and commentators
as having little or no legal effect.'37 In brief, with the exception
of a narrow range of serious human rights offenses such as tor-
ture, extrajudicial killing, rape, slavery, and other violations col-
orable as "crimes against humanity," international human rights
law is only binding on national governments. In other words,
corporations and other private actors are not objects of interna-
tional human rights obligations unless national governments
adopt and implement international human rights law through
domestic legislation such as ATCA."'
Still, many advocates of the Norms envision their use as "soft
law" possessed, if not of legal force, of political significance suffi-
cient to influence domestic and international courts as well as
national legislatures in interpreting existing corporate regula-
tions more expansively and in fashioning new and more restric-
ment, Transnational Corporate Responsibility for International Environmental and
Human Rights Violations: Will the United Nations' "Norms" Provide the Required
Means?, 36 CAL. W. INT'l L.J. 217, 238 (2006). Very little international legal
precedent exists for regulating corporations, and nearly all of what is asserted as
international law is in fact hortatory or aspirational expressions. See generally
LIAliLITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL. LAW
(Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000). Presently, "most govern-
ments appear to remain somewhat ambivalent about accepting corporate
duties . . . toward individuals in states where they operate." Ratner, supra note
75, at 488.
137. See, e.g., Backer, supra note 109, at 340 (discussing the legal effect of
the Norms under international law). Recall that a detailed discussion of the
process by which international legal obligations are created through custom is
well beyond the scope of the present Article.
138. See Robert McCorquodale, Human Rights and Global Business, in COM-
MERCIAl. LAW AND HUMAN RicHTs 89, 94 (Stephen Bottomley & David Kinley
eds., 2002) (discussing in depth the applicability of international human rights
law to corporations); see alsoJFNNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE.
SOCIAL. ResP oNsIIITY: LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2006). For a discussion of the history of international law with regard to cor-
porate civil and criminal liability for human rights violations, see David Kinley &
Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for
Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT'l. L.. 931, 993-94 (2004). For a
critique of the existing international law of corporate responsibility and state
practice regarding international legal incorporation as ineffective to protect
human rights, see DINE, supra note 72, at 68-76. See also id. at 168 ("Perhaps the
most obvious difficulty is that companies have no place in international law,
including international human rights law, as the primacy of nation states is so
important.").
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tive regimes;1 39 others, labeled as "maximalists," argue that
because the Norms incorporate extensive implementation and
reparations provisions they are more than simply voluntary
undertakings and, accordingly, international law and institu-
tions-including regional human rights courts and the Interna-
tional Criminal Court ("ICC")-can and should be used to bind
corporations to existing international legal obligations that are
simply restated in the Norms.14 0 A series of commentaries to
Paragraphs 1 through 12 of the Norms proposes that corporate
violations of obligations listed therein as well as violations of
human rights provisions of the Rome Statute of the ICC constitute crimi-
nal offenses-corporate and individual..' Although the maximalist
position is a minority and arguably radical view, it is clear that
proponents of the Norms have not proffered them in the spirit
of voluntarism, nor have they evinced an interest in generating
the corporate partnerships that occupy the core of CCCs as well
139. See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 136, at 240 (noting that the declaration
of "soft law," particularly in the domain of human rights, is often the first step
in the creation of customary international binding law as states gradually incor-
porate soft law within their practice out of a sense of legal obligation); see also
Kielgard, supra note 84, at 199-201 (noting that soft law "starts in the form of
recommendations and over time may be viewed as interpreting treaties and
helping to establish custom or may serve as the basis for the later drafting of
treaties.") (quoting David Weissbrodt & Maria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibili-
ties of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights, 97 AM.J. INT'L L. 901, 914 (2003)). "[The Norms] [are] soft law,
but [they] provide[ ] for greater accountability and the promise of more bind-
ing norms in the future . . . Voluntarism needs to be encouraged as a resource
for corporate leaders who evince a sincere wish to abide by human rights
norms, but . .. [a] legal framework of binding norms is necessary to compli-
ment voluntarism." Id. at 212.
140. See Schmidt, supra note 136, at 233 (noting that some commentators
maintain that the Norms already represent the opinio juris of the international
community and are either already customary international law or at the very
least lexferenda). Indeed, the Norms expressly claim "that transnational corpo-
rations and other business enterprises.. have, inter alia, human rights obliga-
tions and responsibilities and that these human rights norms will contribute to
the making and development of international law as to those responsibilities
and obligations ..... Commentary on Norms, supra note 127, at pmbl. For a
discussion of the expansiveness of the maximalist position with regard to the
legal force of the Norms, see Backer, supra note 109, at 369-70.
141. See Commentary on Norms, supra note 127, 4 (requiring corpora-
tions to observe international human rights norms set forth in the Rome Stat-
ute of the ICC and other international conventions). Although no case was
ultimately prosecuted, prosecutorial interest in bringing a test case against cor-
porations operating within the Democratic Republic of Congo suggests that the
prospect of using international criminal tribunals to sanction corporations, as
the Norms contemplate, is not an idle threat. See, e.g., Julia Graff, Note, Corpo-
rate War Criminals and the International Crminal Court: Blood and Profits in the Dem-
ocratic Republic of Congo, HUM. RTs. BRIEF, Winter 2004, at 23.
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as the Compact.'4 2 Rather, the Norms appear to be an instru-
ment predicated upon the belief that voluntarism has failed and
engineered largely to bolster a litigation strategy.143
Predictably, the Norms sparked a
great divide between public sector-oriented participants-
principally academics and NGOs-and private sector or
market-oriented participants-businesses and developed
states. The former primarily argued to the Sub-Commis-
sion that the Norms represent a clear and complete
advance over existing voluntary standards for regulating
business behavior. They also suggested that the Norms
represent an advance over existing standards by providing
a single comprehensive regime drawing an appropriate
balance between the obligations of states and of companies
with respect to human rights, and by providing useful tools
for evaluating performance. More importantly, advocates
of the Norms were fond of the Norms' utility in providing a
template for State behavior-providing a framework of
standards that states ought to impose-while providing a
system of remedies for individuals, supervised by a supra-
national organization that important elements of global
civil society trust (or at least trust more than they trust
states). 4 4
In contrast, corporations concerned about the prospects of
additional legal risk and states threatened in the loss of their
power to define international law mounted strong resistance to
the Norms.1'
Politically, the Norms, by affirmation of the Commission on
Human Rights ("CHR") in April 2004, have no legal standing
142. See Schmidt, supra note 136, at 239 ("Another major difference
between the Norms and previous efforts is its terminology. When discussing
compliance, the Norms substitute standard terms like 'should' with 'shall.'
Therefore, the Norms are not merely a restatement of existing obligations, but
rather an effort to fill the voids of previous agreements and mandate certain
aspects of international [CSR].").
143. See id. (" [The Norms] ... may signify [NGOs'] unstated conclusion:
the voluntary compliance called for in previous documents is proving to be
inadequate . )... ); see also Kielsgard, supra note 84, at 203 (suggesting that the
primary utility of the Norms is to enhance litigation prospects).
144. Backer, supra note 109, at 356.
145. Id. at 382-83. See United Nations, Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-
Comm'n on the Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Report of the United Nations
High Commissioner on Human Rights on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corpora-
tions and Related Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/2005/91 (Feb. 15, 2005) (providing specific comments by corporations,
states, and other entities).
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despite their radical attempt to extend existing international law,
and are not to be monitored by UN agencies. In other words,
the Norms are simply voluntary and aspirational goals. In early
2005, the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights
produced a report recommending that the CHR "maintain the
draft Norms among existing initiatives and standards on business
and human rights, with a view to their further consideration"-
bureaucratic language indicating the effective abandonment of
any pretensions to legal status or significant political support for
the Norms.' The CHR, after considering the report, requested
the Secretary General to appoint a Special Representative on
Business and Human Rights with a broad and independent man-
date to research, develop, and compile a report on the issue of
corporation responsibility for human rights.' The Special Rep-
resentative, Professor John Ruggie, released an interim report
detailing his conclusions that the Norms are a "train wreck"'48
that have sown confusion and discord by virtue of their exagger-
ated and absolutist legal claims and conceptual and procedural
ambiguities.4 9
While the Special Representative has declared the Norms
dead, their exponents counter that the issues that gave birth to
them remain alive and well, that the Norms have "articulat[ed] a
core set of standards for going forward,""' and that the Norms
have formed the basis for future dialogue regarding mechanisms
designed to impose transnational regulatory frameworks upon
corporations in the interest of the protection of human rights,
such as the Framework.1' Moreover, having established in prin-
146. See Report of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human
Rights on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Related Busi-
ness Enterprises With Regards to Human Rights, supra note 145, 52(d).
147. See United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on Human
Rights, Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 1 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
2005/L.87 (Apr. 15, 2005).
148. John G. Ruggie, Remarks at the Forum on Corporate Social Respon-
sibility (June 14, 2006), available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Rug
gie-remarks-to-Fair-Labor-Association-and-German-Network-of-Business-Ethics-
14-June-2006.pdf.
149. See United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm'n on Human
Rights, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Interim Report
of the Secretary-General's Special Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 59, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006) [hereinafter Interim Report].
150. David Kinley, Justine Nolan & Natalie Zerial, The Politics of Corporate
Social Responsibility: Reflections on the United Nations Human Rights Norms for Corpo-
rations, 25 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 30, 31 (2007).
151. Backer, supra note 109, at 332; see infra notes 160-66 (discussing the
Framework).
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ciple the possibility of involuntary transnational regulation of
corporate conduct in regard to human rights, the Norms have
opened the door, and the position of the international commu-
nity may well soften. The Special Representative has acknowl-
edged the desirability of some of the principles elaborated in the
Norms, in particular the summary of human rights subject to
infringement by corporate activities,'5 and although he has
rejected the involuntarism that characterized their development
he has restated much of their substance in the Framework.' 5 3
Thus, defenders of the Norms are undaunted and remain opti-
mistic that the principles that animated them may yet achieve the
status of international legal obligation at some future date, and
they are patient.154 As Professor David Weissbrodt, one of the
principal authors of the Norms, explains,
[n]o one can realistically expect business human rights
standards to become the subject of treaty obligations
immediately. The development of a treaty requires a high
degree of consensus among nations. Although a few coun-
tries ... indicated their support for the Norms, as yet there
does not appear to be an international consensus on the
place of businesses and other nonstate actors in the inter-
national legal order. The Norms, like numerous other UN
recommendations and declarations . . . started as "soft"
law. As with the drafting of almost all human rights trea-
ties, the United Nations begins with declarations, princi-
ples, or other soft-law instruments. Such steps are
necessary to develop the consensus required for treaty
drafting . . . . Any treaty takes years of preliminary work
and consensus building before it has a chance of receiving
the approval necessary for adoption and entry into force.
Even soft-law instruments may take years to develop.' 5 5
In sum, the conflict over the Norms is part of an ongoing
and broader battle over the legitimate place of civil society in the
152. See Interim Report, supra note 149, 14.
153. Id. 1 15.
154. See, e.g., Troy Rule, Using "Norms" to Change International Law: UN
Human Rights Law Sneaking in through the Back Door?, 5 Ciii. J. INT'. L. 325, 326
(2004) (describing the Norms as the "first major stepping stone towards the
adoption of an international, enforceable set of legal obligations binding" on
corporations).
155. David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Current Developments: Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Regard to Human Rights, 97 Am.J. INT'l. L. 901, 914 (2003).
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promulgation of international legal standards not soon to be
resolved.' 5 6
c. Global Reporting Initiative
The Global Reporting Initiative ("GRI"),' 5 launched in the
aftermath of the collapse of the Norms, may well be on its way to
becoming the gold standard in transnational regulation of corpo-
rate human rights practice. According to the GRI, and in distinc-
tion from the Norms, the principles it adopts was "developed
through a systematic, conseus-seeking dialogue with a large net-
work of . .. stakeholder groups including business, civil society,
academia, labor and other professional institutions."15" GRI is
funded by "a large international community of Organizational
Stakeholders; [i]nstitutional grants from governments, [and]
foundations; [and] [clorporate and governmental sponsor-
ships," and as a consequence has a greater claim to voluntarism
than did the Norms. To date, over seven hundred corporations
have published reports with the GRI, including many of the firms
identified by socially responsible investment funds as among the
most committed to general principles of CSR.15 9
d. The Framework
In April 2005, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan designated
John Ruggie as his Special Representative with a mandate to
"identify and clarify standards of corporate responsibility and
accountability" and to "elaborate on the role of States" in the
development of transnational regulation."'o With his initial
report, Ruggie dismissed the Norms, drew attention to a govern-
ance gap caused by a "misalignment between economic forces
and governance capacity,"'"6 and pronounced that, despite pro-
156. For a discussion of the history of the Norms and of the future direc-
tions of international "soft law" regulation, see David Kinley & Rachel Cham-
bers, The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications ofPublic
International Law, 6 Hum. RTs. L. RFv. 447 (2006).
157. See GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, http://www.globalreporting.org
(last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
158. Id. (then follow "Reporting Framework" hyperlink, then "Document
Process" hyperlink).
159. Id. (then follow "Funding" hyperlink).
160. See Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, supra note 147, 1
1(a), (b).
161. See United Nations, Human Rights Council,John Ruggie, Implementa-
tion of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled "Human Rights
Council"; Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsi-
bility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, 1 82, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/35 (Feb. 19,
2007) [hereinafter 2007 Report].
2012] 177
178 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 26
gress, it was premature to argue that "the broad array of interna-
tional human rights attach direct legal obligations to
corporations.""' In 2008, Ruggie submitted a proposed Frame-
work to the U.N. Human Rights Council consisting of views and
recommendations in three parts: (1) state duties to protect
against third party human rights violations through enforcement
of trade practices, investment agreements, and lending arrange-
ments; (2) corporate responsibility to respect human rights
through the exercise of formal due diligence, to include human
rights impact assessments, tracking and monitoring, and other
measures; and (3) access by victims of human rights abuses to
effective remedies, both judicial and nonjudicial. "' Many com-
mentators view the three principles constituting the Framework
as largely a more realistic and better articulated restatement and
development of the Norms.
On the strength of the favorable reception of the Frame-
work, which advocates the construction of shared legal and politi-
cal responsibility for CSR as between states, corporations,
domestic constituencies, and NGOs, the Council extended the
mandate until 2011."'" In subsequent reports Ruggie has further
elaborated the three pillars, crafted more concrete standards of
corporate accountability, and advanced the process of normative
development."" However, although the Ruggie Framework is
the most comprehensive set of transnational rules, norms, and
implementation mechanisms in the CSR issue-area, it remains a
solely voluntaristic system without the power to compel, and
many states lack the technical capacity necessary to implement its
mechanisms. Increasing the effectiveness of and reducing gaps
in the regulatory regime remains, in Ruggie's own words, a "long-
term project" that will require its proponents to build broad
coalitions and to ground the regime not merely on legal enforce-
ment but upon all the "moral, social, and economic rationales
that can affect the behavior of corporations.""" At the same
162. Interim Report, supra note 149, 64.
163. Id.
164. Human Rights Council Res. 8/7, 4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/8/7
(June 18, 2008).
165. See Human Rights Council, Promotion of All Human Rights, Civil,
Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Develop-
ment, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/13 (Apr. 22, 2009); see also Human Rights Coun-
cil, John Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: Further Steps toward the
Operationalization of the "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework, U.N. Doc. A/
HRC/14/27 (Apr. 9, 2010).
166. John G. Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International
Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 819, 838-39 (2007). In March 2011, Ruggie com-
pleted his work as Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue
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time, the Framework raises concerns with corporations that disfa-
vor transnational regulation in the issue-area of CSR and oppose
the interposition of NGOs between corporations and states.
Thus, although the Framework is the brightest hope for NGOs,
the optimal governance regime has as yet evaded them.
e. Summary
NGOs now possess greater power to shape corporate con-
duct through regulation than at any time before. Even if their
engagement of transnational civil society to enhance corporate
accountability for human rights practices through voluntary and
involuntary restrictions on corporate conduct has not been as
productive as they had hoped, there appears to be little doubt
that NGOs have raised the question of corporate responsibility
for human rights to the front of international debates about CSR
and created disincentives for corporations to tolerate violations
of human rights. The shareholder model of governance has
been challenged by NGO involvement in the transnational regu-
latory process, and new constituencies have emerged to levy
claims against corporations to behave in a manner consistent
with the spirit, if not the letter, of their proposals. As one com-
mentator puts it, it is almost certainly as a direct result of human
rights NGO efforts to participate in the "new governance" regime
that
soccer moms [now] refuse to buy a famous line of soccer
balls after reading reports that they are hand sewn in Paki-
stan by children; [t]alented African-American MBA[ ] [stu-
dents] . . . will not interview with a company because it has
a poor record of promoting minorities; students ... protest
their university's licensing agreement with a sportswear
manufacturer that uses a Guatemala factory that allegedly
abuses workers; money managers [now have] clients who
refuse to invest in companies with poor environmental rat-
ings; assertive reporters . . . will call a CEO at home to ask
him if he knows the paper clips sold in his national retail
chain were made by prisoners in China; [and] indigenous
groups . . . will no longer passively accept the presence in
their ancestral lands of big oil and mining companies that
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enter-
prises with the release of Human Rights Council, John Ruggie, Guiding Princi-
ples on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect
and Remedy" Framework, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (advance
edited edition).
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exploit natural resources without coming to terms with
local communities. 67
However, as Ruggie noted in dismissing the Norms, NGOs
may well be guilty of "regulatory overstretch" in their pursuit of
involuntary transnational administrative restrictions on corpo-
rate conduct. By extending their proposals beyond measures
that would afford increased human rights protection and
demanding, in effect, that corporations submit to an NGO fiat
that would convert them from private to public actors with
expansive (and expensive) positive duties as guarantors of the
economic and physical welfare of the world, NGOs may well have
forfeited some of their credibility along with any real chance at
achieving lesser-order but attainable objectives.'"" Recognition
of this tactical error has given some NGOs pause, and some have
redirected regulatory efforts out of transnational civil society and
back into domestic legislative processes.
4. Legislate: Model Uniform Code & International Criminal
Court
A fourth strategy to formalize a broad conception of CSR for
human rights, developed in part out of frustrations with the limi-
tations of other strategies and with voluntarism more gener-
ally,"' is the exploitation of legislative opportunities, domestic as
167. Greathead, supra note 48, at 719-20. For a deeper discussion of the
concept of "new governance" in the fields of CSR specifically and transnational
regulation generally, see David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, N6 Governance
and Legal Regudation: Complenentarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, LEGAl STUD.
Ris. PAPER SERI.s No. 1047, 1 (May 2007). For an argument in support of the
continuing utility of soft law and the regulatory approach, see Kevin T.Jackson,
Global Corporate Governance: Soft Law and Reputational Accountability, 35 BRooK. J.
INT'l. L. 41 (2010).
168. A literature on the phenomenon of "regulatory unreasonableness"
and the deleterious effects that asking for too much may have upon the ulti-
mate effectiveness of any resulting regulatory agreements has grown up in the
past quarter century. Although beyond the scope of the present Article, it bears
noting that NGOs, by demanding the impossible of corporations and states in
the Norms, may have given up the possible and thus became their own worst
enemies. For a discussion of "regulatory unreasonableness," see generally
EUGE.NE BARDACH & RonERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF
REGULATORY UNREASONA',I.ENESS (1982). For a discussion of more effective
approaches to regulation that include analyses of the political and economic
constraints on parties, see, e.g., JULIA BLACK, RULES AND REGUlATORS (1997).
See also NEiL GUNNINGHAM ET AL., SHADES OF GREEN: BUSINEss, REGULATION AND
ENVIRONMENT (2003); MALCOLNI K. SPARRow, THE RicuIATORY CRAFr (2000).
169. See Miwa, supra note 27, at 1244 (assuming that CSR with regard to
human rights imposes costs and noting that voluntarism cannot succeed in a
competitive marketplace because it "disadvantage[s] those [corporations] who
acted responsibly and confer[s] a significant market advantage on those who
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well as international, to crystallize soft law into hard law and cre-
ate binding legal obligations that compel corporate legislative
targets.o7 0  Corporations remain unbound by laws governing
human rights except for those enacted by their states of incorpo-
ration or the states where they do business,"' and it is the rare
corporation that chooses to place itself at a potential competitive
disadvantage by adhering to more onerous standards than are
required by law when its competitors do not reciprocate. Propo-
nents of a legislative strategy, convinced that only hard law of
general applicability can generate the deterrent effect necessary
to restrain corporate misconduct, have offered domestic and
international legislative proposals designed to remedy this per-
ceived defect.'17
Domestically, legislative strategists note that, although cor-
porations are subject to legal liability and punishment and to
whatever legal duties states impose upon them,'7 3 the practical
did not"); see also Beate Sjifjell, Why Law Matters: Corporate Social Irresponsibility
and the Futility of Voluntary Climate Change Mitigation, 8 EUR. COMPANY L. 56, 57
(2011) (rejecting voluntarism entirely as a CSR strategy in favor of enforceable
legislation on the ground that voluntarism is "detrimental to the development
of a sustainably and socially responsible business and has contributed to giving
CSR a bad name").
170. As a former corporate attorney turned human rights activist
indicates:
After more than a decade of advocating corporate social responsibility
and seeing its promise often thwarted, I've come to ask myself, What is
blocking change? The answer is now obvious to me. It's the mandate
to maximize returns for shareholders, which means serving the inter-
ests of wealth before all other interests. It is a systemwide mandate that
cannot be overcome by individual companies. It is a legal mandate
with which voluntary change cannot compete.
Douglas Litowitz, Are Corporations Evil?, 58 U. MIAMI L. Rrv. 811, 825 (2004).
171. See generally McCorquodale, supra note 138. Although the
Nuremburg Tribunals did adjudicate corporate guilt for complicity in the com-
mission of war crimes and crimes against humanity during World War II, and
although those cases are of precedential value, there is at present no interna-
tional forum with jurisdiction, and no binding body of regulations, to address
corporate human rights practices. Id. For a discussion of proposals to create a
forum, invest it with jurisdiction, and create binding laws, see supra notes
75-106 and 172-193 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., Ehrlich, supra note 26, at 83 (presenting the critique of vol-
untarism and the argument that the effectiveness of a legislative solution to
perceptions of inadequate control of corporate conduct is superior on the
grounds that the State has "access to better institutional mechanisms that aggre-
gate information, achieve coordination, and minimize the sort of opportunism
one might expect if business managers were to become guardians of the public
good"). For one such proposal, see Bernard, supra note 99.
173. See Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636-38 (1819) (hold-
ing that a corporation is an artificial creation of the State, rather than a natural
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and political difficulties in enforcing sanctions upon non-natural
entities specifically designed to limit liability often trumps the
effectiveness of existing legislation. As one commentator discuss-
ing the current prospects for the legislative punishment of corpo-
rations laments,
[t]he corporation, I submit, is best defined as a liability-
limiting mechanism. Given this definition, no wonder the
courts have so much difficulty meting out just punishment
to corporations when they engage in misconduct! Rarely
can the courts legally pierce the corporate veil to prosecute
individuals thought responsible for corporate wrong-
doing. Even when they can, the courts tend to display a
reluctance to do so-we may suspect that that reluctance is
the result of confusion regarding the range of liability per-
taining to corporations and the well-entrenched personifi-
cation of the corporation as [a] moral agent. When the
courts attempt to place responsibility on the corporation
itself, the appropriate punishment is deemed to be mone-
tary. However, when a corporation engages in repeated
instances of gross misconduct, the courts are reluctant to
levy truly heavy fines .... A truly ponderous fine, the sort
of fine necessary to act as a deterrent . . . [might leave a
community] stranded without its major industry, or con-
sumers might be deprived of a much-needed or much-
wanted product.174
Given the political and practical difficulties in creating and
enforcing law, it is not surprising, then, that many corporations
express a preference for legislation over other potential forms of
restraint on the conduct of their business.17 1
Nevertheless, some proposed legislation is beyond the pale
of what any corporation might be inclined to contemplate,
including stripping corporations that serially violate soft law
human rights norms of the "degree of protection or of compas-
sion or mercy that the courts accord to real persons when they
break the law."'77 Accordingly, "incorrigible" corporations
would be analogized to "criminal psychopath [s]," deemed by
legal person, and thus subject to whatever duties the legislature imposes upon
it).
174. RobertJ. Rafalko, Corporate Punishment: A Proposal, in BUSINEss ETH-
ics, supra note 4, at 307, 308-09.
175. See, e.g., NESTrIA., NEsTut's CoRPouRATi BUSINESS PRINCIouEs 5 (2004),
available at http://www.nestle.pl/download/CorporateBusinesGB.pdf (stat-
ing that "Nestle believes that, as a general rule, legislation is the most effective
safeguard of responsible conduct . . . .").
176. Rafalko, supra note 174, at 311.
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their states of incorporation to have forfeited the advantages of
the doctrine of limited liability, and even "confined in the inter-
ests of public safety"-meaning, potentially, disincorporated and
dissolved." Along this vein, a series of other legislative modifi-
cations to corporate law designed to enhance CSR have been sug-
gested, including, inter alia, requiring corporations to make
human rights disclosures in addition to their financial disclo-
sures17 8 and imposing duties upon directors to act in the interest
of stakeholders in addition to stockholders.' 79
Some States have acted on these proposals. More than thirty
have adopted non-shareholder constituency statutes that permit,
if not obligate, managers to consider the effects of any corporate
action upon shareholders.'" 0 To build on this trend toward the
legislated inclusion of stakeholder concerns, NGOs have pro-
posed amending SEC mandatory disclosure regulations to
require a "list of the countries where the corporation has facili-
ties or operations; data on compliance with occupational health
and safety, anti-bribery, labor rights, and anti-discrimination laws;
and security arrangements with state or private police and mili-
tary forces."18 1
By far the most significant domestic proposal for legislation
that would impose binding legal duties upon corporations to
conform to specified conduct in regard to the promotion and
protection of human rights is the Model Uniform Code for Cor-
177. Id. at 316-17; see also MARJORIE KELLY, THE DIVINE RIGHT OF CAPITAL:
DETHRONING THE CORPORATE ARISTOCRACY 175 (2001) (arguing for granting
States the power to revoke corporate charters on the basis of conduct deemed
immoral or of significant negative impact upon the community). A Constitu-
tional amendment might be necessary to achieve this objective. See Litowitz,
supra note 170, at 821-22 (discussing legal implications of such a proposal).
178. See RALPH ESTES, TYRANNY OF THE BOTTOM LINE: WHY CORPORATIONS
MAKE1 Goon PEOPLE Do BAD THINGs 210 (1996).
179. KELLY, supra note 177, at 140.
180. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830(3) (West 1993) (permitting a
director, in the discharge of duty, to "consider such factors as the director
deems relevant, including the long-term prospects and interests of the corpora-
tion and its shareholders, and the social, economic, legal, or other effects of any
action on the employees, suppliers, customers of the corporation or its subsidi-
aries, the communities and society in which the corporation or its subsidiaries
operate, and the economy of the state and the nation"). For an analysis of
these statutes, see JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORA-
TIONs 42 (5th ed. 2000).
181. See, e.g., Hard Issues, Innovative Approaches: Improving NGO-Industry
Dialogue on Corporate Responsibility and Accountability, CALIFORNIA GLOBAL ColWo-
RATE ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (Nov. 9, 1999), http://oldsite.nautilus.org/
archives/cap/reports/RoundtableReport.pdf.
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porate Responsibility ("Uniform Code").' 8 2 The Uniform Code
would amend State corporate charter legislation by imposing a
duty upon directors, enforceable under civil and criminal law, to
"manage the corporation in a manner that does not cause dam-
age to the environment, violate human rights, adversely affect
the public health or safety, damage the welfare of communities
in which the corporation operate, or violate the dignity of the
corporation's employees."' However, critics of the Uniform
Code, which has yet to make it out of committees, contend that
compliance costs and increased risk of litigation will drive busi-
ness out of states that adopt it,184 and there is at present simply
no bloc of political support that would suggest that the remaking
of corporate law is a viable project.
Less expansive proposals would simply extend the reach of
state tort jurisdiction extraterritorially to reach corporate con-
duct abroad.'" A quite creative proposal would divide each
industry into two groups-"do-gooders" and "evildoers"-and
impose differential regulations, tax consequences, and monitor-
ing obligations on each in the expectation that corporations in
the latter camp would alter their practices in order to escape the
onerous restrictions. In so doing, some of the public benefits of
transformed corporate behaviors could be privatized and trans-
ferred to corporate good citizens, enhancing the likelihood of
compliance.'" Other "green finance" proposals would require
182. MonE UNIF. CoDE FOR CORP. RESPONSIIIvty (2004) [hereinafter
UNIF. CODE], available at http://www.citizenworks.org/enron/corp_code-text.
php. For a comprehensive discussion of the UNIF. Con., see Robert Hinkley,
28 Words to Redefine Corporate Duties: The Proposal for a Code for Corporate Citizen-
ship, 23 MUITINAT'L. MONITOR (July/Aug. 2002), http://multinationalmonitor.
org/mm2002/02july-aug/july-aug02corp4.html.
183. UNIF. CODE, supra note 182, § I (being considered in the legislatures
of Minnesota, California, and Maine).
184. See Elisa Scalise, Note, The Code for Corporate Citizenship: States Should
Amend Statutes Governing Corporations and Enable Corporations to be Good Citizens,
29 SEATTLE U. L. Rilv. 275, 292 (2006) (summarizing criticisms of the Uniform
Code).
185. See, e.g., Barnali Choudhury, Beyond the Alien Tort Claims Act: Alterna-
tive Approaches to Attributing Liability to Corporations for Extraterritorial Abuses, 26
Nw. J. INT'l. L. & Bus. 43, 45 (2005) (describing the proposal).
186. Corporations considered "do-gooders" would be included on lists of
corporations with which it would be deemed by the markets to be "politically
correct" to do business, whereas "evildoers" would feel the sting of that status.
This proposal would avoid the standard criticism of legislation as overinclusive
for imposing costs on corporations that are already adhering to the behavioral
prescriptions and proscriptions imposed by the new legal obligations. See, e.g.,
Diderik Lund, Petroleum Tax Reform Proposals in Norway and Denmark, 23 ENERGY
J. 37 (2002) (rejecting a tax on all petroleum corporations for the purpose of
alternative energy research as inefficient and punitive as it would impose addi-
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financial entities that accept investments from public pension
funds to incorporate legally enforceable and specific domestic
CSR norms within the fiduciary responsibilities of investment
managers.' 8 7
Internationally, advocates of new legislation contend that
every nation should incorporate the principles in the Framework
in binding universal treaties in order to create a universal
approach and deny to corporations the opportunity to "forum
shop" for jurisdictions where they can violate human rights with
relative impunity.' If national regulation remains unresponsive
to CSR out of a fear of creating overly burdensome requirements
that drive away foreign investment, 8" a universal and enforcea-
ble treaty has the potential to equalize national laws and remove
incentives to transnational relocation. o Accordingly, legislative
tional costs on petroleum corporations already investing heavily in research and
development of alternative energy).
187. See, e.g., Oren Perez, The New Universe of Green Finance: From Self-Regu-
lation to Multi-Polar Governance, Bar-Ilan Univ. Pub. Law and Legal Theory,
Working Paper No. 7-03, 2007, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=962633; Frank Jan de Graaf & Alfred Slager, Guidelines
for Integrating Socially Responsible Investment in the Investment Process (Jan. 2009),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=929067.
188. See, e.g., Rachel J. Anderson, Reimagining Human Rights Law: Toward
Global Regulation of Transnational Corporations, 88 DENV. U. L. REv. 183, 184
(2010) (advocating for a "new global human rights regime" complete with a
"Global Law Commission" as a quasi-executive body with the power to create
binding international laws regulations on corporate conduct and with universal
civil jurisdiction to enforce these provisions). The argument is that MNCs stra-
tegically allocate their business units in foreign jurisdictions that present the
least legal risk in regard to their human rights practices and that in so doing
they unfairly impose burdens on stakeholders-customers, employees, mem-
bers of local communities, and others unable to protect their rights in private
markets subject to weak state regulation. If state laws governing corporate
human rights practices were harmonized, MNCs would not be able to "shop"
for low-risk jurisdictions and would be obliged to provide certain minimum
standards of human rights protection. See Backer, supra note 109, at 309. A
counterargument is that each jurisdiction should be permitted to devise that set
of regulations it deems necessary to protect its interests and that the market-
with whatever economic and ethical pressures survive competition -will deter-
mine which regimes and which corporations are successful and which fail. See
Boatright, supra note 33, at 46 ("Governance structures that are not efficient
will disappear, along with the firms that adopted them, in a Darwinian struggle
for the 'survival of the fittest."').
189. See Simaika, supra note 66, at 340 (contending that countries that
refuse to create domestic legislation incorporating the principles that underlie
the Norms are often motivated by the fear of losing foreign investment to less
restrictive jurisdictions).
190. See, e.g., Adefolake Adeyeye, Corporate Responsibility in International
Law: Which Way to Go?, 11 SINGAPORE Y.B. OF INTL L. 141, 143 (2007) (contend-
ing that effective implementation of the CSR agenda requires a universal treaty
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strategists call for new international tribunals to address the phe-
nomenon of corporate violations of human rights by internation-
alizing the field of corporate regulation and preempting
conflicting national laws.'" One legislative "solution" to the per-
ceived inadequacies of domestic corporate law would extend the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court to reach legal
persons, which does not presently have personal jurisdiction over
corporations." This proposal has attracted serious attention:
the International Commission of Jurists has begun work on
defining the legal obligations of corporations with regard to
human rights with direct reference to the Norms and subsequent
debate, and Special Representative Ruggie is monitoring this
work with a view toward the future of the Norms as a source of
customary international law binding in international tribunals,
whether the ICC or a specialized forum staffed with experts in
business and human rights law.3
that "clearly maps out what corporations should be responsible for and the
methods by which such responsibility can be enforced").
191. See Backer, supra note 109, at 319 (describing such proposals). A
proposed "International Corporate Criminal Court" created by the UN Security
Council would have original jurisdiction to impose liability on a corporation
found to have committed such human rights violations as child labor use, envi-
ronmental damage, forced relocation, cooperation with repressive regimes, and
corruption, even if the state of incorporation objects. See Adrienne Barnhard,
Response, Home State Responsibility and Local Communities: The Case of Global Min-
ing, 11 YALE HUm. RTs. & Div. L.J. 207, 212-15 (2008) (elaborating on this
proposal).
192. A French proposal to include a provision in the Rome Statute was
defeated in 2001. It would have extended criminal liability beyond natural per-
sons to include legal persons. See Comment, Developments-International Crimi-
nal Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1943, 2031-32 (2001). During the mandatory
review in 2009, proposals to extend ICC jurisdiction to legal persons-i.e., cor-
porations-will be heard and potentially decided. Choudhury, supra note 185,
at 58.
193. See also Report of the United Nations High Commissioner on
Human Rights on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and
Related Business Enterprises With Regards to Human Rights, supra note 149, 1
65 (noting that Special Representative Ruggie agrees that "there are no inher-
ent conceptual barriers to States deciding to hold corporations directly respon-
sible [for human rights violations] by establishing some form of international
jurisdiction"); Choudhury, supra note 185, at 57 (discussing proposals for a spe-
cialized international tribunal charged with adjudicating claims of corporate
violations of human rights); Michael J. Kelly, Grafting the Command Responsibility
Doctrine onto Corporate Criminal Liability for Atrocities, 24 EMORY INT'l. L. Rivx. 671
(2010) (advocating the use of the command responsibility doctrine to create
criminal liability for corporations and natural persons on the standard that
responsible individuals either knew or should have known about ongoing cor-
porate wrongdoing). See generally Kinley & Chambers, supra note 156 (discuss-
ing the current status of the Norms in the context of proposals to grant them
international legal status in international tribunals).
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5. Delegitimate: Corporate Legitimacy Theory
In the past decade a consortium of observers described by at
least one commentator as the "anti-corporation movement"19 4
have concluded, based on the striking contrast between the
declining power of many developing and failed states and the
growing wealth and power of many contemporary MNCs,' 95 that
if human rights are to be promoted and protected, MNCs are the
sole actors capable of exercising the authority to do so.'9 In
response, an emerging theory woven from interrelated strands
offered by a number of scholars and offered to support and
inform other strategies, contends that the legitimacy of the con-
temporary MNC-often described as its "social license to oper-
ate"-hinges on the degree to which it shoulders the burden not
merely of strict compliance with existing laws but of the broader
functions and duties of democratically accountable public institu-
tions, including the protection of human rights, the conservation
and management of public resources, and the promotion of gen-
eral welfare.' Specifically, those corporations that do not
uphold, at a minimum, obligations to protect and promote
human rights are deemed illegitimate and regarded as having
forfeited their socially-granted license to operate'" 8 and even
194. Litowitz, supra note 170, at 820.
195. See, e.g., Adam McBeth, Privatising Human Rights: What Happens to the
State's Human Rights Duties When Services Are Privatised?, 5 MiiLn. J. INT'L L. 133
(2004).
196. See CRANE & MATTEN, sufra note 23, at 67; DONALDSON, supra note
34, at 31 (arguing that "enhanced power confers enhanced responsibilities" as
the basis for asserting corporate obligations to assume erstwhile public func-
tions protect and promote human rights); Hessbruegge, supra note 116, at 88
(noting that states are "no [longer] strong enough to ... fulfill all their protec-
tive duties" and that the "obvious answer [to this problem] would be to supple-
ment the existing framework of . .. human rights obligations with horizontal
obligations for [MNCs]").
197. See, e.g., Backer, supra note 109, at 301-02 ("Corporate privilege can
only be legitimate if the corporation serves the community from which the fac-
tors of production of its wealth are derived . . . [by undertaking] active obliga-
tion [s] . . . to positively better the environment, to increase the wealth of the
inhabitants in places where corporations operate, to develop economically
depressed neighborhoods, or to pressure other institutions (like banks or gov-
ernment) to change their social or regulatory practices."); Cary Coglianese,
Legitimacy and Corporate Governance, 32 DEL.J. CORP. L. 159, 160 (2007) (stating
that "[1]egitimacy is what is needed to justify, in moral terms, the wielding of
such enormous, monopolistic power" by corporations and that "U]ust as with
governmental power, corporate power . . . can be abused"). For an intellectual
history and taxonomy of the various corporate legitimacy theories, see generally
BRUMMER, supra note 28.
198. See George Balabanis, Hugh C. Philips & Jonathan Lyall, Corporate
Social Responsibility and Economic Performance in the Top British Companies: Are They
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their rights to exist.'"' Put slightly differently, legitimacy theory
contends that in order for a corporation to be permitted to do
business it must demonstrate that it is not merely in compliance
with its legal obligations but that it contributes positively and
proactively to the welfare of all those who might have occasion to
describe themselves as its stakeholders.
Corporate legitimacy theorists and anti-corporation activ-
ists20o are aware that the major philosophical reconstruction of
the corporation as a public, rather than as a private entity, for
which legitimacy theory calls, is a profound move. Although not
all proponents of corporate legitimacy theory view the modern
MNC as "essentially sociopathic-something akin to a super-rich
and well-connected human being who is motivated solely by
return on investment and totally unmoved by attachments to . . .
community, "'2111 most would agree that corporations are inher-
ently anti-social entities that "have no conscience, morals, nor
sense of right and wrong[,] . . . no sense of living in a commu-
nity[,] [and] have none of the human traits and characteristics
that restrain people in ways that laws cannot and make living in a
community possible."" 2 Moreover, most do not shy from
Linked?, 98 EUR. Bus. Rirv. 25, 25-26 (1998) (arguing that a corporation that
does not meet the terms of its social license to operate should be denied the
right to do so); Dennis M. Patten, Exposure, Legitimacy, and Social Disclosure, 10J.
AccT. & Pun. PoL' 297 (1991) (same).
199. DONADISON, supra note 34, at 55 (arguing that an MNC must
"honor [human] rights as a condition of its justified existence"); see id. at 81
(enumerating the fundamental human rights MNCs are obligated, at a minum
to protect, including freedom from arbitrary detention, ownership of property,
freedom from torture, the right to a fair trial, the right to nondiscriminatory
treatment, freedom of speech and association, the right to a minimal educa-
tion, the right to political participation, and the right to subsistence). Some
scholars describe the minimal moral obligations of corporations to society as
the product of a social contract, yet maintain that only those corporations that
fulfill the contract possess sufficient legitimacy to be permitted to continue to
operate. See, e.g., id. at 54 (contending that a corporation must "enhance the
long-term welfare of employees and consumers in any society in which it oper-
ates" and "refrain from violating minimum standards ofjustice and of human
rights in any society in which it operates" in order to be considered legitimate);
see also Patricia H. Werhane, Accountability and Employee Rights, 1 INr't. J.
ArmDnn PHIL.. 15 (1983) (same).
200. See Den Hond & De Bakker, supra note 51, at 906-07 (describing
NGO strategies and tactics designed to delegitimize corporations).
201. Litowitz, supra note 170, at 819; see Thomas Donaldson & Mike Wal-
ler, Ethics and Organization, 17 J. Mgmt Stud. 34 (1980).
202. Robert C. Hinkley, Neither Enron Nor Deregulation, COMMON DRFAMS.
ORG (May 19, 2002), http://www.commondreams.org/views02/0519-07.htm
(quoting an anti-corporate NCO activist who formerly worked as a securities
lawyer at the renowned law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom).
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describing their argument for enhancing corporate accountabil-
ity for human rights as a "complete rethinking of [corporate]
ethics and ethical theory,"20s and all understand that their theory
provides vastly different answers than does traditional corporate
legal theory as to what corporations are, who owns them, and
what can properly be demanded of them by non-owners.
Consequently, corporate legitimacy theorists contend that,
because corporations, like states, are not natural creatures
endowed with natural rights but in fact are artificial social con-
structions that owe their existence entirely to positive acts of leg-
islation, society possesses the power to remake or even abolish
them by the same legislative process if they cannot be justified
morally.204 Corporate law and the corporations it creates and
regulates are not terra sancta but rather are legitimate terrain for
social intervention. If under existing law corporations do not
function to benefit society in an equitable fashion, or if corpora-
tions impose too many externalities upon stakeholders, then the
law must yield in the interest of social welfare, and new laws must
be instituted to attenuate corporate pathologies.20 In other
words, if corporations will not become socially responsible of
their own volition, they must be made so. If they cannot be made
so, they must be destroyed.2 0 6
Thus, a primary recommendation of corporate legitimacy
theorists is the formal replacement of the shareholder model of
corporate governance with a stakeholder model that advocates
maintain will "constrain [ ] corporate misbehavior" and distribute
wealth more equitably.207  State corporate law codes would
203. Jones et. al., supra note 30, at 34.
204. See, e.g., Donaldson, supra note 14, at 167-68 (distinguishing the
powers granted by society and possessed by corporations from the rights inher-
ent in natural persons); see also Thomas Donaldson, Personalizing Corporate Ontol-
ogy: The French Way, in BUSINESS ETHICS, supra note 13, at 69, 71 (locating the
source of corporate powers in legislation and differentiating powers from
rights).
205. See generally Greenfield, supra note 40 (stating that the ultimate goal
of corporate law must be to create social welfare and that failures to achieve the
goal must be remedied through regulatory modifications).
206. The most radical corporate legitimacy theorists call for the elimina-
tion of corporations, and with them capitalism. See, e.g., HARRY GLASBEEK,
WEALTH BY STEALTH: CORPORATE CRIME, CORPORATE LAW, AND THE PERVERSION
OF DEMOCRACY (2002); JOHN GRAY, FALSE DAWN: THE DELUSIONS OF GLOBAL CAP-
iTALISM (1998); DAVID C. KORTEN, THE POST-CORPORATE WORLD: LIFE AFTER
CAPITALISM (1999).
207. Greenfield, supra note 40, at 13; see also Surya Deva, Sustainable Good
Governance and Corporations: An Analysis of Asymmetries, 18 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L.
REv. 707, 748-49 (2006) ("[Because] the structure of [existing] corporate law
does not allow corporations to look beyond shareholders or allow them to bal-
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require much more dramatic wholesale revision than that con-
templated by the Uniform Code; moreover, implied in the the-
ory of corporate legitimacy is that corporations that resist
attempts to convert them from private to quasi-public entities
would face sanctions up to and including a corporate "death pen-
alty."20s1 More internationalist-oriented legitimacy theorists
would discard the state-centric paradigm of corporate law in
favor of an international corporate legal regime complete with
protective provisions enforceable in domestic courts as well as
international tribunals and an array of sanctions similarly suffi-
cient to compel corporate compliance.2on Anti-corporation activ-
ists drawn from the memberships of NGOs apply corporate
legitimacy theory directly to their subjects, employing tactics such
as sabotage, "hacktivism," boycotts, seizure and destruction of
corporate property, and other hostile activities designed to inflict
material damage on their targets.210
Critics of corporate legitimacy theory dismiss it as a "Marx-
ist" ideology advanced by "high-status Western academics" una-
ble or unwilling to see the corporation as anything other than
the "great example, symptom, or cause of some or all of the great
maladies affecting the world."21' They argue against the basic
premise of corporate legitimacy theory-that corporations have
eclipsed states in terms of their capacity to protect human
rights-by noting that corporations, unlike states, "ha[ve] no
power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action any different in
ance the interests of stockholders with stakeholders ... the next step should be
to remove this obstacle . . . through reforms of corporate law . . . .").
208. The following anecdote is exemplary of the "Delegitimate" strategy
in action. In 1998 thirty NGOs, led by law professor Robert Benson, filed a
petition urging the California Attorney General to revoke the charter of the
Unocal Corporation on the ground that it was a "repeat offender" in its human
rights conduct. See Mary Hood & Nick Penniman, Environmental, Human Rights,
Women's, and Pro-Democracy Groups Petition Attorney General of California to Revoke
UNOCAL's Corporate Charter, COMMONDREAMS.OR. (Sept. 10, 1998, 6:32 PM),
http://www.cominondreams.org/archive newswire/0998releases.htm. Accord-
ing to Benson, "there has to be a point at which "some corporations should be
permanently prevented from doing [further] harm." Id. The California Attor-
ney General denied the petition without comment. Id.
209. See Backer, supra note 109, at 307-08; see also Deva, supra note 207, at
749 (" [B] ecause some gap between expectations from and actions of corpora-
tions toward [protection of human rights] is inevitable, efforts should be made
to develop a coherent, obligatory international regulatory regime that could
make deviant corporations accountable in an efficient manner.").
210. See Den Hond & De Bakker, supra note 51, at 909-11.
211. See Backer, supra note 109, at 314-316. For a detailed criticism of
corporate legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory as vestiges of Marxist infil-
tration ofJapanese economic culture, see generally Miwa, supra note 27.
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the slightest degree from ordinary marketing contracting
between any two people."2 12 In other words, corporations are
simply larger and wealthier-and more artificial-than most nat-
ural persons, and thus no more responsible for the protection of
human rights. Moreover, corporate power is in fact diffused:
when corporations act, they do so on behalf of thousands and
even millions of individual owners-their shareholders. Further-
more, critics point out that under the law as it has existed for
centuries the "mere act of chartering [a corporation] does not
turn a firm into a public entity any more than the act of issuing a
birth certificate or a marriage license obligates the individual(s)
to serve the public interest. "213
Ultimately, although critics are quick to note that public
support of Marxist theory has eroded since the fall of the Berlin
Wall, they are less quick to recognize the influence of corporate
legitimacy theory-in particular its claims that corporations owe
normative duties to stakeholders that society can and should
enforce-in ATCA litigation, in the Framework and the Com-
pact, and in the Uniform Code.
6. Summary
NGOs have pursued five basic strategies. The first, "Negoti-
ate," is the only strategy predicated upon the principle of volun-
tarism and enforced by the market, while the other four rest
upon the power of state political intervention and enforcement.
By way of the first strategy, NGOs have demonstrated and negoti-
ated, with some success, to induce corporations to adopt volun-
tary codes of conduct specifying responsibilities to protect and
promote human rights in all aspects and places of their opera-
tions. Second, they have turned to litigation, primarily in the
U.S. under ATCA, in a largely unsuccessful attempt to impose
legal liability for breaches of duties to protect human rights viola-
tions in foreign jurisdictions where multinational corporations
do business. Third, they have lobbied in the United Nations sys-
tem, with mixed but largely poor results, to pass declarations and
statements of corporate responsibility for the protection of
human rights in the hope that these pronouncements will
acquire legal force. Fourth, they have rather unsuccessfully
urged the States of incorporation for many firms to create State
212. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs,
and Economic Organization, 62 Am. EcoN. REv. 777, 777 (1971).
213. Fred D. Miller, Jr. &John Ahrens, The Social Responsibility ofCorpora-
tions, in BUSINESs ETHICS, supra note 4, at 190 (summarizing the position of
critics of corporate legitimacy theory).
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liability regimes for violations of specified human rights obliga-
tions. Finally, in conjunction with the academy, NGOs have
highlighted the wealth and power of many contemporary corpo-
rations, in contrast to the declining power of many developing
and failed states, as the basis for urging a major philosophical
reconstruction of the corporation as a public, rather than a pri-
vate, entity, and for contending that, to be judged legitimate and
allowed to exercise its power and authority, the corporation must
assume many of the functions and duties of public institutions,
including, inter alia, the protection of human rights, stewardship
of public resources, and promotion of the general welfare.
Unifying each of these strategies are two goals: (1) to con-
cretize significantly heightened corporate duties to protect and
promote human rights and (2) to either secure voluntary corpo-
rate compliance with these expanded duties or else render them
enforceable in domestic and/or international courts.
B. Multinational Corporations
In theory, when interacting with NGOs, corporations are
free to choose from a gamut of strategic options ranging from
determined opposition at one end of the conflict spectrum to
comprehensive alliance at the other, with detached philan-
thropic engagement, critical but constructive engagement,
accommodation through adoption of some degree of mutually
reinforcing objectives, and close strategic coordination occupy-
ing the domain between the two poles. 214 In practice, however,
corporations recognize that their policies and actions produce
political, economic, and social effects that determine corporate
performance and yield consequences not only for the firm but
for claimed "shareholders."'2 1  Strategies for interaction with
NGOs on the question of human rights must therefore answer
not only the fundamental economic question of where and how
the firm should compete to earn profits, 2" but must also ask and
answer the following, equally important questions: (1) what are
the political, environmental, and social consequences for the cor-
poration and for relevant third-parties of any given strategic
choice, and (2) how are these consequences to be accounted for
and defended, both internally as well as externally, in economic
214. See John Elkington & Shelly Fennell, Partners of Sustainability, in
TERMs FoR ENDEARMENT: BUSINEss, NGOS, AND SUSTAINABLI.E DEVEi oi'miirmNT 150,
150-62 (Jem Bendell ed. 2000).
215. See RonIERT H. MILES, CoFFIN NAILS AND CORIPORATE STRATEGY 49, 52,
92 (1982).
216. Id. at 52.
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as well as non-economic terms? Corporations vary in the singu-
larity with which they pursue profits, in their sensitivity to the
economic consequences of their decisions, and in their appetite
for risk; the neoclassical assumption that all corporations are
pure profit maximizers217 is inconsistent with empirical
observation.
Thus, while the core rights within the human rights canon-
freedom from arbitrary arrest, from torture, from rape, and from
extra-judicial executions-are universally regarded as forming
the bedrock of civilized life by NGOs, by the corporations they
shadow, and by states, 2 1 s great differences of opinion exist as to
corporate responsibility-moral as well as legal-for the promo-
tion and protection of these rights. In turn, great variance in the
answers provided by various corporations to the questions posed
above manifest in the adoption of four very different ideal-typic
corporate strategies for interaction with human rights NGOs.
The four primary corporate strategies, presented in order from
most to least conflictual, are (1) Fight, (2) Engage, (3) Accom-
modate, and (4) Collaborate.21 9
1. Fight
a. Theory
The first strategy, "Fight," is predicated upon principles of
orthodox shareholder theory that regard the sole social responsi-
bility of a corporation to be the maximization of profit for its
shareholders. So long as a corporation "does not transgress the
rules of the game set by law, it has the legal right to shape its
strategy without reference to anything but profits."220 In fact, for
managers to pursue other objectives, however noble they might
be, is to, in effect, steal property from its owners. 221 At least in
217. See generally RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANAINSIS OF THE LAw (6th
ed. 2003) (elaborating a neoclassical theory of law and economics that takes as
a given that corporations are rational actors that seek to maximize profits).
218. See Cernic, supra note 15 (defining the universal and nonderogable
core of the human rights regime).
219. The four ideal-typic corporate strategies have been selected as the
set that best reflects empirical observation, an approach with at least one prece-
dent in the literature. See, e.g., Archie B. Carroll, A Three-Dimensional Conceptual
Model of Corporate Social Performance, 4 AcAD. MGMT. REv. 497, 503 (1979) (cod-
ing the social responsiveness of corporations to various "social responsibility
categories" as either a "reaction," "defense," "accommodation," or
"proaction.").
220. Albert Z. Carr, Is Business Bluffing Ethical?, 46 HARv. Bus. REv. 143,
149 (1968).
221. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAw 38 (1991) (contending that under existing cor-
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the U.S., the shareholder model "has remained durable as a mat-
ter of domestic policy," and accordingly, "traditional American
corporate law. . . does not speak the language of human
rights.""' In short, because corporations are obligated to be effi-
cient, self-centered, and politically and ethically neutral partici-
pants in the marketplace, and because social responsibility is
invariably at odds with the obligation to seek profitability, corpo-
rations need only submit to the laws imposed through public reg-
ulation-narrowly interpreting their legal obligations if it is in
their economic interest to do so-and must disregard the ethical
or moral demands lodged by private entities with contrary objec-
tives.2  If corporations produce outcomes deemed ethical or
"socially responsible" by outsiders-for example, the Johnson &
Johnson decision to withdraw Tylenol upon the first evidence of
tampering-they do so not to earn those judgments or out of
consideration of moral or ethical obligations, but because the
actions were those most likely to yield future profits. 224
porate law a manager cannot simultaneously promote shareholder wealth and
stakeholder interests); Ehrlich, supra note 26, at 71-72 (concluding that
existing corporate law does not permit managers to make "socially responsible
decisions" where such decisions come at the expense of profits owed the
shareholders).
222. Backer, supra note 109, at 305-07; see also Ehrlich, supra note 26, at
65 ("Shareholder wealth maximization may be controversial, reviled by some
ethical theorists who prefer a social model that emphasizes some sort of com-
munity responsibility, but it reflects the basic commercial understanding, at
least in the U.S."); Ehrlich, supra note 26, at 65 ("The current reality ... is that
business leaders are almost exclusively bottom line oriented, and stakeholder
theory . . . is not the current state of the law.").
223. See Scalise, supra note 184, at 283-84 (analyzing shareholder theory
and concluding that "[s]ince directors only owe a legal duty to shareholders,
directors . . . regard external interests as irrelevant in their decision making ...
unless those [interests] result in profit.") (alteration in original); see also Miwa,
supra note 27, at 1245 (suggesting that "any requirement that corporate leaders
bear 'social responsibility' would diminish society's aggregate wealth in propor-
tion to the intensity of enforcement" because social responsibility is invariably
at odds with profitability). Human rights NGOs and other advocates of expan-
sive theories of CSR rail at existing corporate law, contending that its fiduciary
duty principle "actually [imposes] a legal obligation [upon the corporation] to
be a monster, an ethical monster . . . . They're not supposed to do nice things.
If they are, it is probably illegal." Noam Chomsky, Interhemispheric Res. Ctr.:
20th Anniversary, Taking Control of Our Lives: Freedom, Sovereignty, and Other
Endangered Species (Feb. 26, 2000), available at http://www.ratical.org/co-global-
ize/NC022600.htmi (alteration in original).
224. See Ehrlich, supra note 26, at 67-68 (distinguishing actions motivated
by concerns of social responsibility from actions motivated by profit and con-
tending that, although an action may please "stakeholders" as the socially
responsible choice, it requires no justification other than its relationship to
profitability).
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Although corporations deliberately seek competitive advan-
tage by investing in developing countries where resources and
labor are cheap and plentiful and host governments provide
forced labor and commit other human rights violations to maxi-
mize returns,2 2 5 corporations, like states, are not moral agents
and thus, have no duties to consider the rectitude of the acts of
third parties so long as they themselves are in compliance with
their legal obligations.2 2 1 While "Fight" would not condone the
commission of human rights violations by corporations, it flatly
denies responsibility for human rights violations committed by
third-parties,2 2 ' and rejects the guilt-by-association argument at
the core of ATCA "aiding and abetting" claims. Moreover,
"Fight" finds no legal basis for rejecting any competitive advan-
tages secured through investment in countries whose govern-
ments, without the knowledge and support of corporations, are
the direct authors of human rights misconduct.22 8  "Zones of
weak governance," a designation that includes failing states,
regions of conflict and war, and repressive regimes, may present
risks but also create opportunities in the form of lower costs aris-
ing from more docile workforces and more facilitative regulatory
authorities. 2
In short, for "Fight," law, and not some notion of social
responsibility, defines the boundaries of permissible conduct,
225. DONALDSON, supra note 34, at 33 (stating that MNCs seek out foreign
countries for investment to take advantage of favorable labor, regulatory, and
legal environments). The competitive advantage gained, at least in the short
run, by locating operations in such "business-friendly" environments is quantifi-
able and significant. Id. For a discussion of the association of legal deficiencies
with economic underdevelopment, see AVINASH K. DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND Eco-
NOMICs: ALTERNATIVE MODES OF GOVERNANCE 3-4, 7-9 (2004).
226. CRANE & MAT-EN, supra note 23, at 134.
227. Id. at 48.
228. An example of a corporation that has chosen "Fight" as its strategy is
Unocal. Despite a recent legal settlement with plaintiffs alleging its complicity
in human rights violations committed by the Burmese Government, Unocal
continues to assert political and ethical neutrality in its discussion papers and
continues to select host nations on the sole basis of their capacity to create
environments conducive to the furtherance of profits. See Kielsgard, supra note
84, at 195.
229. See Ruggie, supra note 166 (defining the phenomenon of weak gov-
ernance). "Fight" treats as theoretically irrelevant all normative arguments,
including the hypothesis that a lack of CSR increases the likelihood of political
violence born from the resentment of those who have suffered relative losses
during the process of globalization and thus increases risks and costs over the
long term, as well as the likelihood that corporations will be obligated to
"Fight." For a discussion of the theory that socially responsible business yields
peace, see TIMOTHY L. FORT, BUSINESS, INTEGRITY, AND PEACE: BEYOND GEOPOLIT-
ICAL AND DISCIPLINARY BOUNDARIES 1-129 (2007).
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and the social contract in its current iteration supports this inter-
pretation .2 Because this position is diametrically opposed to
that espoused by human rights NGOs, "Fight" treats these enti-
ties as hostile, extra-legal actors that jeopardize corporate profit-
ability and pose existential legitimacy threats.2 3 ' Accordingly, in
response to NGO pressure, "Fight" directs corporations to adapt
to the environment by using those tactics necessary to mitigate
the threat and overcome NGO opposition, including, if need be,
the willingness to battle for survival in "zero-sum conditions."
CSR, through the lens of "Fight," is merely "Corporate Scandal
Response."233
b. Implementation
Several tactics follow. First, "Fight" directs corporate coun-
sels to prosecute the criminal acts of NGOs... and to bring civil
actions to hold human rights NGOs accountable for the legally
unsupportable aspersions they cast against their corporate
targets.2 -" Second, corporations choosing "Fight" are lobbying
230. See Ehrlich, supra note 26, at 71 ("Law ... will resolve most questions
of business ethics in a way that most people will find appealing, without the
need to resort to questions of social responsibility.").
231. See Miwa, supra note 27, at 1229-30 (arguing that the notion that
corporations have duties to entities other than shareholders is "dangerous and
harmful" to the profitability and even survival of corporations).
232. PFTER LORANGE, CORPORATE PIANNING: AN ExeCuTiVE VIEWPOINT
119, 284 (1980).
233. Joe W. (Chip) Pitts III, Business, Human Rights, & the Environment:
The Role of the Lawyer in CSR & Ethical Globalization, 26 BERKELEYJ. INT'I. L. 479,
479 (2008).
234. NGOs have engaged in a host of allegedly illegal acts in support of
their advocacy, including destruction of animal testing labs, occupation of oil
platforms, sabotage, and illegal occupations of corporate property. See EDmUND
M. BURKE, MANAGING A COMPANY IN AN Ac-rvisT Womi.o 3 (2005) (chronicling
"violent" NGO protests, including the firebombing of gas stations in Germany,
destruction of oil wells in Canada, transmission of threatening letters to phar-
maceutical corporate employees, arson at research centers, and even murder).
In 2003, ExxonMobil filed a civil action against Greenpeace seeking injunctive
relief and damages for trespassing on ExxonMobil headquarters. Greenpeace,
Inc. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 133 S.W.3d 804, 807 (Tex. App. 2004) (affirming
grant of temporary injunction prohibiting Greenpeace protesters from entering
Exxon property). In 2006, ExxonMobil, acting through an NGO entitled Pub-
lic Interest Watch funded almost exclusively by ExxonMobil, filed an unsuccess-
fuil IRS complaint against Greenpeace, accusing it of abusing its tax-exempt
status in its lobbying efforts against ExxonMobil and of money laundering and
other financial crimes. See IRS Audited Greenpeace at Request ofExxonMobil-Funded
Group, Di,.MOc;RACY Now! (Mar. 24, 2006), http://www.clemocracynow.org/arti-
cle.pl?sid=06/03/24/150203.
235. Conley & Williams, supra note 31, at 16. For example, a New Zea-
land paper mill targeted with boycotts, trespassing, and intense negative media
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Congress to severely restrict, or even eliminate, corporate liability
under ATCA.2 36 Third, corporations that "Fight" are making
good on their threats to disinvest in order to avoid the threat of
litigation. For example, Chevron recently ceased operations in
offshore oilfields in southern Nigeria and permanently elimi-
nated jobs after militant attacks led to the abductions of six work-
ers and reduced output by more than 200,000 barrels per day.2 37
While Chevron might have hired additional security personnel
either from the private sector or from the ranks of the Nigerian
military in order to continue operations-the "socially responsi-
ble" choice, perhaps-had it done so, and had these personnel
in the discharge of their duties been accused of human rights
violations, the effect on Chevron's profitability might well have
been more negative than to simply cease operating. Finally, cor-
porations that "Fight" reject any responsibility for the actions of
host governments: when Shell was asked in 1995 to comment on
the detention, trial, and hanging of a group of Nigerian citizens
who had campaigned against environmental damage inflicted by
foreign petroleum corporations, the official response was that
"Nigeria makes its rules and it is not for private companies like us
to comment on such processes in the country."238 In sum, corpo-
rations that elect to "Fight," a committed group that may still
have constituted a majority less than a decade ago,23 9 are actively
demonstrating that they cannot be bent by NGO pressure to
'join the parade" of socially responsible corporations. To main-
tain their resolve they remind themselves that "[wie just don't
campaigns by Greenpeace sought an injunction; according to the mill manager,
"We decided to take the battle to Greenpeace, and our PR guy enjoyed the
scrap. We decided we can win this war. We can visit the schools before they do,
and build relationships with indigenous groups. It comes down to individuals
and over time, to trust." Robert A. Kagan et al., Explaining Corporate Environmen-
tal Performance: How Does Regulation Matter?, 37 LAw & Soc'v REv. 51, 72 (2003).
236. See Borchien Lai, Note, The Alien Tort Claims Act: Temporary Stopgap
Measure or Permanent Remedy?, 26 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 139, 161 (2005)
(describing such efforts).
237. Spencer Swartz & Chip Cummins, Chevron Move Hurts Oil Markets,
Nigeria, WALL. ST. J., May 12, 2007, at A3.
238. CHRISTOPHER AvERY, BusiNEss AND HUMAN RicHTS IN A TIME OF
CHANGE 22 (2000), available at http://198.170.85.29/Avery-Report.html. (fol-
low "2. Society Calls on business to act" link).
239. See id. (follow "4. A slow response to new realities" link) (stating that
"the absentees [from the CSR movement] remain in the majority, treating
human rights violations as external to their responsibilities, regarding any
adverse impact as a public relations problem rather than one that lies in the
heart of the boardroom").
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take a view that we should try to paint a picture of something
other than what we are."2o
The "Fight" strategy rests on two main, and potentially weak,
assumptions. First, it assumes that developing and maintaining
positive relationships with constituencies other than sharehold-
ers-an objective central to all other strategies-is irrelevant to
profitability. In other words, a reputation with certain constitu-
encies as a "good corporate citizen" is less valuable than the prof-
its to be had by refusing to perform those actions that would earn
that reputation.24 1 Second, it assumes that any legal liability suf-
fered by a corporation employing the "Fight" strategy will be less
than the additional profits earned by choosing to "Fight."
With respect to the first assumption, there is reason to
believe that positive relationships with at least some constituen-
cies are necessary, if not sufficient, conditions for profitability,
and that reputation matters. As one commentator reminds cor-
porations planning to "Fight,"
[t]he marketplace sometimes punishes bad acts. Selling
shoddy goods drives customers away; bad workplace condi-
tions drive employees away; wasteful use of resources drives
costs up. In the long run, these practices tend to fail. This
is particularly true when there will be repeated transactions
and enduring relationships, because the gain from future
cooperation exceeds the immediate gain that cheating
might bring. Hence, the importance of one's reputa-
tion . . . . It is not that good ethics is good business. It is
the other way around.2 4 2
240. Geoff Colvin, The Defiant One, FORTUNE, Apr. 30, 2007, at 86, 88. As
evidence of their intransigence in the face of NGO pressure, note that although
ExxonMobil has already spent $3 billion cleaning up the Prince William Sound
in Alaska after the spill in the Exxon Valdez case, the corporation continues to
resist paying the $2.5 billion in punitive damages awarded against it, contend-
ing that hundreds of peer-reviewed scientific studies conducted by researchers
from major independent scientific laboratories and academic institutions have
proven that "the ecosystem in Prince William Sound today is healthy, robust
and thriving." ExxonMobil, The Valdez Oil Spill, http://www.exxonmobil.com/
Corporate/about issues...valdez.aspx (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
241. CRANE & MATTEN, supra note 23, at 175. There is reason to believe
that the importance of reputation, and the impact of external events on corpo-
rate reputation, varies as between corporations, and that those that elect to
"Fight" may be less sensitive to repuitational effects. See generally BRENT FissE &
JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF PunuLcny- ON CORPORATE OFFENDERS (1983)
(developing a theory of corporate reputational effects and suggesting variation
in terms of sensitivity to reputational effects across corporations).
242. Ehrlich, supra note 26, at 66.
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The perception that a corporation is irresponsible with
respect to human rights protection may well earn it a bad reputa-
tion with at least some employees, customers, shareholders, insti-
tutional investors,2 43 concerned citizens, and even regulators.
Whether and, if so, how much the reputational effects of the
"Fight" strategy with regard to human rights depress profits are
very difficult to determine and may depend at least in part on the
validity of the second assumption.
Determining the legal liability suffered by a corporation
employing the "Fight" strategy in situations involving interaction
with human rights NGOs is a complex proposition. Only one
corporation to date has been found liable under ATCA,244 and
no existing international tribunal has yet asserted jurisdiction
over corporations for violations of human rights. 245 Yet just as
Congress or the federal judiciary can narrow the applicability of
ATCA to corporate human rights practices, these branches of the
government can also extend it. Moreover, the cost of litigation
in such cases is great even when corporations are successful in
avoiding liability. Finally, many risk-averse boards of directors
and managers are cautious about the prospect of future ATCA
claims, not primarily because of the potential for liability or the
cost of defense (although these are concerns)2 4 6 but because of
the "far more significant risk of damage to [corporate] reputa-
tion[s] from credible allegations of human rights abuse."24 7 In
the words of various business organizations in their amicus brief
to the Supreme Court in the Sosa case, ATCA "lawsuits almost
invariably raise highly charged allegations of human rights
abuses [and] generate considerable publicity .... The very exis-
tence of such lawsuits creates risk."2 4 1 In short, it is not even the
proof of human rights abuses, but the mere allegation thereof
243. See Williams & Conley, supra note 19, at 95 (noting that institutional
investors are increasingly requiring that corporations in which they hold shares
demonstrate "social responsibility").
244. As of this writing, only one corporation has been found liable, and
only two have settled cases. See supra notes 79-106 and accompanying notes.
245. See supra notes 81, 83-85 and accompanying text.
246. See Williams & Conley, supra note 19, at 88 (indicating that "human
rights violations are part of the liability risks that directors need to consider"
after Sosa).
247. Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins, & Michael Klausner, Outside
Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1055, 1092-94 (2006); see also Williams & Con-
ley, supra note 19, at 93 (stating that the "risks to business reputation from
credible allegations of human rights abuses create incentives for companies and
directors to consider these issues seriously, irrespective of whether an ultimate
finding of liability is likely.").
248. See Brief for the Nat'l Foreign Trade Council et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Commissioner, supra note 5, at 4.
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and the resulting public hue and cry, that may most significantly
injure the accused corporation's profitability.24 9
On the other hand, corporations truly committed to "Fight,"
even if they should be found liable under an invigorated ATCA,
are able to calculate and then pass along, or threaten to pass
along, the cost of any civil penalties imposed by courts to other
entities, resulting in lost jobs, higher prices, and fewer products
on the market.2 5 1o In some instances, "Fight" might even urge
deliberate acceptance of liability as a profitable and rational strat-
egy. The case of the Ford Pinto is an exemplar of this tactic:
The Ford Pinto was first introduced in 1971 and became
the focus of a major scandal when it was discovered that its
design allowed its fuel tank to be ruptured in the event of a
rear end collision. Ford was aware of this design flaw and
decided it would be cheaper to pay off possible lawsuits for
resulting deaths than to redesign the car. A cost-benefit
analysis prepared by Ford concluded that it would cost $11
per car to correct the flaws. Benefits derived from spend-
ing this amount of money were estimated to be $49.5 mil-
lion. This assumed that each death which could be
avoided would be worth $200,000, that each major burn
injury which could have been avoided would be worth
$67,000 and that an average repair cost of $700 per car
would also be avoided. It further assumed that there
would be 2,100 burned vehicles, 180 serious burn injuries
and 180 burn deaths during the lifetime of the car. When
the unit cost was spread out over the number of cars and
light trucks which would be affected by the design change,
at a cost of $11 per vehicle, the cost was calculated to be
$137 million, much greater than the $49.5 million benefit.
It was hence perfectly rational, according to this instru-
mental logic, to decide that 360 people should be burnt or
die rather than Ford pay out an extra $87 million.2 5 1
Moreover, although Ford clearly absorbed some reputa-
tional damage for its manufacture of the Pinto, public outrage
did not translate into formal or informal boycotts of other Ford
vehicles or otherwise injure Ford's profitability. In other words,
there is simply insufficient empirical evidence that, by electing to
249. See French, supra note 69, at 276 (discussing the utility of using pub-
lic shame to punish corporate misdeeds).
250. See Rafalko, supra note 174, at 315-16 (describing the "ricochet"
effects of civil punishment of corporations).
251. CAMPBELL JONES, MARTIN PARKER, & RENIE TEN Bos, FOR BUSINESS
ETHics 89 (2005).
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"Fight," a corporation will necessarily incur costs for legal liability
and/or reputational damage that will exceed the additional prof-
its to be earned by choosing that strategy.2 5 2 Unless the costs of
civil penalties and reduced consumer demand outweigh the
gains of cleaving closely to the pursuit of profits for the benefit of
shareholders-a calculation that may depend on the strategy
chosen by NGOs-the corporation beset by human rights
NGOs2 11 is, according to a "Fight" strategy, agnostic with regard
to ethics or morals, best off simply giving battle on all fronts-
legal, political, and economic. 25 4
2. Engage
a. Theory
The second strategy, "Engage," maintains that the "eco-
nomic mission" of the corporation is to maximize strength while
minimizing vulnerability in a world in which "steadily rising
moral and ethical standards" and rapidly expanding and unregu-
lated communications networks have sharpened the examination
of corporate activities and injected "complexity" into corporate
decision-making.2 55 "Engage," also described as "strategic corpo-
rate citizenship," 256 recognizes that many external constituencies
bring to bear additional demands upon the corporation and that
prudent corporate decision-makers must, out of self-interest and
necessity, be simultaneously prepared to exploit opportunities to
benefit from, or to shrewdly counter the constraints and threats
imposed by, these relationships. 257 Corporations employing the
"Engage" strategy must be acutely sensitive to opportunities and
threats in the external environment and either learn from expe-
rience how properly to differentiate between and respond to vari-
252. See, e.g., DONALDSON, supra note 34, at 114 (conceding that corporate
risk analysis relies on a combination of objective and subjective judgments and
that many corporations elect options that entail the likelihood of harm out of
the belief that the benefits outweigh that harm).
253. CRANE & MATTEN, supra note 23, at 363 (describing human rights
NGOs as a mass of "unelected, unaccountable ideologues").
254. One commentator describes corporations electing the "Fight" strat-
egy as "Corporate Locusts" that "operate ... everywhere destroying social and
environmental value and undermining the foundations of future growth." See
John Elkington, The Triple Bottom Line, in 3 THE AccouNTAIRE CORPORATION:
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILiIY, supra note 16, at 97, 104-05.
255. KENNETH R. ANDREws, THE CONCEPT OF CORPORATE STRATEGY 89
(rev. ed. 1980).
256. Note, Finding Strategic Corporate Citizenship: A New Game Theoretic View,
117 HARv. L. REv. 1957, 1958-59 (2004).
257. DANIEL R. GiLPERT, JR., THE TWILIGHT OF CORPORATE STRATEGY: A
COMPARATIVE ETHICAL CRITIQUE 86-104 (1992).
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ous "stakeholders" or else cease to exist in an increasingly
competitive economy."'
"Engage" is not an overtly political strategy. Its objective is
still the maximization of firm profits, and it acknowledges this by
the very act of making business decisions: a corporation reallo-
cates resources and impacts the interests of external constituents
(some positively and others negatively) who can affect firm prof-
itability through their responses.' Accordingly, "Engage"
embraces the principle that every corporate decision must be
based, at least in some measure, on noneconomic calculations. 2 6 0
Nor is "Engage" an expressly ethical strategy; it directs the corpo-
ration toward the maximization of profit by capitalizing upon
opportunities and minimizing threats, treating the "generally
accepted moral conventions current at the time" of each decision
in purely instrumental terms.26 '
Corporations electing to implement "Engage" must answer
three fundamental questions to implement the strategy: (1) Who
are the "stakeholders" and what is the relative importance of
each?; (2) What opportunities does each stakeholder present?;
and (3) What threats does each stakeholder make (implicitly or
expressly)?
i. Who is a stakeholder?
The domain of potential claimants to stakeholder status is
potentially vast, particularly for MNCs that operate around the
globe. In the case of British Petroleum, for example, the list
includes "hundreds, probably even thousands of [groups] . . .
[f]rom Azerbaijan educational groups, to British transport orga-
nizations, to Saharan desert communities, or fishing community
groups in Trinidad."2 62 Yet not all self-proclaimed stakeholders
are legitimate "stakeholders" within the understanding of that
word employed by "Engage" strategy, which maintains that a cor-
poration is the ultimate arbiter of who is a stakeholder and that
258. See Luo, supra note 29, at 214 (warning that "[flailure to pay heed to
[the demands of external constituencies]" can destroy a corporation's eco-
nomic value).
259. See, e.g., Williams & Conley, supra note 19, at 75-76 (describing the
political dimension of corporate decision-making with regard to assessing and
weighing the interests of various external constituencies and the impacts of cor-
porate actions upon these constituencies).
260. See, e.g., J.J. Boddewyn, International Political Strategy: A Fourth 'Generic'
Strategy (1986) (unpublished paper) (on file with author) (discussing a strategic
concept not dissimilar from "Engage").
261. Ehrlich, supra note 26, at 67.
262. CcANF. & MArTEN, supra note 23, at 352.
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the resolution of the question is both an objective and subjective
inquiry. Objectively, any individual or group who can assist or
hinder the corporation in the achievement of its overriding pur-
pose-profitability-affects the corporation and is thus a stake-
holder as that concept is employed within the "Engage" strategy.
Subjectively, managers may exercise theirjudgment to determine
that certain groups that are simply "affected by the corporation"
at present but may in the future gather the capacity to check its
organizational purposes, either through alliances with existing
stakeholders or through resort to media or government interven-
tion, may be regarded as stakeholders as well."'
Clearly, not all stakeholders are equally important. Those
who possess the power to enhance or threaten firm profitability,
make demands that are generally perceived as legitimate, and
require immediate corporate action are the most salient; the
"Engage" strategy instructs that it is toward them that corporate
energies must be directed in order to address their interests and,
thereby, to protect and promote the corporation.264
In the debate about CSR and human rights protection, vari-
ous external constituencies-typically, NGOs, consumer groups,
academics, and investors-claim that corporations must possess
"regulatory, economic, and social licenses [to operate]," that the
set of obligations to which corporations are bound is broader
than simply the existing corporate legal regime, and that these
constituencies-who self-identify as "shareholders"-are entitled
to privately enforce corporate compliance to the level of these
higher ethical and social standards by publicizing negative infor-
mation about wayward corporations, bringing lawsuits, and using
other means to injure corporate reputations.265 Each of these
constituencies poses an immediate threat to the profitability and
263. See FREEMAN, supra note 56, at 52 (developing the strategic approach
to the concept of "stakeholder").
264. See Ronald K. Mitchell et al., Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identifica-
tion and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts, 22 ACAD.
MGMT. REv. 853, 853-55. (1997) (elaborating upon a shareholder salience the-
ory); see also FORT, supra note 229, at 131-229 (discussing an Integrated Social
Contracts Theory that aids corporations in determining which stakeholders
should have influence). "Engage" often adopts a definition that assesses
whether the proposed stakeholder can negatively influence the corporation; if
so, the entity is a stakeholder. See, e.g., Robert A. Kagan et al., Explaining Corpo-
rate Environmental Performance: How Does Regulation Matter?, 37 LAw & Soc'v REv.
51, 52-77 (2003) (describing as stakeholders any entities that can "enforce[ ]
the terms of the social license [to operate]" by imposing adverse publicity, gen-
erating consumer boycotts, bringing citizen suits, or applying political pressure
for regulatory initiatives).
265. See Kagan et al., supra note 264 at 77-78 (describing informal
"enforcement" of "obligations" that exceed formal legal rules).
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the continued existence of the corporations they target2"" and
thus qualifies as a stakeholder under the "Engage" strategy.
On the other side of the equation, various other constituen-
cies in the debate over CSR and human rights may present
opportunities for enhancement of firm profitability. Employees,
customers, suppliers, and local communities may have prefer-
ences regarding corporate protection of human rights and the
capacity, through labor unions, business-to-business decision-
making, or consumer advocacy groups, to exercise choices with
regard to those preferences. Any constituency that has the
power to choose whether to do business with a corporation at any
point along its value chain, and who predicates that choice (at
least in part) upon its perception of that corporation's actions
with respect to the protection of human rights, is thus regarded
by the "Engage" strategy as a stakeholder." 7
ii. What are the Opportunities?
Advocates of the "business case for CSR"2"8 generally argue
that, by pursuing a socially responsible agenda, corporations
reap intangible resources from their stakeholders, such as
reputational benefits, increased organizational legitimacy, and
long-term relationships that translate into tangible benefits and
confer long-term competitive advantage over corporations that
are not committed to CSR." 9 In effect, the socially responsible
266. See CRANE & MATTEN, supra note 23, at 353 ("As soon as a [group]
starts to direct its attentions towards a corporation, the stakes begin to rise, and
the potential impact on the corporation and its reputation becomes more haz-
ardous.") (alteration in original).
267. For a discussion on the various indicia that corporations have used
to identify external stakeholders, see BURKE, supra note 234, at 79-89.
268. Williams & Conley, supra note 19, at 104. For a thorough presenta-
tion and critical examination of the "business case" for CSR, see SIMON ZADEK,
THE CivIL CORPORATION 65-76 (2001). For an examination of the business case
for CSR using empirical data from European corporations, see generally
Daniela Venanzi & Barbara Fidanza, Corporate Social Responsibility and Value Crea-
tion: Determinants and Mutual Relationships in a Sample of European Listed Firms
(2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=939
710 (finding a slight but positive correlation between responsible corporate
behavior and corporate value).
269. See, e.g., Shawn L. Berman et al., Does Stakeholder Orientation Matter?
The Relationship Between Stakeholder Management Models and Firm Financial Perform-
ance, 42 AcAD. MGMT. J. 488 (1999); Thomas Donaldson, Defining the Value of
Doing Good Business, FIN. TIMEs (London), June 3, 2005, at 2-3. The argument
is that a significant portion of the value of the socially responsible corporation
is achieved in the reputation of its brand, leaving such a corporation simultane-
ously vulnerable to reputational damage and open to reputational benefit. For
a detailed discussion of the concept of corporate reputation, see generally
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corporation sells its responsibility as a "product" in the market-
place for which there is positive demand. Primary stakeholders
value the protection of human rights independently of market
transactions, and are willing to pay a premium to do business
with a corporation that has earned its reputation by serving these
ends.270 Corporations that protect human rights may increase
consumer demand and decrease price sensitivity,2 7' increase
employee satisfaction, earn additional investment,272 enjoy price
CHARLES J. FORBRUN, REPUTATION: REALIZING VALUE FROM THE CORPORATE
IMAGE (1996).
270. Foremost among these primary stakeholders may well be consumers,
who register strong preferences in favor of CSR in surveys. See, e.g., Scalise,
supra note 184, at 288-89 (citing a September 2000 Business Week Harris Poll
in which U.S. respondents preferred, by a ratio of 19 to 1, socially responsible
corporate behavior over purely self-interested corporate behavior); see also
Greathead, supra note 48, at 725 (citing other studies). Socially responsible
corporations may also attract and retain more capable employees, as employee
preferences of where to work and loyalty once hired are correlated with percep-
tions of corporate ethics. Litowitz, supra note 170, at 813-14.
271. See, e.g., Thomas W. Dunfee, Marketing an Ethical Stance, FIN. TIMES
(London), Nov. 17, 1995, at 13 (noting that "[t]he Body Shop and ice cream
producer Ben & Jerry's receive substantial free media publicity as a result of
their identification with popular social issues . . . [as well as] a premium over
competing products."); Bruce Horovitz, Whole Foods Pledges To Be More Humane,
USA TODAY, Oct. 21, 2003, at IB (citing Whole Foods' adoption of price
increases in order to introduce humanely-raised and -slaughtered meats) (alter-
ation in original).
272. The contention is that certain socially responsible investment funds,
that assess corporations on variables such as transparency, environmental sus-
tainability, and protection of human rights, will purchase shares only of corpo-
rations that satisfy their guidelines. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 53
(stating that corporations which use their influence to promote human rights
promote a better climate for investment). Research supports this assertion:
investors have demonstrated a willingness to pay an 18% premium for shares of
U.S. corporations perceived to exercise sound corporate governance. See
Steven Lydenburg, The Mainstreaming of Socially Responsible Investing: Current
Developments and Future Trends, in 3 ACCOUNTABLE CORPORATION: CORPORATE
SOCIAL REsrONsIBurY, supra note 16, at 175, 177 (describing the growth of the
socially responsible investment movement and reporting that information
about a corporation's CSR record is, to socially responsible investors, the "finan-
cial equivalent of nutrition labels" on food). Teams at investment brokerages
responding to investor demand for information about corporate performance
assess how corporations are affected by variables ranging from environmental
performance to governance records and human rights performance. Id. at 181.
Paul Coombes & Mark Watson, Three Surveys on Corporate Governance, McKINSEYQ., Dec. 2000, at 74, 76; Pete Engardio, Beyond the Green Corporation, Bus. WK.,
Jan. 29, 2007, at 50, 54 (reporting that if Wal-Mart enjoyed the reputation that
Target possesses it would be worth an additional $16 billion); Roberto Newell &
Gregory Wilson, A Premium for Good Governance, MCKINSEY Q., Aug. 2002, at 20,
20-23. The Calvert Group, a leader in socially responsible investment, "actively
seek[s] out companies that are making serious efforts to promote human rights
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premiums on their equity due to reduced litigation and regula-
tory risk,"' and thus deliver increased valuation to their share-
holders.2 11 In short, if corporate attentiveness to human rights is
a good for which stakeholders are willing to pay, providing that
good serves corporate self-interest.27 5 As evidence of the oppor-
tunities available to the corporation electing the "Engage" strat-
egy, it is significant to note that many-perhaps even most-
senior executives accept the validity of the business case for
CSR,27" and that their public relations departments spend signifi-
cant organizational energy and resources to publicize their cor-
porate good citizenship in the various media.
at home and abroad." AVERY, supTa note 238. For a thorough examination of
the concept of socially responsible investment and the processes whereby it
adds value to corporations, see generally Frank Jan de Graaf & Alfred Slager,
Guidelines for Integrating Socially Responsible Investment in the Investment Process
(2009), available at, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract i(=9.19
108.
273. Stocks with good CSR ratings, as determined by managers of socially
responsible investment funds, may enjoy a small price premium because they
are more attractive purchases to such funds, while those with poor ratings can
carry a price discount. Moreover, socially responsible firms tend to enjoy lower
stock price volatility and lower firm-specific risk than irresponsible firms due
perhaps to decreased concerns about legal exposure. See Alison Maitland, Prof-
its from the Righteous Path, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 3, 2003, at 13 (citing a
study by the United Kingdom's Institute for Business Ethics).
274. See Luo, supra note 29, at 206 (indicating that for many socially
responsible corporations, "an increasing percentage of their corporate valie
today is made up of reputation, goodwill, or benevolence" earned through act-
ing responsibly). See generally Alison Mackey et al., Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity and Firm Performance: Investor Preferences and Corporate Strategies, 32 ACAn.
MGMT. Riv. 817 (2007), for a thorough empirical examination and analysis of
the "business case for CSR" and a conclusion that there is a positive correlation
between CSR and firm value.
275. A number of studies affirm the positive financial effects of socially
responsible corporate behavior. See, e.g.,JOSHUA DANIEL. MARGOLIS &JAMES PAT-
RICK WALSH, PEOPLE AND PROFITS? (2001);Jeffrey S. Harrison & R. Edward Free-
man, Stakeholders, Social Responsibility, and Performance: Empirical Evidence and
Theoretical Perspectives, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 479 (1999); Richard A. Johnson &
Daniel W. Greening, The Effects of Corporate Governance and Institutional Ownership
Types on Corporate Social Performance, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 564 (1999); Marc
Orlitzky et al., Corporate Social and Financial Performance: A Meta-Analysis, 24 OR;.
STun. 403, 424-25 (2003) (re-analyzing 52 empirical studies with a population
of 33,878 observations).
276. See WORlD Ec:oN. FORuNI, GLOHAL CORI'ORATE CITIZENSHI: THE
LEADERSHIP CHALLEINGE FOR CEOS AND BOARDS 10 (2002), available at http://
www.weforum.org/pdf/GCCI/GCC CEOstatement.pdf (reporting that 70% of
U.S. CEOs and 78% of European CEOs surveyed in 2002 agree that CSR is
essential to corporate profitability).
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iii. What are the Threats?
Critics of the business case for CSR contend that the "jury is
still out on the economic benefits to be derived from good cor-
porate citizenship" and that "[w] ith the exception of those in the
socially responsible investment business, [critics] have not heard
anyone make a robust claim that CSR can be shown to boost the
traditional bottom line."27 Few NGOs or the corporations they
monitor have attempted to quantify the costs or benefits of alter-
ing business practices to satisfy stakeholders concerned with cor-
porate CSR performance,2 7 8 and some recent empirical research
suggests that the cost of CSR is greater than its benefits, mea-
sured strictly in economic terms, to business. 279 As one commen-
tator noted before the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, "BP
is spending $200 million on reformulating their brand [as a
more socially responsible product] . . . . Yes, they're high on
corporate reputation rankings. But what does it do for them?"n2 8 o
Recent research suggests that CSR increases firm value only
where the demand for it exceeds available supply, and that,
under some conditions, a corporation that behaves "responsibly"
will actually decrease its value.2 8 '
277. Conley & Williams, supra note 31, at 14 (citing PouIomi MRINAI,
WHAT CASE FOR THE BUSINESS CASE, ETHICAL CORP. (June 3, 2005), http://www.
ethicalcorporation.com/content.asp?ContentlD=3718; see also Deva, supra note
207, at 741-42 (rejecting the business case for CSR on the basis of disconfirm-
ing empirical data). A handful of authors claim that the question of whether
CSR is beneficial to the profitability of a corporation has been decided in the
affirmative and that the debate is over. See Aguilera et al., supra note 30, at 836.
Others suggest that while CSR imposes costs it also serves to insure against
incurring other costs, such as reputational harm, the expense of litigation, and
so on. See, e.g., Mackey et al., supra note 274; Venanzi & Fidanza, supra note 268.
For a discussion on the merits of these claims and on the vitality of the debate,
see infra notes 278-83 and accompanying text.
278. See Conley & Williams, supra note 31, at 13-14. For example, with-
out offering any evidence, Amnesty International insists that it is "difficult to
put figures to the business costs and benefits associated with human rights, but
the connections are undeniable." AMNESTY INT'L, HUMAN RIGHTS: IS IT ANY OF
YOUR BUSINEss? 25 (2000).
279. See Conley & Williams, supra note 31, at 37; see also Brad Brown &
Susan Perry, Removing the Financial Performance Halo from Fortune's "Most Admired"
Companies, 37 AcAD. MCMT.J. 1347 (1994).
280. David J. Vogel, Managing Corporate Social Responsibility, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 3. 2007, at R2 ("[The CSR field] is littered with lofty intentions that don't
pay off.").
281. See Mackey et al., supra note 274, at 831-33 (noting, however, that
ascertaining demand and supply for CSR is exceedingly difficult, especially as
these variables are evolving, are subject to "shocks," and can be artificially
manipulated).
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Intuitively, formulating new policies, taking different
actions, and monitoring conduct will increase costs; it is less clear
that potential benefits will follow as a result. Moreover, increas-
ing supply of CSR "products" typically does not immediately
increase demand; there is a time lag during which the firm
absorbs costs. 28 2 Further, critics suggest that only the least price-
sensitive and best informed of consumers will voluntarily pay a
price premium for the goods or services offered by a socially
responsible corporation. 2 " Finally, many corporations have
declined to represent themselves as socially responsible in the
first instance by rejecting membership in organizations such as
the Global Compact out of fear that the slightest perceived viola-
tion of the rights enumerated therein will trigger expensive
litigation.284
b. Implementation
One of the most contested subjects within the field of corpo-
rate governance generally, and CSR specifically, is whether the
corporate pursuit of a socially responsible agenda is a benefit or
a cost.' The answer to this question in any specific case is
dependent upon a host of variables that are very difficult to
model in such a manner as to give constructive guidance to cor-
porate decision makers. A casuistic approach to the implementa-
282. Id. at 833.
283. See Conley & Williams, supra note 31, at 14 ("[E]very person we have
heard or interviewed has agreed with the proposition that they (except for an
affluent niche) will not pay more for responsibly-produced products."); see also
Deva, supra note 207, at 746 ("Stakeholders may not fully understand the con-
plex ethical dimensions involved in a given product or service . . . [and] do[ ]
not usually boycott each and every product or service."); id. ("[C]onsimers or
investors may very much like to support [CSR] but for the price of doing so; the
more the variance in price between the products and services of X [the respon-
sible corporation] and Y [the irresponsible corporation], the less the chances
that rewards and sanctions will flow from consumers .... ); Ezra Rosser, Offset-
ting and the Consumption of Social Responsibility, 89 WASH. U. L. Riv. (forthcoming
2011) (conceding that only a very small percentage of consumers will pay a
significant price premium to ensure CSR, and that the likelihood they will do so
is proportional to their incomes and personal wealth).
284. See, e.g., Kielsgard, supra note 84, at 203 ("The issuance of corporate
human rights policies and acquiescence to international initiatives, like the
Global Compact, . . . puts [corporations] on the record vis-a-vis their responsibil-
ity for human rights norms . . . [and the] use of the company policy to impeach
them, either in a public relations forum or in a lawsuit, can have a devastating
impact.").
285. See Deva, supra note 207, at 745 ("[R]esults coining from this
research so far have not been conclusive or one-sided .... ).
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tion of "Engage" that identifies relevant variables, assigns them
weights, and links them in a chain of causation is necessary.
Generically speaking, "Engage" counsels corporations to
manage relationships with stakeholders in the non-market envi-
ronment aggressively and proactively, and many corporations
have formed CSR departments with mandates to do just this.286
From a tactical perspective, "Engage" is amoral and self-inter-
ested: the theory seeks to shape and even manipulate public and
media opinion through tactical demonstrations of support for
causes clebres2 "lobbying, educational efforts, forming alliances
with other corporations, (lawfully) purchasing influence with
government and regulatory officials, signing on to NGO declara-
tions such as the Global Compact to enhance reputation, selec-
tively developing relationships with certain NGOs to increase
leverage over them, and [taking] other forms of 'political
action'"28 that are permissible and legitimate means of coun-
tering threats and seizing opportunities to enhance profitability.
Many mining corporations and financial services corporations
with imperfect reputations have embraced "Engage" as the strat-
egy most likely to minimize negative social pressures while pre-
serving profitability;289 an interesting recent application is the
286. See Williams & Conley, supra note 19, at 81 (providing examples of
corporations that have formed CSR departments).
287. The use of the word "manipulating" is deliberate: NGO critics
accuse a number of corporations, including BP, Bayer, Nike, Shell, Rio Tinto,
and Nestl6, of using proclamations of commitment to CSR as marketing tools to
enhance their reputations and images and gain benefits from consumers and
other stakeholders without actually transforming their practices. See generally
Terry Collingsworth, "Corporate Social Responsibility," Unmasked, 16 ST. THOMAs L.
REv. 669 (2004) (arguing that corporate voluntarism is a public relations ploy
designed to gain corporations a positive image but which is bereft of any sin-
cere commitment to human rights principles); see also Conley & Williams, supra
note 31, at 15 ("[S]ome CSR insiders have expressed a concern that [corpora-
tions] may be 'gaming the system' . . . [by] imposing a code of conduct. . . only
to . . . revert[ ] to business as usual .... ); Note, supra note 256, at 1969-70
(" [S]ome firms use socially responsible behavior to shield themselves from
interest group criticism and public sanctions" even as they carry on irresponsi-
bly, while others simply strive to create the perception that they engage in
socially responsible behavior to reap the benefits of this perception in the mar-
ketplace.). One commentator refers to this deliberate manipulation as the
"ugly" face of CSR. See SUBHABRATA BOBBY BANERJEE, CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILilY: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY 2 (2007).
288. DONALDSON, supra note 34, at 40.
289. YAKOviiVA, supra note 17, at 19. Interestingly, however, not all min-
ing corporations have adopted the basic "Engage" strategy; at least some of the
corporations with greater market capitalization, including Rio Tinto, Normany
Mining, and Placer Dome, have moved "beyond compliance" and adopted fairly
rigorous and restrictive voluntary industry codes of conduct. Id. at 98. These
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"Members Project" by American Express, which urges card mem-
bers to vote on a "project to do something good for our world"
and promises to fund the winning project with a $5 million
grant. 290 Through the "Members Project," American Express is
simultaneously reinforcing its brand, demonstrating its commit-
ment to CSR to its most important stakeholders, and seemingly
inviting these stakeholders into full partnership, all for less than
0.2% of its gross profit.2"'
Thus, under the "Engage" strategy, the corporation may,
and indeed should, vigorously protect human rights so long as it
is profitable to do so. For example, as Royal Dutch Shell stated
in its Principles (1997) it is formally committed to supporting
"fundamental human rights in line with the legitimate role of
business."2 1 If it is not profitable to protect human rights, how-
ever, "Engage" directs the corporation to either (1) reshape the
interests of stakeholders so that they come to disfavor corporate
involvement in human rights protection, (2) reduce stakehold-
ers' capacity to do harm by concerted lobbying and legal efforts
to eliminate or reduce potential ATCA liability, or (3) pass along
the costs of human rights protection, such as privately contracted
and directly accountable security forces, foregone opportunity
costs in states where governments cannot be constrained, and lia-
bility judgments or settlements in claims brought under ATCA,
to consumers and other external constituencies.
corporations might be more properly classified as having chosen an "Engage
Plus" strategy: although they have not elected to "Accommodate," they have
distinguished themselves from peers.
290. See Am. EXPRESs, The Members Project, FACEROOK.COM, http://www.
facebook.com/ membersproject (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
291. See AM. ExPREss, Financial Statement (2006), available at http://money
central.msn .com/investor/invsub/results/statemnt.aspx?symbol=axp.
292. See DONALDSON & DUNFEE, supra note 43, at 4 (citing Shell's Princi-
ples) (citation omitted).
293. An example of the successful implementation of "Engage," albeit in
strategic interaction with NGOs in the issue-area of health and environment
rather than human rights, is the case of Pepsi. See Diane Brady, Pepsi: Repairing
a Poisoned Reputation in India, Bus. WK.,June 11, 2007, at 46-54. When hit with
boycotts for allegedly introducing high levels of pesticides in its soft drinks in
India and draining water from water-poor areas for its production, Pepsi recog-
nized community groups as important stakeholders and funded construction of
clean water delivery systems and environmental improvements in poor areas
but refused to bend to pressure to withdraw its products or alter its manufactur-
ing on the ground that Pepsi products were, according to its CEO, "the safest in
the world, bar none," and the tests suggesting impurities were faulty. Id. (quot-
ing Pepsi CEO Indra K. Nooyi). Instead, the CEO traveled to India, met
directly with influential news media, and appeared in public speaking about
Pepsi initiatives to improve the environment. Sales of Pepsi resumed and rose
to levels higher than before the boycotts. Id. Recognizing the value of Pepsi's
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3. Accommodate
a. Theory
The third strategy, "Accommodate," is grounded in the
belief that it is possible and desirable to produce a theory of the
corporation that is "simultaneously morally sound in its behav-
ioral prescriptions and instrumentally viable in its economic out-
comes."294 Thus, the selection of "Accommodate" as corporate
strategy entails a commitment, as in the case of Altria-the par-
ent corporation of the tobacco company Philip Morris-to a
"responsibility effort" that pledges to all stakeholders that the
corporation will make not only lawful business decisions but
"responsible" ones, implying a standard of ethical care higher
than that imposed by law... and a commitment to "overcomp-
liance" rather than to merely brushing over the legal bar. Corpo-
rations that "Accommodate" reject an adversarial relationship
with critics in favor of forming partnerships that can assist them
in identifying and addressing potential CSR problems even
before they develop."" In short, CSR is an important part of
their business profile and their strategy.2 9 7
strategy, Coke is now planning to replicate it. See Andrew Batson, Coke Aims to
Improve Water Recycling, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2007, at A1O.
294. Jones et al., supra note 30, at 28. Many corporate executives are
philosophically committed to the tenet of the "Accommodate" strategy that
maintains that if a corporation embraces CSR and alters its business practices in
keeping with the normative regimes, CSR imports the net economic outcome
will be positive. Conley & Williams, supra note 31, at 13-14.
295. See AITRIA, Responsibility: Our Approach, http://www.altria.com/en/
cms/Responsibility/At A Glance/Our Approach/default.aspx# (last visited
Oct. 11, 2011). In other words, under the "Accommodate" strategy, laws pro-
scribing unethical conduct could "wither away" or be repealed and corpora-
tions would nonetheless refrain from engaging in such behavior no matter how
profitable.
296. Conley & Williams, supra note 31, at 5.
297. See Gary R. Weaver et al., Integrated and Decoupled Corporate Social Per-
formance: Management Commitments, External Pressures, and Corporate Ethics Prac-
tices, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 539 (1999) (describing what is effectively the
"Accommodate" strategy). Corporations that have made CSR an integral part
of their business, although more in the environmental rather than the human
rights arena, include Unilever, GE, GlaxoSmithKline, and Sony. See Engardio et
al., supra note 272. Corporations that "Accommodate" have been termed "Cor-
porate Honeybees" because of their capacities to create a "sustainable business
model" with a "clear ... set of ethics-based business principles" and for their
"sociability and ... powerful symbiotic relationships ..... Elkington, supra note
254, at 107. Other commentators describe this strategy as a "New Economy"
approach in which the corporation adapts, acts on stakeholder interests, and
builds new CSR competencies voluntarily and without primary reference to
profitability. ZADEK, supra note 268, at 67.
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The "Accommodate" strategy incorporates five basic princi-
ples: (1) corporations are responsible for all of the direct and
indirect outcomes of their business operations;"" (2) managers
are moral as well as economic agents obliged to exercise discre-
tion toward the achievement of socially responsible outcomes;2 W'
(3) the protection of human rights is decidedly within the sphere
of the outcomes of corporate business operations; (4) conflicts
between corporate ends and the ends of stakeholders, and in
particular NGOs, are to be resolved through cooperation and
relational negotiation rather than through litigation, with the
object being the discovery of hidden value and the accommoda-
tion of all parties' interests;"oo and (5) profit and ethical practice
are mutually reinforcing from both positive and normative per-
spectives: their intersection in the use of the "Accommodate"
strategy-also known as "convergent stakeholder theory"o3 0_
adds value to corporations and produces morally just outcomes.
b. Implementation
Implementation of "Accommodate" in the issue-area of
human rights protection requires several concrete actions. A
corporation must first survey its operations against the backdrop
of its code of conduct, declarations such as the Global Compact,
the Norms, and the Framework, and other statements of best
practices to identify situations or circumstances where its con-
duct, even if lawful, falls short of delivering socially responsible
human rights outcomes."o2 It must then bear the expenses asso-
ciated with altering its practices if necessary, negotiating with
injured parties and relevant stakeholders as to redress and mea-
298. See Luo, sufra note 29, at 200 (labeling this the "principle of public
responsibility").
299. Id. at 202 (labeling this the "principle of managerial discretion").
300. See TIMOTHY L. FORT, ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE: BUSINFSS AS MEDIAT-
INC INSTITUTION 11 (2001) (suggesting, from an "Accommodate" strategic point
of reference, that whereas "law [is] framed in adversarial terms ... business ...
focus[es] on cooperation" and relational negotiation).
301. Jones et al., supra note 30, at 28-29.
302. A number of corporations employing the "Accommodate" strategy,
including Barclays, Ericsson, GE, General Motors, Hewlett-Packard, and Novar-
tis have formed the Business Leaders Initiative for Human Rights ("BLIHR") to
"break down some of the barriers and uncertainties that have kept many
responsible companies from realizing their role in supporting universal human
rights." BuSINrss LEADERS INITIATIVE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Sept. 14, 2011),
http://w.blihr.org. BLIHR aims to "find practical ways of implementing the
[international human rights instruments] in a business context" and to inspire
other businesses to do likewise. Id.
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sures to prevent future violations, and subscribing to initiatives
such as the Global Compact, the Norms, and the Framework.
Furthermore, it must defend its commitment to ethical con-
duct if challenged by shareholders. Under existing corporate
law-even in jurisdictions that lack stakeholder statutes-the
managers and directors of corporations are permitted to "take
into account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded
as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business, and ...
devote a reasonable amount of resources" to CSR functions.os
However, the corporation electing "Accommodate" as its strategy
must anticipate and prepare arguments to defend its business
judgment against shareholder derivative suits challenging its pur-
suit of particular human rights outcomes as an abandonment of
shareholder interests and a violation of fiduciary duty."0
4. Collaborate
a. Theory
The fourth strategy, "Collaborate," is distinct in that it states
the core mission of the corporation in virtually altruistic terms
and rejects the argument that corporations are economically
rational actors.3 05 Although some managers go so far as to sug-
gest that the pursuit of profit is "wicked and immoral and must
be curbed and controlled by external forces,""o6 the "Collabo-
303. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TioNs Part 1I(a)-(b) (Tentative Draft No. 2, Apr. 13, 1984).
304. Well-settled case law supports the "Accommodate" strategy and the
proposition that the business judgment rule has always given managers and
directors wide discretion to make decisions that advance stakeholders' interests
even at the expense of shareholders. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d
776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). The Australian and other common legal systems make
similar allowances for directors and managers to consider the interests of stake-
holders even at shareholders' expense; many civil law systems specifically
require such considerations. See generally Andrew Lumsden & Saul Fridman,
Corporate Social Responsibility: The Case for a Self-Regulatory Model, (Sydney L. Sch.
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07/34, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=987960, for a discussion of Australian corporate law as regards direc-
tors' and managers' duties, the consistency of the "Accommodate" strategy and
self-regulation more generally with Australian law, and suggestions for how Aus-
tralian law might be reformed to further protect directors and managers exer-
cising a vision of CSR.
305. See POSNER, supra note 217, at 3-4 (arguing that corporations are
economically rational entities that, by virtue of this rationality, ineluctably pur-
sue economic self-interest).
306. Donaldson, supra note 14, at 166. Some scholars have noted that
some corporations have undergone an "overreaction" to the felt necessity of
adopting CSR programs and have, as a result, neglected to maintain a focus on
profitability. See, e.g., Vogel, supra note 280.
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rate" strategy generally does not demonize profit but rather seeks
it out in order to place it voluntarily in the service of all conceiva-
ble stakeholders.'' As capitalist potentate Henry Ford II
explained in embracing a "Collaborate" strategy before a
Harvard Business School audience in 1969: "[f]or a long time
people believed that the only purpose of industry is to make a
profit. They were wrong. Its purpose is to serve the general
welfare."-""
This normative commitment to the social welfare and to eth-
ical objectives, even at the expense of profit, allows corporations
electing the "Collaborate" strategy to dispense with any concerns
about the accountability or the agendas of stakeholder organiza-
tionso" and to open their doors to admit these entities as full
partners. Accordingly, NGOs have become "part of the system,"
and it is no longer a question of acceding to NGO demands;
rather, corporations are falling into the ranks beside them,
eagerly and even passionately embracing CSR as their identity
and their lodestar."" The social, economic, political, and cul-
tural views of the corporation that elects to "Collaborate" and the
NGO are shared, their preferences are identical, and they pub-
307. Under CEO Emeritus Bill Gates, the Microsoft Corporation, at least
in the last decade, has gradually transitioned into what might best be described
as a "Collaborate" strategy in regard to NGOs and the CSR agenda in general.
Although Microsoft is still run profitably, profit has taken a back seat to charita-
ble works: Gates, as of June 2008, has left his managerial role to focus com-
pletely on philanthropy at the head of his $60 billion Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation. In his words, "'Humanity's greatest advances are not in its discov-
eries-but in how those discoveries are applied to reduce inequality.'" Robert
A. Guth, The Speechmaker: How Bill Gates Got Ready for Harvard, WALL. ST. J., Jun.
8, 2007, at Al (quoting Bill Gates).
308. DAVI W. EwING, FREFOM INSImE THE ORGANIZATION 65 (1977)
(quoting Henry Ford II, grandson of Henry Ford, the founder of the Ford
Motor Company).
309. SeeJem Bendell, Civil Regulation: A New Form of Democratic Governance
for the Global Economy?, in TERMS FOR ENmARMENT: BusINIss, NGOS AND SUSTAIN-
AllEi DiEvi.OPMENT, supra note 214, at 239, 239-54.
310. See Conley & Williams, supra note 31, at 11 (indicating that for some
managers, embracing CSR is not simply an attitude toward corporate govern-
ance but is rather a "feel-good, therapeutic focus on process"). For some "true
believers," CSR is less a mode of corporate governance or an ethical corporate
strategy than it is a cult complete with behavioral and intellectual homogeneity
and the promise of "continued self-improvement." Id. at 9; see also BURKE, Supra
note 234, at 8 (noting that Orin Smith, CEO of Starbucks, volunteers alongside
employees to clean beaches as part of his commitment to an expansive notion
of CSR). One former CEO describes CSR as a moral commitment and a "con-
cern for justice," as expressed in the corpus of international human rights law
and environmental law, which permeates business decision-making. Pitts, supra
note 233, at 491-92.
BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL
licly express their joint commitments. 31' Symbiotic partnerships
thus formed create, in effect, joint ventures between corpora-
tions and NGOs-in which both partners are able to decide cor-
porate actions and policies,3 12 including investment decisions,
divestment decisions, and operating policies.
However, while "Collaborate" implies equality as between
partners, NGOs have been quick to assert their influence, and
corporations that choose to "Collaborate" may find that unless
they participate in their power-sharing arrangements they may
surrender decisional freedom to NGOs who will wind up "con-
trolling the agenda and defining the choices that are availa-
ble."314 While this may be of concern to some corporations, it
appears that others are so committed to "Collaborate" and so
dependent upon NGO approval that they do not fret the loss of
strategic control or the sacrifice of profitability that may accom-
pany their pursuit of CSR. Examples of this strategy put into
practice include corporations such as The Body Shop, Ford, Gen-
eral Motors, Novartis, and Microsoft announcing, unbidden, that
they and their suppliers promote fair trade, oppose animal test-
ing, defend human rights, protect the environment, and assist in
disaster relief around the globe; in response, NGOs laud them
with awards and praise them as "responsible corporate
citizens.""
b. Implementation
Implementation of "Collaborate" in the protection of
human rights is largely a matter of allowing human rights NGOs
to set an agenda and dedicating the necessary financial resources
to fund their work in transnational fora and in the field. Corpo-
rations that "Collaborate" lead in the adoption and adherence to
the Global Compact and the Norms yet strive to meet the even
higher standards demanded by their NGO partners, who are
invited to closely monitor every stage and every locale of their
operations.3 6 If local governments complicate the attainment of
311. See BuIUxE, supra note 234, at 99 (describing the degree of symbiosis
in the corporate-NGO relationship that emerges under these conditions).
312. CRANE & MAT-TEN, supra note 23, at 369.
313. See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 278, at 11 (describing an ideal corpo-
rate strategy from the NGO perspective as ceding this power to NGOs).
314. Conley & Williams, supra note 31, at 18 (quoting SustainAbility's
research and advocacy director).
315. See Deva, supra note 207, at 715-16 (footnote omitted) (describing
the symbiotic relationship between corporations and NGOs that characterizes
the "Accommodate" strategy).
316. Collaborating corporations might also voluntarily adopt the
"Human Rights Impact Assessment" approach that anticipates and mitigates
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high standards of human rights protection, corporations that
"Collaborate" divest and swiftly and quietly reach negotiated set-
tlements should any parties allege violations of human rights as a
result of corporate activity. Finally, the "Collaborate" strategy,
recognizing the potential for competitive advantage, urges gov-
ernments to adopt more expansive legislation, including the Uni-
form Code, to create jurisdiction and tribunals that can impose
civil and even criminal liability on other corporations whose com-
mitments to human rights protection in both theory and practice
fall short of those who "Collaborate." In short, with respect to
human rights protection, corporations that "Collaborate" are
effectively hosts, perhaps even proxies, for their NGO partners.
5. Summary
When interacting with NGOs in the domain of human rights
protection, corporations choose from four primary strategic
options that guide decisions such as where and how to do busi-
ness and what considerations to give to the consequences of cor-
porate decisions and actions. Although the millions of
corporations across the globe are all but universally committed
to the protection of human rights as a desirable end in theory,
their conduct shows great variation in their acceptance of the
argument that corporations, rather than states, bear moral and
legal responsibility for human rights in practice. The four pri-
mary corporate strategies for interaction with human rights
NGOs-Fight, Engage, Accommodate, and Collaborate-reflect
this variation.
III. MODELING THE CONFLICT AND PROSPECTIVE SOLUTIONS
A. Game Theory: An Introduction
When a corporation and the human rights NGO community
interact, each party (1) assesses its objectives and preferences
and its limitations and constraints, (2) is aware that its actions
will affect the outcome or set of outcomes available to the other,
and (3) makes decisions in response to what the other will do (or
what each thinks the other might do). Interdependency is criti-
cal. Because each party can affect the outcome available to the
other, corporations and human rights NGOs do not engage in
impacts of firm activities on the human rights of a wide range of stakeholders.
See Tarek F. Maassarani et al., Extracting Corporate Responsibility: Towards a
Human Rights Impact Assessment, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 135 (2007) (describing a
collaborative and proactive corporate approach to preventing human rights vio-
lations similar to environmental impact assessments and labeled "Human
Rights Impact Assessment").
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independent decision-making but rather in the explicit calcula-
tion of each other's actions upon their own decisions and in the
selection of actions based upon these cross-effects. The interac-
tion between "strategies," or choices available to each "player," is
known as a "game."s' Accordingly, it is useful to turn to game
theory, a relatively young but important branch of the decision
sciences that permits the generation of core strategic principles
and provides a rigorous method for analyzing these principles
and the decisions players make as they interact under conditions
of strategic interdependence. 3 1 8
In brief, game theory assigns the outcomes associated with a
game, which correspond to each available combination of strate-
gies, numerical values, or "payoffs," which are a function of the
strategic interaction.3 ' The rules of the game are simply the list
of players, the strategies available to each player, the payoffs to
each player of all possible strategy combinations, and the
assumption of rationality."o Note that although game theory
presumes rationality-meaning that players purposefully act to
maximize their payoffs321-it does not presume the values play-
ers pursue, nor does it assume perfect information, perfect play,
or perfect competition. Games range the spectrum in terms of
the degree of opposition of player interests from pure coopera-
tion games, in which players must coordinate strategies to maxi-
mize payoffs, to zero-sum games in which either player gains only
at the expense of the other.
In determining the selection of strategies, each player seeks
to play a "dominant strategy," defined as that strategy that out-
performs all of that player's other strategies irrespective of the
rival's strategy, and to avoid a "dominated strategy," defined as
that strategy that is uniformly worse for the player playing it than
317. See AVINASH DIXIT & SUsAN SKEATH, GAMES OF STRATEGY 18-20 (2d
ed. 2004) (differentiating mere "decisions" from "games" on the basis of a
mutual capacity to affect the outcomes available to the other party).
318. Game theory as a discipline dates back to World War II. See, e.g.,
JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR (1944). While a relative newcomer to the social sciences, game the-
ory is robust in its explanatory and predictive capabilities as confirmed by
experimental research and field observations across a wide range of disciplines.
See Vernon L. Smith, Game Theory and Experimental Economics: Beginnings and
Early Influences, in TOWARD A HISTORY OF GAME THEORY 241 (E. Roy Weintraub
ed., 1992).
319. DIXIT & SKEATH, supra note 317, at 28-29.
320. Id. at 32.
321. "Payoffs" are simply numerical values for the units of the "good"
achieved by a given outcome and can be defined in economic or noneconomic
terms.
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any of his other strategies. When each player employs the strat-
egy that is the best response to the strategies of the other player,
an "equilibrium" with corresponding payoffs is achieved in
which, given what the other player does, neither would alter his
own move. If neither player has a dominant strategy, each
chooses a strategy that maximizes his own payoff while correctly
anticipating the payoff-maximizing strategy of his rival, and a
"Nash equilibrium" of mutual "best responses" results.
1. The Prisoners' Dilemma
The Prisoners' Dilemma ("PD") is a commonly used game
useful in explaining and predicting interactions between players
who wish to cooperate but are uncertain whether self-interest will
permit it. In the standard PD game, two players each interested
in maximizing their own payoffs simultaneously choose strategies
and receive payoffs determined by their combination of strate-
gies. Although each player can gain by cooperating, the strategy
of "defecting," or betraying the other player, is dominant for
each player and cooperation fails. For example, two suspects, A
and B, are arrested by the police, who have insufficient evidence
to convict either. The police, having physically separated both
prisoners, visit each to offer the same deal: if one testifies for the
prosecution against the other while the other remains silent, the
defector goes free and the silent accomplice receives the full ten-
year sentence. If both remain silent, both are sentenced to only
six months on a lesser charge. If each betrays the other, each
receives a two-year sentence. Each prisoner must decide whether
to defect or to "cooperate," defined here as remaining silent.
However, neither prisoner can be certain what choice the other
will make. The dilemma can be summarized as follows:
TABLE 1: THE PRISONERS' DILEMMA
Prisoner B
Silent Confess
Prisoner A Silent .5, .5 10, 0
Confess 0, 10 2, 2
Prisoner A's payoff is listed first-the smaller the payoff the
lower the sentence and the greater the value to the player.
Each player desires for the other to remain silent while he
confesses, yet both know that if each confess they will receive two-
year sentences-a worse outcome than the cooperative outcome
of six-month sentences. The cooperative outcome is Pareto opti-
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mal-any other decision would be worse for the two prisoners
considered together-but unstable, because neither can be sure
that the other will not defect in the hope of escaping punish-
ment entirely and forcing the other to serve ten years. Conse-
quently, because defection is not punishable and the dominant
strategy for each is to confess, a suboptimal Nash equilibrium
results where each player confesses and serves two years and
would not wish unilaterally to change his strategy. In other
words, a collectively irrational outcome is obtained through indi-
vidually rational actions. Each player would like to remain silent
if he could be certain that the other player would remain silent
as well; since neither can be sure, they cannot escape from the
dilemma and are stuck with a sentence four times longer than
that which they might have received.
B. The "Corporation" v. The "NGOs"
The strategic interaction, or game, between any given corpo-
ration and the human rights NGOs can be modeled using a
multi-strategic variation of the standard PD game."' In this
322. It is also possible to conceive of the provision of human rights pro-
tection as a public goods problem, where each corporation is effectively playing
a game against other corporations and employing strategies with regard to
human rights protection in consideration of what strategies it expects other
corporations to choose. In such a game, a cooperative strategy is one that pro-
vides human rights protection, whereas a defection is one that does not. The
payoff to the corporation that defects while others cooperate is greater than the
payoff for cooperation because the defector does not incur the costs of provid-
ing protection, thus conferring upon the defector a competitive advantage rela-
tive to cooperating corporations. However, if too many corporations defect,
increased government prosecution and generalized reductions in public per-
ceptions of business make all corporations worse off than if they had all cooper-
ated. Nonetheless, because of uncertainties as to what strategies other
corporations will choose, in this game defection emerges, ironically, as the
dominant strategy, even for corporations that would otherwise prefer to cooper-
ate, unless: (1) players can communicate, (2) the game is played repeatedly, or
(3) third-parties, such as the government or NGOs, can impose direct and
meaningful sanctions upon defectors. See AVINASH K DiXIT & BARRY J.
NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE COMPETITIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POIIT-
ics, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 115-18 (1991) (modeling this game); see also Deva, supra
note 207, at 742-44 (analyzing corporate conduct regarding CSR as a public
goods game); Note, supra note 256, at 1965-69 (analyzing corporate conduct
regarding CSR as a public goods game). While the foregoing is an important
application of game theoretic modeling to the study of CSR, the questions
posed in the present Article involve the assignment of the benefits of strategies
directly to the players, thus dictating the treatment of the game as one involving
private goods. More specifically, this Article asks: (1) what are the optimal strat-
egies for corporations and for NGOs in their strategic interaction over the
issue-area of human rights protection, and (2) are there outcomes that are
either Pareto optimal or Nash equilibria that might be achieved through com-
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game, as in the standard PD game, there are two players-the
"corporation" and the "NGOs""-yet instead of two strategies,
"cooperate" and "defect," there are four and five discrete strate-
gies available to the corporation and to NGOs respectively.
Thus, rather than four, there are a total of 4-by- 5, or twenty,
outcomes possible, each with a set of associated payoffs. Once
these outcomes and their payoffs are determined, they can be
represented in a 4-by- 5 matrix324 and subjected to analysis.
1. General Assumptions
In determining payoffs for each of the twenty possible out-
comes, the present theory makes the following simplifying
assumptions:
(1) protection of human rights is equally costly or beneficial
as a proportion of revenue for all corporations; 25
(2) payoffs associated with the various strategies can be
assigned within a reasonable margin of error;
munication or third-party intervention and which are superior to those that
pertain at present?
323. Although it is possible to apply game theory to interactions of more
than two players, by representing each corporation as a discrete decisional
entity and aggregating all the various human rights NGOs into a second and
unitary decisional entity it becomes possible to generate testable explanations
and predictions of corporate and NGO behavior without vastly expanding the
complexity of the model and the calculations necessary to build it. This maneu-
ver, while a simplification of reality, is perhaps not inappropos: each corpora-
tion is an independent decisional entity, even if it is influenced by internal and
external constituencies, and the human rights community is made up of a pre-
dictable variety of players-human rights and labor NGOs, trade unions,
national and international business organisations, lawyers, and academics from
multiple disciplines-whose preferences and normative understandings tend to
be rather closely aligned. See Kinley & Chambers, supra note 156. For these
reasons at the least, theoretical parsimony, so long as it does not seriously
weaken explanatory and predictive power, is desirable.
324. See infra Table 2.
325. There is reason to suspect that this assumption does not survive
closer comparative analysis: different national political economies afford differ-
ing incentives and impose differing costs for corporations considering whether
to engage in CSR generally and the protection of human rights more specifi-
cally. See Aguilera et al., supra note 30; see also Isabelle Maignan & David A.
Ralston, Corporate Social Responsibility in Europe and the U.S.: Insights from Busi-
nesses' Self-Presentations, 33 J. INT'l. Bus. STUn. 497 (2002) (reporting that the
tendency toward socially responsible corporate behavior varies across coun-
tries). However, incorporating the assumption simplifies analysis and aids the-
ory-building and thus it falls to future research to examine the role of national
cultural and political-economic variables in determining CSR strategies and
behaviors.
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(3) costs and benefits of strategies are objective and
transparent;
(4) costs and benefits are private;3 26
(5) no other strategies are possible;
(6) players elect "pure" strategies-that is, they do not play a
mixed strategy of "Fight" and "Engage," or "Demonstrate" and
"Regulate;"
(7) payoffs are a function of the degree to which each player
accomplishes its objectives;
(8) NGOs' objectives are fixed; the objectives of the corpora-
tion depend on and vary with the strategy it selects;
(9) players are playing a one-shot game and do not consider
the effects of their play on the future; and
(10) each player has no reliable information about what
strategy the other will play.
The present pre-theory is very specific in not assuming that a
corporation has a preference for maximizing profit simply by vir-
tue of the fact that it is a corporation. Although "rationality [and
thus profit maximization] is a strong assumption in the legal
literature about how corporations . . . behave in market settings,"
empirical observation suggests strongly that preferences vary
between corporations, and for this reason corporations elect dif-
ferent strategies to satisfy different preferences. 2
2. Assumptions Regarding Payoffs
a. NGOs
The "NGOs" player can earn a maximum payoff of "100" in
interacting with a corporation. Points are earned by NGOs for
the commission of each corporate act as follows:
(i) negotiate directly with NGOs, 5 points;
(ii) sue NGOs, -5 points;
(iii) adopt voluntary Code of Conduct, 5 points;
326. For an analysis of the game that relaxes or discards these assump-
tions, treats CSR as a public good, and allows corporations only two strategies,
see generally Note, supra note 256.
327. Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), in
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND EcoNoMIcs 144, 144-45 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
Tracing the chain of causation-whereby preferences are formed and exert
influence as independent variables upon the selection of strategies as depen-
dent variables-is the focus of future research. See Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction
to BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, at 1 (noting that "preferences ... are con-
structed rather than elicited by social situations."). For a brief discussion on the
origin of preferences as independent variables that determine strategy, see infra
notes 434-35 and accompanying text.
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(iv) explicitly include respect for human rights in Code of
Conduct, 5 points;
(v) agree to reporting provisions on its human rights prac-
tices, 10 points;
(vi) scrupulously honor commitments in Code of Conduct,
10 points;
(vii) provide resources for active NGO monitoring and
reporting, 10 points;
(viii) grant settlement in ATCA case, 10 points;
(ix) offer redress to human rights victims without being
sued, 5 points;
(x) sign the Global Compact, 5 points;
(xi) publicly embrace the Norms and/or the Framework, 5
points;
(xii) lobby for the Uniform Code, 10 points;
(xiii) publicly commit to the stakeholder theory of govern-
ance, 5 points;
(xiv) accept membership in BLIHR,12 8 5 points;
(xv) lobby for heightened legal requirements for protection
of human rights, 10 points;
(xvi) lobby for reduced legal requirements for protection of
human rights, -5 points;
(xvii) invest in state with bad human rights record, -5 points;
(xviii) divest to avoid threat of litigation, -5 points;
(xix) be sued by shareholders for practices subsequent to
adopting stakeholder approach, 5 points.
b. The Corporation
Each corporation can earn a maximum payoff of "100" in
interacting with the NGOs. The points earned by a corporation
vary depending upon its preferences and its choice of strategy.
For "Fight", the corporation earns points as follows:
(i) successfully prosecute NGOs either civilly or criminally,
10 points;
(ii) successfully lobby to eliminate or severely restrict ATCA,
10 points;
(iii) divest to avoid threat of litigation, 5 points
(iv) avoid accepting external constituencies as "stakehold-
ers," 20 points;
(v) avoid economic sanction by the marketplace, 10 points;
328. See supra note 302 (discussing the BLIHR).
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(vi) absorb economic sanction by the marketplace, -10
points;
(vii) avoid being sued under ATCA, 20 points,
(viii) avoid liability in ATCA suit, 5 points;
(ix) maintain or increase profitability, 20 points.
For "Engage," the corporation earns points as follows:
(i) maintain or increase profitability, 20 points;
(ii) earn price premium through providing enhanced
human rights protection, 10 points;
(iii) earn equity premium through providing enhanced
human rights protection, 10 points;
(iv) earn additional investment through providing
enhanced human rights protection, 10 points;
(v) avoid ATCA suit, 10 points;
(vi) earn reputational benefits for signing Corporate Code
of Conduct (with express provisions for human rights protec-
tion) and Global Compact, 10 points
(vii) successfully lobby to eliminate or severely restrict
ATCA, 10 points;
(viii) pass along costs of affording enhanced human rights
protection to stakeholders, 10 points;
(ix) form strategic partnership with NGO stakeholders to
increase leverage, 10 points.
For "Accommodate," the corporation earns points as
follows:
(i) make public commitment to stakeholder theory of gov-
ernance, 10 points;
(ii) earn reputational benefits for signing Corporate Code of
Conduct (with express provisions for human rights protection)
and Global Compact, 20 points;
(iii) agree to reporting provisions under the Corporate
Code of Conduct, 10 points;
(iv) embrace and conform corporate practice to Norms/
Framework, 10 points;
(v) provide resources to assist NGOs in monitoring, 10
points;
(vi) avoid violations of human rights in sphere of opera-
tions, 10 points;
(vii) avoid ATCA suit, 10 points
(viii) offer redress to human rights victims of corporate
actions without being sued, 10 points;
(ix) avoid shareholder suit, 10 points.
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For "Collaborate," the corporation earns points as follows:
(i) negotiate directly with NGOs, 5 points;
(ii) adopt voluntary Code of Conduct, 5 points;
(iii) explicitly include respect for human rights in Code of
Conduct, 5 points;
(iv) agree to reporting provisions on its human rights prac-
tices, 10 points;
(v) scrupulously honor commitments in Code of Conduct,
10 points;
(vi) provide resources for active NGO monitoring and
reporting, 10 points;
(vii) avoid ATCA case, 10 points;
(viii) offer redress to human rights victims without being
sued, 5 points;
(ix) sign the Global Compact, 5 points;
(x) publicly embrace the Norms/Framework, 5 points;
(xi) lobby for the Uniform Code, 10 points;
(xii) publicly commit to the stakeholder theory of govern-
ance, 5 points;
(xiii) accept membership in BLIHR, 5 points;
(xiv) lobby for heightened legal requirements for protection
of human rights, 10 points.
3. Narrative Accounts of Game Outcomes
The following narratives assess the outcomes for each strat-
egy pairing.
a. "Fight" v. "Negotiate"
When a corporation electing to "Fight" interacts with an
NGO choosing to "Negotiate," the NGO is unable to negotiate
directly with the corporation, and, if it is too "noisy," it faces the
possibility of civil or criminal prosecution. The corporation will
simply not adopt a Code of Conduct or accept the principle that
it owes any duties to stakeholders, and thus it will reject any
responsibility for violations of human rights committed by other
parties, even in states with bad human rights records where it
locates some of its investments. It is as likely that refusing to
adopt a Code of Conduct will have negative economic effects as it
is that a corporation will successfully sue NGOs. Accordingly, the
corporation choosing to "Fight" against NGOs choosing to
"Negotiate" will earn 45 points, while NGOs will earn -10 points.
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b. "Fight" v. "Litigate"
When a corporation electing to "Fight" interacts with an
NGO choosing to "Litigate," the legal strategy of the corporation
will be focused on defending against ATCA claims, and thus it
will not successfully prosecute NGOs. At the same time, the cor-
poration defending against an ATCA claim does not have the
"clean hands" necessary to lobby for the restriction or elimina-
tion of the statute; however, the corporation will likely divest
from other states with bad human rights records to avoid other
litigation. While the corporation will reject that it has stakehold-
ers, it will nevertheless absorb some economic sanctions in the
marketplace by virtue of the reputational harm it suffers from
the ATCA lawsuit. Although the corporation will not likely be
found liable, nor will it offer a settlement, it will incur costs in
defending against the ATCA claim. It is difficult to assess the
effects of the ATCA claim on profitability, as despite the market
sanctions the corporation may well benefit from its strategy of
investing in states with bad human rights records; it is probably
safest to assume they are negligible.
Accordingly, the corporation choosing to "Fight" against
NGOs choosing to "Litigate" will earn 50 points, while NGOs will
earn -10 points.
c. "Fight" v. "Regulate"
When a corporation electing to "Fight" interacts with an
NGO choosing to "Regulate," the corporation fixes its efforts on
lobbying to undercut the Global Compact and the Norms as "soft
law," and generally to reduce legal protections of human rights
in domestic and international fora. During this process the cor-
poration electing to "Fight" is not likely to invest in states with
bad human rights records, and may well seek to divest in order to
reduce risk.
The outcome of the regulatory battle is unclear; the Norms
are largely dormant or at least still voluntary in nature, and it is
thus necessary to assume that the status quo will prevail at least in
the short run. It is also probable that the effects of regulatory
battles will not cause negative market effects for the corporation
that decides to "Fight"-hearings in transnational fora are not as
likely to generate public interest as is litigation in domestic
courts. However, the application of regulatory pressure is
unlikely to induce corporations choosing to "Fight" to accede to
any NGO demands regarding the Code of Conduct or the
Norms/Framework, and the likelihood that shareholders would
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sue a corporation seeking to avoid the prospect of additional
involuntary quasi-legal obligations is near zero.
Accordingly, the corporation electing to "Fight" against the
NGO adopting the "Regulate" strategy will earn 80 points while
the NGO will earn -10 points.
d. "Fight" v. "Legislate"
When "Fight" interacts with "Legislate," the corporation
focuses its efforts on lobbying to eliminate or severely restrict
ATCA, to undercut the Global Compact and the Norms/Frame-
work as "soft law," to prevent the implementation of the Uniform
Code and stakeholder statutes, to deny the expansion of the
jurisdiction of the ICC, and to reduce legal protections of human
rights in domestic and international fora. As with "Regulate," the
"Legislate" strategy creates disincentives for corporations to
invest in states with bad human rights records and may well cause
them to divest in order to reduce risk.
The outcome of the legislative struggle is dependent on the
party affiliations of political incumbents and on the capacity of
the players to spend on lobbying. Without additional informa-
tion, uncertainty abounds, especially given the recent pro-
nouncement of the Supreme Court in Sosa coupled with the
headway the Uniform Code has made in several States. Yet the
negative publicity that attends corporate intransigence on the
subject of human rights in legislative hearings may yield some
measurable economic sanctions from the market. Although the
application of regulatory pressure is unlikely to induce corpora-
tions choosing to "Fight" to accede to any NGO demands regard-
ing the Code of Conduct or the Norms/Framework, and
although the likelihood that shareholders would sue a corpora-
tion seeking to avoid the prospect of additional and expensive
legal obligations is near zero, the ultimate effects on corporate
profitability of the "Legislate" strategy may well be negative.
Accordingly, the corporation choosing to "Fight" against the
NGOs electing to "Legislate" earns 20 points, while the NGOs
earn -10 points.
e. "Fight" v. "Delegitimate"
When a corporation electing to "Fight" interacts with NGOs
choosing to "Delegitimate" through theoretical development and
academic discourse, the corporation is likely to do little more
than observe, maintain lobbying efforts to reduce the risk of
greater legal exposure under ATCA and potentially the Global
Compact and the Norms/Framework, develop their own theoret-
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ical rebuttals, and be prepared to react if NGO efforts to "con-
strain corporate misbehavior" are translated into concrete
proposals for major legislative reform-whether in the Uniform
Code, the ICC, or some other model. The corporation that
elects to "Fight" does not alter its investment strategy, does not
absorb economic sanctions, and does not experience any nega-
tive effects on profitability.
Accordingly, the corporation that decides to "Fight" against
NGOs that chooses to "Delegitimate" earns 75 points while the
NGO earns -10 points.
f "Engage" v. "Negotiate"
The corporation that elects to "Engage" against NGOs that
"Negotiate" is determined to be selective about drawing stake-
holders into relationships, but will negotiate directly with NGOs
to increase its leverage through co-optation. The corporation
that decides to "Engage" will seek the reputational benefits of
signing a Code of Conduct, with express provisions for human
rights protection, in the expectation that doing so will earn it a
price and an equity premium as well as additional investment,
and thereby increase profitability. However, the corporation will
not agree to NGO reporting or absorb the reporting costs
incurred by NGOs in monitoring its compliance, as the "Engag-
ing" corporation reserves the power to package its own case for
compliance and tailor it directly to the media. The "corpora-
tion" that decides to "Engage" is not scrupulously committed to
compliance; rather, it is strategically committed to compliance,
and if compliance contributes to its profitability, it will comply,
whereas compliance that is more costly than the benefits derived
will soon cease.
Furthermore, the "Engage" strategy requires the corpora-
tion to be selective in its investment strategy, and to consider
carefully the human rights record of the states in which it consid-
ers investing, but when interacting with NGOs that "Negotiate"
the strategy does not necessarily counsel divestment. When a cor-
poration that has elected to "Engage" interacts with NGOs that
"Negotiate," ATCA litigation is not directly at issue; however, the
corporation will seek to reduce its legal exposure under that stat-
ute by lobbying to eliminate or severely restrict its reach to corpo-
rate conduct associated with human rights, arguing that
voluntarism, rather than litigation, is the most effective means to
achieve results desired by both players. The corporation will set-
tle legitimate claims of human rights violations without the need
for suit to preserve its reputation.
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Although unlikely to reduce legal exposure in the short run
through lobbying, the corporation choosing to "Engage" will
ensure that any additional costs incurred, such as settlement
costs paid to victims of human rights violations to avoid litigation
or the costs of altering its conduct to bring it into compliance
with its Code of Conduct, will be passed along to stakeholders,
thereby satisfying shareholders and avoiding derivative litigation.
Accordingly, the corporation playing "Engage" against the
NGOs playing "Negotiate" will earn 90 points, while the NGOs
will earn 30 points.
g. "Engage" v. "Litigate"
The corporation that elects to "Engage" against NGOs that
"Litigate" is determined to be selective about drawing stakehold-
ers into relationships, but will negotiate directly with NGOs if it
perceives that to do so will allow it to increase its leverage. How-
ever, given NGOs' choice of strategy, corporations that "Engage"
will not likely achieve leverage through partnerships with NGOs.
Nonetheless, the corporation that decides to "Engage" will
seek the reputational benefits of signing a Code of Conduct with
express provisions for human rights protection, in the expecta-
tion that doing so will earn it a price and an equity premium as
well as additional investment, and thereby increase profitability.
However, it will not include a reporting provision in its Code of
Conduct, nor will it embrace the Global Compact or the Norms/
Framework, as it will anticipate that NGOs will seek to use viola-
tions of the Code as well as the "soft law" provisions of these doc-
uments in ATCA litigation to expand corporate liability. Nor will
it absorb the reporting costs incurred by NGOs in monitoring its
compliance, as "Engage" preserves to the corporation choosing it
the power to package its own case for compliance and tailor it
directly to the media. The "corporation" that decides to
"Engage" is not scrupulously committed to compliance. Rather,
it is strategically committed to compliance, and if compliance
contributes to its profitability, it will comply. But compliance
that is more costly than the benefits derived will soon cease.
Furthermore, the "Engage" strategy requires the corpora-
tion to be selective in its investment strategy and to consider care-
fully the human rights record of the states in which it considers
investing, and when interacting with NGOs that "Litigate," divest-
ment from states with bad human rights records is imperative.
When a corporation that has elected to "Engage" interacts with
NGOs that "Litigate," ATCA litigation is directly at issue, and it is
not the appropriate time to seek to reduce its legal exposure
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under that statute by lobbying to eliminate or severely restrict its
reach to corporate conduct associated with human rights.
Rather, it is imperative to either win or to settle the claim, with
the determination based on profitability. If litigation that could
otherwise be won would impose reputational sanctions in the
marketplace, the corporation choosing to "Engage" will settle the
claim but will also ensure that these and any additional costs
incurred, such as the costs of altering its conduct to bring it into
compliance with its Code of Conduct, will be passed along to
stakeholders, satisfying shareholders and avoiding derivative liti-
gation. The ultimate effects on profitability are uncertain: while
reputational benefits incurred by devising a Code of Conduct will
provide some market benefits, the ATCA claim may erode those
benefits and even impose additional costs, particularly if the suit
reveals the corporation as having been insincere in its adoption
of its Code. The outcome is case-specific, but for the purpose of
theory-building the assumption will be that there is no effect on
profitability except that the corporation will lose price- and
equity-premiums as well as additional investment during the pen-
dency of the litigation.
Accordingly, the corporation that chooses to "Engage"
against NGOs that "Litigate" will earn 20 points, while the NGOs
will earn 25 points.
h. "Engage" v. "Regulate"
The corporation that elects to "Engage" against NGOs that
"Regulate" is determined to be selective about drawing stake-
holders into relationships but will negotiate directly with NGOs if
it perceives that to do so will allow it to increase its leverage over
the regulatory process. The corporation that decides to
"Engage" will seek the reputational benefits of signing a Code of
Conduct with express provisions for human rights protection and
for reporting, in the expectation that doing so will earn it a price
and an equity premium as well as additional investment, and
thereby increase profitability. The corporation will seek to influ-
ence but will not, however, embrace the Global Compact and the
Norms/Framework because it will anticipate that NGOs will seek
to use the "soft law" provisions of those documents in future
ATCA litigation to expand corporate liability. Also, the corpora-
tion will not absorb the reporting costs incurred by NGOs in
monitoring its compliance, as "Engage" preserves to the corpora-
tion choosing it the power to package its own case for compli-
ance and tailor it directly to the media. The "corporation" that
decides to "Engage" is not scrupulously committed to compli-
ance; rather, it is strategically committed to compliance.
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Further, the "Engage" strategy requires the corporation to
be selective in its investment strategy and to consider carefully
the human rights record of the states in which it considers invest-
ing. When interacting with NGOs that "Regulate," divestment
from states with bad human rights records is not a high priority,
although the increased transnational scrutiny counsels against
undertaking additional investment in similar states. When a cor-
poration that has elected to "Engage" interacts with NGOs that
"Regulate," ATCA litigation is not directly at issue, and it is thus
the appropriate time to seek to reduce its legal exposure under
that statute by lobbying to eliminate or severely restrict its reach
to corporate conduct associated with human rights. The corpo-
ration will settle legitimate claims of human rights violations
without the need for suit in order to preserve its reputation.
Should legitimate human rights violations occur in the sphere of
influence of the corporation that "Engages," the injured party
will receive a settlement from the corporation without the need
for litigation.
To the extent that the transnational regulatory process is
perceived domestically as too anti-corporate, the prospects for
lobbying success increase, yet it is too difficult without case-spe-
cific information to make a determination as to their ultimate
probability of success. Still, these lobbying efforts, along with any
additional costs incurred, such as the costs of altering its conduct
to bring it into compliance with its Code of Conduct, the Global
Compact, and the Norms/Framework, will be passed along to
stakeholders, satisfying shareholders and avoiding derivative
litigation.
The ultimate effects on profitability may be neutral: reputa-
tional benefits incurred by devising a Code of Conduct will pro-
vide some market benefits, and the corporation choosing to
"Engage" against NGOs electing to "Regulate" will earn price-
and equity-premiums as well as additional investment, but some
backlash in the market is expected for refusing to accept mem-
bership in the Compact and the Norms.
Accordingly, the corporation that chooses to "Engage"
against NGOs that "Regulate" will earn 80 points, while the
NGOs will earn 20 points.
i. "Engage" v. "Legislate"
The corporation that elects to "Engage" against NGOs that
"Legislate" is determined to be selective about drawing stake-
holders into relationships, but will negotiate directly with NGOs
if it perceives that to do so will allow it to increase its leverage by
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discovering mechanisms to induce NGOs to accept negotiated
legislative settlements of their differences. The corporation that
decides to "Engage" will seek the reputational benefits of signing
a Code of Conduct with express provisions for human rights pro-
tection, in the expectation that doing so will enhance its bargain-
ing power in the legislative process, in addition to earning it a
price and an equity premium, additional investment, and thus
increased profitability. However, the corporation choosing to
"Engage" will be chary of including reporting provisions in its
Code of Conduct and of embracing the Global Compact and the
Norms/Framework out of concern that NGOs will seek to use
violations of the Code of Conduct or of the "soft law" provisions
of the latter two documents as the basis for legislative amend-
ments to domestic corporate law, as well as to expand corporate
liability under ATCA and even in the ICC. Because the corpora-
tion electing to "Engage" is not scrupulously committed to com-
pliance and is determined to limit legal exposure, it will not
absorb any NGO reporting costs.
A corporation playing "Engage" against NGOs playing "Leg-
islate" must be very selective in its investment strategy and should
divest from states with bad human rights records in order to deny
their opponents legislative ammunition. Although ATCA litiga-
tion is not directly at issue, in the legislative context it is an
opportune time for the corporation choosing to "Engage" to
seek to reduce its legal exposure under the statute by lobbying to
eliminate or severely restrict its reach to corporate conduct asso-
ciated with human rights. To the extent that the legislative pro-
cess is governed by bargaining, it is reasonable to assume that the
corporation might well achieve some legislative limitation, or at
the very least clarification, of ATCA that reduces its legal risk,
even if the same process imposes other legal requirements.
Because the scope of legal liability under ATCA is directly under
debate, the corporation will not redress claims of human rights
violations even at the risk of suit under ATCA.
Whatever the outcome, the cost of engagement in the legis-
lative process, along with any additional costs incurred, such as
the costs of altering its conduct to bring it into compliance with
its Code of Conduct, will be passed along to stakeholders, satisfy-
ing shareholders and avoiding derivative litigation.
The ultimate effects on profitability are likely to be neutral:
reputational benefits incurred by devising a Code of Conduct will
provide some market benefits, yet the negative perception of its
efforts in reducing its legal liability for the protection of human
rights will likely cancel out any price- and equity-premiums as
well as any additional investment.
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Accordingly, the corporation that chooses to "Engage"
against NGOs that "Legislate" will earn 50 points, while the
NGOs will earn 15 points.
j. "Engage" v. "Delegitimate"
The corporation that elects to "Engage" against NGOs that
"Delegitimate" is determined that it will not negotiate or form
partnerships with NGOs. The corporation will seek the reputa-
tional benefits of signing a Code of Conduct with express provi-
sions for human rights protection, in the expectation that doing
so will enhance its market reputation, earn it price and equity
premium, attract additional investment, and thus increase profit-
ability. However, the corporation choosing to "Engage" will not
include reporting provisions in its Code, nor will it embrace the
Global Compact or the Norms/Framework, out of concern that
NGOs will seek to use violations of the Code or of the "soft law"
provisions of the latter two documents as the basis for legislative
amendments to domestic corporate law, as well as to expand cor-
porate liability under ATCA and perhaps even in the ICC.
Because the corporation electing to "Engage" is not scrupulously
committed to compliance and is determined to limit legal expo-
sure, it will not absorb any reporting costs of NGOs that
"Delegitimate."
A corporation playing "Engage" against NGOs playing
"Delegitimate" should continue the status quo in its investment
strategy. Although ATCA litigation is not directly at issue, given
the extreme position of NGOs playing "Delegitimate," it is likely
an opportune time for the corporation choosing to "Engage" to
seek to reduce its legal exposure under the statute by lobbying to
eliminate or severely restrict its reach to corporate conduct asso-
ciated with human rights. To the extent that the legislative pro-
cess is governed by bargaining, it is reasonable to assume that the
corporation might well achieve some legislative limitation, or at
the very least clarification, of ATCA that reduces its legal expo-
sure, even if the same process imposes other legal requirements.
Because the scope of legal liability under ATCA arises in this
debate, the corporation will not redress claims of human rights
violations even at the risk of suit under ATCA.
Whatever the outcome, the cost of engagement in the legis-
lative process, along with any additional costs incurred, such as
the costs of altering its conduct to bring it into compliance with
its Code of Conduct, will be passed along to stakeholders, satisfy-
ing shareholders and avoiding derivative litigation.
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The ultimate effects on profitability are likely to be neutral:
reputational benefits incurred by devising a Code of Conduct will
provide some market benefits, yet the negative perception of its
efforts in reducing its legal liability for the protection of human
rights will likely cancel out any price or equity premiums as well
as any additional investment.
Accordingly, the corporation that chooses to "Engage"
against NGOs that "Delegitimate" will earn 50 points, while the
NGOs will earn 10 points.
k. "Accommodate" v. "Negotiate"
The corporation choosing to "Accommodate" NGOs playing
"Negotiate" will swiftly create a Corporate Code of Conduct with
express provisions on human rights protection and monitoring,
and it will scrupulously honor these commitments and avoid vio-
lations of human rights in its sphere of operations to the best of
its ability. Moreover, the corporation that chooses to "Accommo-
date" will embrace and conform corporate practice to the Global
Compact and the Norms, and will provide NGOs playing "Negoti-
ate" with resources to assist them in monitoring corporate con-
duct. Against NGOs playing "Negotiate" the corporation that
plays "Accommodate" will avoid an ATCA suit, if need be, by
offering redress to the rare victims of alleged corporate actions,
and although it may dissatisfy some shareholders it will not likely
face a shareholders' suit.
Accordingly, the corporation electing to "Accommodate"
NGOs playing "Negotiate" will earn 90 points, while NGOs will
earn 65 points.
1. "Accommodate v. "Litigate"
The corporation choosing to "Accommodate" NGOs playing
"Litigate" will swiftly create a Code of Conduct with express pro-
visions on human rights protection and monitoring provisions,
and it will scrupulously honor these commitments and avoid vio-
lations of human rights in its sphere of operations to the best of
its ability. Moreover, the corporation that chooses to "Accommo-
date" will embrace and conform corporate practice to the Global
Compact and the Norms/Framework, and will provide NGOs
playing "Litigate" with resources to assist them in monitoring cor-
porate conduct. Against NGOs playing "Litigate," however, the
corporation that plays "Accommodate" will not avoid an ATCA
suit despite, or perhaps because of, its voluntary acceptance of
heightened standards of human rights protection. The corpora-
tion will likely settle the suit to avoid reputational harm.
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Consequently, the corporation that elects to "Accommo-
date" will lobby to limit the scope of corporate liability under
ATCA, and it will divest from states with human rights records
that pose the threat of future liability risk. Although the corpora-
tion playing "Accommodate" may dissatisfy some shareholders, it
will not likely face a shareholders' suit.
Accordingly, the corporation electing to "Accommodate"
NGOs playing "Litigate" will earn 70 points, while NGOs will earn
60 points.
m. "Accommodate" v. "Regulate"
The corporation choosing to "Accommodate" NGOs playing
"Regulate" will swiftly create a Code of Conduct with express pro-
visions on human rights protection and monitoring provisions,
and it will scrupulously honor these commitments and avoid vio-
lations of human rights in its sphere of operations to the best of
its ability. Moreover, the corporation that chooses to "Accommo-
date" will embrace and conform corporate practice to the Global
Compact and the Norms/Framework, and any other substantive
principles generated in transnational fora, and will provide
NGOs playing "Regulate" with resources to assist them in moni-
toring corporate conduct. Against NGOs playing "Regulate" the
corporation that plays "Accommodate" will avoid an ATCA suit, if
need be, by offering redress to the rare victims of alleged corpo-
rate actions. Although it may dissatisfy some shareholders by
"Accommodating", it will not likely face a successful sharehold-
ers' suit.
Accordingly, the corporation electing to "Accommodate"
NGOs playing "Regulate" will earn 90 points, while NGOs will
earn 65 points.
n. "Accommodate" v. "Legislate"
The corporation choosing to "Accommodate" NGOs playing
"Legislate" will swiftly create a Code of Conduct with express pro-
visions on human rights protection and monitoring provisions,
and it will scrupulously honor these commitments and avoid vio-
lations of human rights in its sphere of operations to the best of
its ability. Moreover, the corporation that chooses to "Accommo-
date" will embrace and conform corporate practice to the Global
Compact and the Norms/Framework, and any other substantive
principles generated in transnational fora, and will provide
NGOs playing "Legislate" with resources to assist them in moni-
toring corporate conduct. Against NGOs playing "Legislate" the
corporation that plays "Accommodate" will avoid an ATCA suit, if
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need be, by offering redress to the rare victims of alleged corpo-
rate actions, yet it will resist legislative proposals, such as the Uni-
form Code or ICC jurisdiction over corporations, that would
heighten legal requirements for the protection of human rights
in favor of the voluntary approach laid out in the Code, the Com-
pact, and the Norms/Framework. Given the strategy of "Legis-
late" chosen by NGOs, the corporation that plays
"Accommodate" will become very risk-averse in their investment
strategies and will divest from some states in order to reduce liti-
gation risk. It will not likely face a shareholders' suit.
Accordingly, the corporation electing to "Accommodate"
NGOs playing "Legislate" will earn 90 points, while NGOs will
earn 55 points.
o. "Accommodate" v. "Delegitimate"
The corporation choosing to "Accommodate" NGOs playing
"Delegitimate" will swiftly create a Code of Conduct with express
provisions on human rights protection and monitoring provi-
sions, and it will scrupulously honor these commitments and
avoid violations of human rights in its sphere of operations to the
best of its ability. Moreover, the corporation that chooses to
"Accommodate" will embrace and conform corporate practice to
the Global Compact and the Norms/Framework and any other
substantive principles generated in transnational fora. However,
the corporation playing "Accommodate" will not provide NGOs
playing "Delegitimate" with resources to assist them in monitor-
ing corporate conduct, and it will lobby to reduce the risk of
legal exposure faced by corporations to include efforts against
the Uniform Code, expansion of the ICC to reach corporate con-
duct, and other major corporate legal reforms. Furthermore,
the corporation electing to "Accommodate" will divest from
states with human rights records that might make them the sub-
ject of increased scrutiny and reputational harm.
Against NGOs playing "Delegitimate" the corporation that
plays "Accommodate" will avoid an ATCA suit, if need be, by
offering redress to the rare victims of alleged corporate actions,
and although it may dissatisfy some shareholders it will not likely
face a shareholders' suit.
Accordingly, the corporation electing to "Accommodate"
NGOs playing "Delegitimate" will earn 70 points, while NGOs
will earn 45 points.
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p. "Collaborate" v. "Negotiate"
The corporation deciding to "Collaborate" with NGOs that
"Negotiate" quickly adopts a Code of Conduct that expressly
respects human rights and includes reporting provisions, and the
corporation provides resources to the NGOs to assist their moni-
toring efforts. The corporation that decides to "Collaborate" in
its interaction with NGOs that "Negotiate" scrupulously observes
its commitments under the Code, signs the Global Compact,
publicly embraces the Norms/Framework, avoids suit under
ATCA, lobbies for the Uniform Code and for heightened
requirements for the protection of human rights, offers redress
to the rare alleged human rights victims of its practices, and
accepts membership in BLIHR.
Accordingly, the corporation playing "Collaborate" against
NGOs that "Negotiate" will earn 100 points, while the NGOs play-
ing "Negotiate" will earn 90 points.
q. "Collaborate" v. "Litigate"
The corporation deciding to "Collaborate" with NGOs that
"Litigate" quickly adopts a Code of Conduct that expressly
respects human rights and includes reporting provisions, and the
corporation provides resources to the NGOs to assist with their
monitoring efforts. The corporation that "Collaborates" in its
interaction with NGOs that "Litigate" scrupulously observes its
commitments under the Code, signs the Global Compact, pub-
licly embraces the Norms/Framework, lobbies for the Uniform
Code and for heightened requirements for protection of human
rights, is sued under ATCA but offers a settlement to plaintiffs,
divests from states without high standards for protecting human
rights, and accepts membership in BLIHR.
Accordingly, the corporation playing "Collaborate" against
NGOs that "Litigate" will earn 85 points, while the NGOs playing
"Litigate" will earn 90 points.
r. "Collaborate" v. "Regulate"
The corporation deciding to "Collaborate" with NGOs that
"Regulate" quickly adopts a Code of Conduct that expressly
respects human rights and includes reporting provisions, and the
corporation provides resources to the NGOs to assist with their
monitoring efforts. The corporation that "Collaborates" in its
interaction with NGOs that "Regulate" scrupulously observes its
commitments under the Code, signs the Global Compact, pub-
licly embraces the Norms/Framework, avoids suit under ATCA,
lobbies for the Uniform Code and for heightened requirements
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for protection of human rights, offers redress to the rare alleged
human rights victims of its practices, and accepts membership in
BLIHR.
Accordingly, the corporation that chooses to "Collaborate"
with NGOs that "Regulate" earns 100 points, while NGOs earn 90
points.
s. "Collaborate" v. "Legislate"
The corporation deciding to "Collaborate" with NGOs that
"Legislate" quickly adopts a Code of Conduct that expressly
respects human rights and includes reporting provisions, and the
corporation provides resources to the NGOs to assist with their
monitoring efforts. The corporation that "Collaborates" in its
interaction with NGOs that "Legislate" scrupulously observes its
commitments under the Code, signs the Global Compact, pub-
licly embraces the Norms/Framework, avoids suit under ATCA,
lobbies for the Uniform Code and for heightened requirements
for protection of human rights, offers redress to the rare alleged
human rights victims of its practices, and accepts membership in
BLIHR.
Accordingly, the corporation that "Collaborates" with NGOs
that "Legislate" earns 100 points, while NGOs earn 90 points.
t. "Collaborate" v. "Delegitimate"
The corporation deciding to "Collaborate" with NGOs that
"Delegitimate" quickly adopts a Code of Conduct that expressly
respects human rights and includes reporting provisions, and the
corporation provides resources to the NGOs to assist their moni-
toring efforts. The corporation that "Collaborates" in its interac-
tion with NGOs that "Delegitimate" scrupulously observes its
commitments under the Code, signs the Global Compact, pub-
licly embraces the Norms, avoids suit under ATCA, lobbies for
the Uniform Code and for heightened requirements for protec-
tion of human rights, offers redress to the rare alleged human
rights victims of its practices, and accepts membership in BLIHR.
Accordingly, the corporation that chooses to "Collaborate"
with NGOs that "Legislate" earns 100 points, while NGOs earn 90
points.
Table 2, illustrates the interactions of corporate and NGO
strategies in the issue-area of the protection of human rights:
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TABLE 2: MATRIX OF OUTCOMES AND ASSOCIATED PAYOFFS
NGOs






The payoff to the corporation is the value in the lower left-
hand corner of each cell and the payoff to the NGOs is the value
in the upper right-hand corner of each cell.
C. Analysis of The Game: Corporations v. NGOs
1. Equilibria
Whereas the objectives and preferences of NGOs are fixed,
the objectives and preferences of a corporation with which it
interacts depend on and vary with the strategy it selects.
Although it might appear that "Collaborate" is, for the corpora-
tion, a dominant strategy because it outperforms all of the corpo-
ration's other strategies irrespective of the NGO's choice of
strategy, this is not in fact the case. Because the payoff structure
for each corporation player is different depending on its choice
of strategy-specifically, for the corporation playing "Fight"-the
preference is heavily weighted toward profit maximization and
obduracy, whereas for the corporation playing "Collaborate"
profit is but an afterthought and performing "ethically" and
cooperating with NGOs are the values that drive the organiza-
tion. Thus, because the payoff structure varies by strategy for the
corporation, it is not possible to "solve" the game by finding an
equilibrium or a Nash equilibrium.
However, for the NGOs whose preferences are fixed, "Nego-
tiate" is weakly dominant over "Regulate," suggesting that no
matter what strategy the corporation plays, the best strategy for
NGOs is to "Negotiate." This will be discussed further infra; it is
sufficient to note that in the game as specified, the corporation
should anticipate that NGOs will always play "Negotiate," even if
this does not in fact occur in practice.
-10 -10 -10 -10 -10
45 50 80 20 75
30 25 20 15 10
90 20 80 50 50
65 60 65 55 45
90 70 90 90 70
90 90 90 90 90
100 85 100 100 100
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2. NGO Strategies
a. "Negotiate": The Virtue of Voluntarism
"Negotiate" is the dominant strategy for NGOs, and as a gen-
eral rule should always be played unless another of the remain-
ing three strategies can be used at low- or no-cost to punish
violations of agreements implied by the selection of particular
strategies by corporations.3" It offers 175 points across the four
corporate strategies and 500 points in total payoff to both parties.
The finding that the dominant strategy for NGOs is "Negoti-
ate" is compelling. At the heart of the "Negotiate" strategy is the
principle of voluntarism, which has been the subject of sharp
debates in the academic literature and in the field. Critics of vol-
untarism, as manifested in Codes of Corporate Conduct and
other voluntary statements of principles, deride it as far too lack-
ing in teeth and insufficient to overcome the profit motive and
induce corporate protection of human rights.so One NGO, rep-
resentative of the views of many, brands CSR and the Codes of
Corporate Conduct as a sham foisted upon society by corpora-
tions concerned only with protecting their reputations against
the "potential damage of public campaigns directed against
them, and overwhelmingly, with the desire-and the impera-
tive-to secure ever-greater profits.""s' Proponents of volunta-
rism, on the other hand, view Codes of Conduct as a "genuine
commitment to human rights" and a categorical "reject[ion] [of]
antithetical arguments sounding in corporate neutrality" that will
"eventually lead to binding corporate norms and
accountability." 3 2
The present study supports the notion that voluntarism-
the principle at the core of "Negotiate"-may well be the best
approach to the formation of enduring social partnerships
between NGOs and corporations that carry with them the poten-
tial for joint development of effective corporate policies for the
protection of human rights without sacrificing other core values
important to many firms, foremost among them profitability.
329. See supra notes 55-74 and accompanying text.
330. See David P. Forsythe, Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONs 218-48 (2d ed. 2006).
331. ANDRw PENDLETON ET AL., CHRISTIAN Al) SocIETY, BEHIND THE
MASK: THE REAL FACE OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBiiriy 5 (2004), available
at http://baierle.files.wordpress.com/2007/11/behind-mask.pdf.
332. Kielsgard, supra note 84, at 215 (describing viewpoint of proponents
of voluntarism).
333. Previous research has developed the proposition that social partner-
ships between civil society organizations ("CSOs") and corporations are the
mechanisms most likely to develop solutions to CSR problems that satisfy the
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In practice, NGOs, despite a lack of any direct coercive power,
are able to provide expertise and consultation regarding specific
practices and actions that corporations can take to improve their
performance and their reputations for status, a measure of con-
trol, and significant grants of resources from their corporate
partners."' Corporations lack knowledge about problems and
solutions, while NGOs lack the capacity to impose solutions.
Through negotiation, NGOs gain leverage over corporate poli-
cies and actions and corporations gain reputational benefits that
translate into enhanced profits. Joint payoffs-a proxy for the
benefit to society if one considers that NGOs represent all con-
ceivable stakeholders while corporations represent shareholders,
and most citizens are either the former, the latter, or, increas-
ingly, both-totaled 500 when NGOs played "Negotiate"-a
greater payoff than for all strategies except for "Regulate"-rein-
forcing the proposition that the strategy is conducive to the
achievement of mutual interests.
Although "Negotiate" may not be an effective strategy in
interacting with corporations that elect to "Fight," it is dominant
over all other strategies available to NGOs, and the conflict with
"Fight" may be rooted in a broad cultural and social gulf that
divides corporations with preferences that cause them to choose
to "Fight" NGOs. Moreover, as NGOs and firms "move[ ] from a
primarily confrontational engagement to a more complex, mul-
tifaceted relationship""' involving negotiation rather than dem-
onstration, the effectiveness of "Negotiate" may well increase to
the point where, even in their interactions with corporations that
still elect to "Fight," NGOs may well claim some positive payoffs.
At the very least, the success of "Negotiate" should cause oppo-
nents of voluntarism to reevaluate their position. At its best,
"Negotiate" evinces potential to profoundly reshape the relation-
ship between corporations and NGOs.
interests of both partners. See generally TERMS FOR ENDEARMENT: BUSINESS,
NGOS AND SUSTAINABLE DiEViiLOPMENT, supra note 309.
334. See Wendy Schoener, Note, Non-Governmental Organizations and Global
Activism: Legal and Informal Approaches, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STun. 537 (1997)
(describing the basis of exchange between NGOs and corporations negotiating
over the protection of human rights); see also Cecelia Albin, Can NGOs Enhance
the Effectiveness of International Negotiation?, 4 INT'i. NEGOTIATIONs 371 (1999).
335. See Geoffrey D. Chandler, Do the Right Things, GREEN FUTURES
Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 22, 23 ("Companies need the expertise of NGOs in tackling
problems of which they have inadequate knowledge" while "NGOs need the
huge and growing influence of companies if they are to maximise their
impact.").
336. CRANE & MATTEN, supra note 23, at 382.
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b. "Litigate": A Stick, But Not (Yet) a Strategy
"Litigate" is dominated by "Negotiate" but dominates "Legis-
late" and "Delegitimate." It should only be played to punish the
corporation playing "Engage" or "Accommodate" who cannot be
trusted to honor the commitments they implicitly make by virtue
of those strategy choices. In other words, if NGOs have reliable
information that the corporation will play "Engage" but will vio-
late its Code of Conduct, spin its human rights record in the
media, lobby against existing legal protections of human rights,
and pass along costs to consumers, the NGO might be willing to
absorb 5 points of cost to punish the corporation playing
"Engage" in the amount of 70 points. Similarly, if NGOs have
reliable information that the corporation will play "Accommo-
date" only to fail to sign the Global Compact, embrace the
Norms/Framework, redress violations of human rights in its
sphere of influence, and maintain its commitment to human
rights in the face of shareholder pressure, NGOs might choose to
absorb 5 points of cost to play "Litigate," and punish the corpora-
tion playing "Accommodate" in the amount of 20 points.
Finally, if NGOs know that the corporation will "Collaborate," it
might choose to "Litigate," but only if it could be assured as well
that the result of litigation would neither alter the future strategy
of that corporation nor dissuade other corporations from choos-
ing to "Collaborate." "Litigate" offers 165 points across the four
corporate strategies and 390 points in total payoff to both parties.
Many human rights NGOs have reposed great faith in litiga-
tion, particularly under ATCA, as the strategy that would bring
corporate malefactors to heel. Yet the promise of "Litigate" has
not been borne out by the history of human rights litigation
under ATCA, and there is no reason to believe that this will
change in the near future. Resorting to the official legal machin-
ery of the state is costly and uncertain, and insufficient political
support exists to modify the available laws to shift the payoffs in
favor of NGOs. That "Litigate" yields inferior payoffs for both
NGOs and the corporation-and thus inferior societal benefits-
no matter what strategy the latter plays suggests that NGOs can-
not increase the payoffs they would otherwise obtain by choosing
to "Negotiate" and that the corporation suffers when NGOs elect
to "Litigate" due to the expense of litigation and not due to the
remedial potential of "Litigate." Commentators have suggested
that significant corporate opposition to "Litigate" arises from a
337. Both of these potential strategies involve considerations of the "next
round," otherwise known as the future. While this is an important subject of
research, it is beyond the scope of the present Article.
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mere "paper" commitment to human rights on the part of corpo-
rations,, - yet the dominance of "Negotiate" (a largely voluntary
form of interaction) over "Litigate"(the resort to state judicial
power) calls this notion into question and suggests that the costs
of litigation may well represent no small part of corporate
objections."
That said, "Litigate" retains its value in the case of corpora-
tions who play "Engage" or "Accommodate" and fail to deliver
compliance with Codes of Conduct, the Global Compact, and the
Norms/Framework, or who fail to afford redress to victims of vio-
lent regimes where they locate their business, or who wilt under
shareholder pressure. The threat alone that NGOs will play "Liti-
gate" may well be enough to steel the spines of the executives of
corporations that "Engage" or "Accommodate" against the
siren's call of profitability, and in favor of implementing prac-
tices protective of human rights, selecting investment opportuni-
ties based in some measure on the risk posed by host
governments to human rights, and otherwise balancing eco-
nomic concerns with human rights concerns. "Litigate" is, in
effect, a "backstop"'o that introduces sufficient uncertainty
about the potential costs to a corporation playing "Engage" or
"Accommodate" should it attempt to cheat on the private bar-
gains it strikes with NGOs, such as Codes of Conduct, adherence
to the Global Compact, and membership in the BLIHR. By hav-
ing "Litigate" as a weapon in its arsenal, NGOs can enforce cor-
porate discipline. However, Sosa rendered ATCA sufficiently
toothless, and the probability of significant sanctions are so
remote,34' "Litigate" is just a stick and not truly a strategy for
interaction with corporations in the issue-area of human rights
protection.
c. "Regulate": A Support Strategy
Although "Regulate" dominates "Legislate" and "Delegiti-
mate" it is dominated by "Negotiate" and offers 165 points across
the four corporate strategies and 515 points in total payoff to
both parties. Thus, it should only be played by NGOs who have
338. See, e.g., Kielsgard, supra note 84, at 215.
339. The superiority of "Negotiate," a strategy which draws both players
into private ordering of their relationship, may well signify, at least in part, the
costliness of invoking the formal machinery of the state. See DixiT, supra note
225, at 10, 29-32.
340. See id. at 29-31 (modeling how the threat of litigation negatively
transforms the payoffs for the potential defector and thereby encourages nego-
tiation; litigation thus "backstops" negotiation against defection).
341. See supra notes 92-106 and accompanying text.
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reliable information that (1) the corporation will play "Accom-
modate" and that by playing "Regulate" NGOs can, at no cost,
create deeper normative commitments to regulatory principles
that may in the future crystallize from "soft law" into hard law
and be reflected as such in Corporate Codes of Conduct; or (2)
that the corporation will play "Collaborate" in which case "Regu-
late" offers the same payoffs to both parties while creating deeper
and more transnational normative commitments.
Although much of the energies of NGOs have been invested
in the last decade in transnational fora attempting to generate
normative regulatory principles that would be adopted by corpo-
rations and governments and then rapidly crystallize into bind-
ing international law, the results have been, at least for
proponents of such regulation, disappointing. The Global Com-
pact has secured some important members, and yet many large
corporations have declined to join that organization and refused
to adopt the Norms."' While some advise yet another push in
the same direction, international legal process has simply not
yet developed to support the project of formalizing legal obliga-
tions that can bind corporations over the opposition of their
states of incorporation.3 44 The same limitations exist in the
domestic arena: regulations that do not benefit from a wide-
spread perception that they are legitimate restrictions necessary
to bring corporate conduct into line with what the relevant politi-
cal community deems its "social license to operate" are unlikely
to secure the requisite political support for enactment and mar-
ket support for compliance. 345 Effective regulation requires the
342. Id.
343. See, e.g., Kinley & Chambers, supra note 156 (noting that some
human rights groups see the Norms as just a normative basis for creating even
more detailed regulations).
344. Although there has been some evolution, there has been no major
revolution in international law since 1989, when "the realm of what is called
'international law' [wa]s largely a realm of voluntary associations, with agreed-
upon rules and few sanctions[,] ... [and] the prospects for regulating business
by international rules backed by sanction seem[ed] dim." DONAL DSON, supra
note 34, at 149.
345. See generally Kagan et al., supra note 264 (analyzing corporate regula-
tory compliance and finding convergence between corporate behavior and
"social license [s] to operate" commonly accepted within the relevant political
communities). Regulations that seek to impose duties beyond the social license
to operate-the grant by a community of permission to do business contingent
upon the provision of a certain level of corporate social responsibility to that
community-encourage corporate resistance if they are enacted at all. Regula-
tions that fall short of the requirements of the social license often produce
behavior described as "beyond compliance" in which corporations adhere to
the higher standards of the social license. Id. Moreover, and perhaps even
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political and economic support of local communities, and NGOs
have not dedicated as much effort to winning this support as they
have to fashioning regulations. At the same time, it requires the
support of its subjects: a growing literature, albeit directed at the
subject of the U.S. administrative process, suggests that a static
and inflexible "command and control" regulatory model such as
the Norms will prove inferior in practice to a model that permits
ongoing negotiation between the regulators and the regulated
and allows for the achievement of reasonable regulatory goals at
reduced enforcement costs through adaptive dialogue and deci-
sion making by all parties."' Corporations that are not con-
sulted and treated as partners in the regulatory process resort to
resistance and disengagement, whereas those who are "Engaged"
develop "social bonds" to regulators and to the beneficiaries of
regulation that create a culture of compliance and managerial
accommodation. 4 7
In essence, corporations have been alienated by the stand-
offish and arrogant regulatory efforts of NGOs, and regulatory
overstretch, coupled with a maladaptive approach, has, at least
for the short term, likely doomed any meaningful transnational
administrative restrictions on corporate conduct in the issue-area
of human rights protection while setting traps for the credibility
of NGOs who would attempt to play "Regulate" as a strategy.
Accordingly, NGOs find that "Regulate" is dominated by "Negoti-
more importantly, regulations that do not comport with the social expectations
of the relevant communities will not be entitled to enforcement in the market-
place by stakeholders. Consumers will choose to buy or not buy from regulated
companies, not by virtue of corporate compliance with ill-suited regulations,
but on the basis of criteria unrelated to the social purpose underlying the
regulations.
346. See generally ARCHON FUNG & ERIK OLIN WRIGHT, DEEPE.NING Di moc-
RACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GoVERNANCE;
(2003); Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative
Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land
Use Decisions: Installment Two, 24 STAN. ENvrl.. L.J. 269 (2005); Michael C. Dorf
& Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 Coi.um. L.
REv. 267 (1998); Daniel A. Farber, Revitalizing Regulation, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1278
(1993); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. REV. I (1997); Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmen-
tal Regulation, 54 DuKE L.J. 795 (2005); Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations:
A Cure for Malaise, 71 Gio. L.J. 1 (1982); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of
Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 342 (2004).
347. See generally Valerie Braithwaite, Games of Engagement: Postures Within
the Regulatory Community, 17 Law & Pot 'Y Q 225 (1995) (developing a taxonomy
of regulatory approaches and suggesting the importance to compliance of
developing corporate commitments to the goals of regulation and, even more
importantly, of building social bonds in the regulator-regulatee relationship).
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ate" and has value as a strategy in the foreseeable future only to
the extent that (1) specific corporations likely to "Accommodate"
and predisposed to accept additional normative guidance from
NGOs can be convinced to internalize deeper normative princi-
ples that emerged from the transnational regulatory process but
yet are the product of direct bargaining, or (2) NGOs devise
effective substrategies in the domestic legal and political
frameworks of states of incorporation to urge governments to
adopt the "soft law" of the Compact and the Norms/Framework
as hard law binding on all corporations. With respect to number
one, however, corporations that "Accommodate" are at least as
likely to respond to a "Negotiate" strategy as they are to "Regu-
late" unless by virtue of its international institutional provenance
a normative principle stands a greater chance of finding its way
into a Code of Conduct and corporate practice than the same
principle developed through other means. Regarding the sec-
ond point, the usefulness of an international legal incorporation
sub-strategy is not limited to the "Regulate" strategy but would
interact with and bolster the utility of "Negotiate," "Litigate," and
"Legislate" by placing an additional source of normative pressure
upon corporations, the judiciary, and politicians.
In sum, however, NGOs seeking to transform corporate
practice in the issue-area of human rights protection and
endowed with limited resources would be better advised, at least
in the short run, to "Negotiate" while recalibrating their expecta-
tions for their regulatory campaigns.
d. "Legislate": Implementation and Enforcement of Negotiate
"Legislate" is dominated (weakly) by "Negotiate" and "Liti-
gate," and its only utility to NGOs is in the case where (1) NGOs
have reliable information that a corporation will play "Fight," in
which case NGOs can impose 25 units of punishment at no cost,
(2) where NGOs are willing to absorb 15 points of cost to inflict
40 units of punishment on a corporation about which they have
reliable information that it will play "Engage" only to violate its
implied agreement, and (3) where NGOs have reliable informa-
tion that the corporation will play "Collaborate," in which case
"Legislate" offers the same payoffs to both parties, while creating
actionable law useful to the execution of all other strategies in
interactions against this or other corporations. "Legislate" offers
150 points across the four corporate strategies and 410 points in
total payoff to both parties.
Stakeholder advocates of "Legislate" note that the state has a
fiduciary duty to society as a whole, that the government has the
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power to impose additional legal restrictions in corporate con-
duct, and that the existing corporate legal regime does not offer
adequate (dis)incentives to encourage corporations to protect
human rights."' 8 Advocates of shareholder theory contend as
well that legislation is the only legitimate method of transform-
ing corporate conduct,34 9 for reasons of democratic accountabil-
itysso and to create disincentives for noncompliance.1 , Even
those who credit voluntarism with some success suggest that a
"legal framework provides powerful tools and incentives for
improvement" and "anchor[s] [voluntary principles] in a legal
framework [that] is likely to enhance their effectiveness."3 5 2
However, the law is an imperfect institution that is subject to
political inertia, and the basic canons of corporate law have not
been fundamentally reordered since the 1930s. Legislative pro-
posals have remained just that-proposals-and although calls
to convert corporations into quasi-public entities responsible for
most of the functions of government, while they may benefit poli-
ticians, are not good strategy for NGOs. That "Negotiate" and
"Litigate" dominate "Legislate" is thus unsurprising.
In the short run, "Legislate" is less a strategy than one of
several processes to implement and enforce the "Negotiate" strat-
egy as it benefits NGOs in only two ways: (1) it punishes corpora-
tions that "Fight" and refuse to acknowledge the existence of any
obligations to protect human rights with the specter of bad pub-
licity, diminished profits, and future sanctions if they continue as
"evildoers;" and (2) it offers NGOs an additional forum wherein
348. See, e.g., Deva, supra note 207, at 741 (arguing for legislative induce-
ments to enhance corporate protection of human rights).
349. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 22, at 126.
350. In theory, by creating constraints through the democratic process,
ethical questions are aired and then put to rest through a legitimate process
rather than left open to constant and destructive argument. See Ehrlich, supra
note 26, at 83-84 ("The language of ethics suggests that you are right and I am
wrong; that you speak with moral authority and that you have the right to tell
me how to live my life. Work to change the law, but do not demonize me as
being greedy because I disagree with you.").
351. See id. at 83 ("[It is] unlikely that a firm will voluntarily place itself at
a competitive disadvantage by incurring a cost associated with ethical behavior
when others in the field do not do so, unless bigger firms attempt to promul-
gate rules that will disadvantage smaller competitors by saddling them with
costs that the larger firms can afford to bear . . . . If society wants business to
behave in a certain way that escapes the discipline of the market, . . . then it is
better to regulate by law so that all competitors are burdened
proportionately.").
352. Kielsgard, supra note 84, at 197 (quoting INT'l COUNCIL ON HUMAN
RIGHTS Poi.icv, BEYOND VOLUNTARISM, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEVEL.OPING
INTERNATIONAL. LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF COMPANIES, SUMMARY (2002)).
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to press corporations to voluntarily adopt constraints lest more
onerous restrictions are imposed by government. In the long
run, "Legislate" offers NGOs the prospect, however far down the
temporal road, that actionable law useful to the execution of all
other strategies will emerge.
e. "Delegitimate ": An Empty Threat
"Delegitimate" is the worst of the five strategies available to
NGOs as it is (weakly) dominated by the other four. There is no
instance in which NGOs should play it, with the sole possible
exception of the case of a corporation the NGOs are certain will
play "Collaborate" now and in the future no matter what strategy
NGOs chooses in the present. "Delegitimate" offers 135 points
across the four corporate strategies and 430 points in total payoff
to both parties.
"Delegitimate" is not a strategy for interaction with corpora-
tions; rather, it is a repudiation of the corporation and a battle
cry for adherents to use their critique of the corporate form as a
point-of-entry into the re-engineering of the political economy.
Ultimata backed by the threat of the "corporate death penalty"
are not politically popular and may even be irresponsible from
the point of view of NGOs, as these proposals may have the effect
of shielding corporations from constraints, whether incurred vol-
untarily or by other means, drawn from the realm of the politi-
cally possible. Furthermore, "Delegitimate" shuts off dialogue,
heightens the stakes, and may well promote defensive synergies
between corporations and business associations. In short, NGOs
should avoid "Delegitimate," which is inferior to all other strate-
gies, unless and until popular support for its radical propositions
is sufficient to make its implementation a practical possibility and
other strategies have failed.
3. Corporate Strategies
a. "Fight": Corporate Neanderthal Model
"Fight" is almost certainly, in the words of Professor Donald-
son, "corporate Neanderthalism," or unreconstructed neoclassi-
cal shareholder theory, and as such has a series of preferences
different from each of the three other corporate strategies. Its
payoffs range from 20 to 80, and it performs worst against "Legis-
late" and best against "Regulate." Interestingly, a corporation
choosing to "Fight" imposes a uniformly bad payoff on NGOs of -
10, suggesting that at least in the short run corporate power, if
committed to "Fight," can overcome NGOs. At the same time,
however, "Fight" does not perform very well against "Negotiate."
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Because "Negotiate" is the dominant strategy for NGOs, if a cor-
poration cannot or will not alter its preferences sufficiently to
justify another strategy it will receive a payoff worse than what it
would have received had it chosen any other strategy. Moreover,
if NGOs know that the corporation plans to "Fight," either by its
reputation, its public communication, or by the use of competi-
tive intelligence, it can, in effect, "punish" the corporation in the
amount of 25 points by choosing "Legislate" at no cost to itself.
Under these conditions, a corporation that plans to "Fight" must
either attempt to manage its reputation or else be cautious about
releasing actionable intelligence regarding strategy.
The sole virtue of "Fight" in the contemporary political
economy is thus its ability to frustrate NGOs. It achieves this,
however, at great cost: with NGOs playing the dominant strategy
of "Negotiate," the corporation that chooses to "Fight" draws the
ire of all that claim stakeholder status and in so doing signifi-
cantly harms its own economic bottom line. In sum, stakeholder
theory appears to have eclipsed the shareholder model of corpo-
rate governance, and the corporation that continues to deny this
political and economic reality-deemed "Yesterday's Company"
by one commentator3 5 -will pay a price.
b. "Engage": Strategic Stakeholder Model
"Engage" is, in most respects, "strategic stakeholder the-
ory,"154 which considers and responds to all threats and opportu-
nities that might affect its objective: shareholder wealth
maximization. "Engage" payoffs range from 90 to 20, with the
highest payoff coinciding with NGOs' dominant strategy, "Nego-
tiate," creating a subgame equilibrium. Accordingly, "Engage"
should consistently perform well against NGOs unless NGOs
decide, perhaps because the corporation has been violating its
Code of Conduct and manipulating the media, to "punish"
"Engage" by playing "Litigate." "Litigate" yields a payoff of (20,
25), and thus by abandoning its dominant strategy and incurring
only a 5 point penalty NGOs can "punish" the corporation that
chooses to "Engage" in the amount of 70 points. In other words,
the corporation that chooses to "Engage" can gain from honor-
ing its agreements with NGOs that "Negotiate," but failure to do
so can lead to costly litigation.
353. AVERY, supra note 238 (follow "1. Changes in business thinking" link)
(coining this term to describe the corporation that denies responsibility for
human rights and environmental protection, and distinguishing such a corpo-
ration from "Tomorrow's Company" which accepts these responsibilities).
354. Donaldson, supra note 14.
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Critics of "Engage" contend that it fails not because it is
immoral, but because it is nonmoral-it is not an ethical synthe-
sis but simply strategic reasoning that considers the retaliatory
potential of aggrieved parties only and not the morality of their
claims."' Although this description is not entirely unfair, the
conclusion is not supported by the present study. Because the
dominant strategy for NGOs is to "Negotiate," a corporation
choosing to "Engage" will enjoy a reputation as a good corporate
citizen, enhance its profitability, and continue to prosper so long
as it chooses its NGO partners wisely and upholds the agreement
it reaches with these partners. If the cost of adhering to the
agreement becomes onerous, the corporation electing to
"Engage" can pass it along to consumers.
It is crucial, however, that in choosing to "Engage" the cor-
poration is sincere in its commitment to accept stakeholders,
negotiate protections of human rights within its business sphere,
and implement its agreement. Failure to do so can be very costly:
although the direct effects of NGOs switching to "Litigate,"
which can be swiftly imposed at relatively low cost to NGOs, are
not likely to be significant in terms of corporate profitability, the
loss of reputational benefits, and with it the loss of premiums on
stock price, demand, and investment, will have serious negative
impacts. In short, a corporation choosing to "Engage" must keep
its bargain.
c. "Accommodate": Good Citizenship Model
"Accommodate" is the strategy-of-choice for many contem-
porary corporations who have accepted the CSR movement as a
fundamental fixture of modern business. "Accommodate"
payoffs range from 70 to 90, with payoffs of 90 earned when
NGOs play their dominant strategy of "Negotiate" as well as when
NGOs play "Regulate." The "Accommodate"-"Regulate" sub-
game equilibrium should be stable: although NGOs cannot
inflict serious punishment for violation of this equilibrium, the
corporation that chooses "Accommodate" intends to keep its bar-
gain, and "Litigate" and "Delegitimate" would impose costs upon
NGOs with little effect on the corporation.
Given the dominant strategy of NGOs-"Negotiate"-
"Accommodate" earns high payoffs; what is more, against any
other NGO's strategy "Accommodate" scores no worse than 70
out of 100. For corporations that have internalized the values of
CSR and of the human rights movement, "Accommodate" guar-
antees them high payoffs and virtually immunizes them from
355. Id.
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punishment in the form of litigation or regulation. Provided
that such a firm can manage to remain profitable after taking on
the broad responsibility to guarantee human rights protection
within its sphere of business well beyond that required by law,
and after navigating the shoals of discontented shareholder
groups for whom heightened protection of human rights repre-
sents profits otherwise owed to them, "Accommodate" is a strat-
egy with few, if any, faults. It requires, however, significant
managerial competence to implement in such a manner as to
satisfy stakeholders who demand profitability as well as those who
demand accountability.
d. "Collaborate": Symbiotic Model
"Collaborate" is played only by the very most "progressive"
corporations who, but for their corporate charters and the fact of
their shareholders, might be mistaken for NGOs themselves.
"Collaborate" payoffs range from 85 to 100, with only "Collabo-
rate"-"Litigate" yielding anything less than a perfect payoff.
Moreover, NGO payoffs, regardless of NGO strategy, are 90
whenever a corporation plays "Collaborate." Thus, although
"Collaborate"-"Negotiate" is a subgame equilibrium, meaning
that it is the best possible outcome for each party, there exists an
incentive for NGOs to choose "Litigate" against the corporation
that chooses "Collaborate" because doing so imposes no cost on
NGOs while the resulting litigation may offer benefits against
other corporations choosing different strategies.
Moreover, in practice "Collaborate" is almost a non-strategy:
it effectively hands the corporate reins to NGOs and allows them
to implement their own strategy in the corporate stead. Still, for
corporations driven principally by the need to express support
for human rights and whose payoff structures reflect this prefer-
ence, and for NGOs as well, "Collaborate" works. For the corpo-
ration playing "Collaborate," payoffs are virtually perfect, 5"5 and
for NGOs the payoff, regardless of its strategy, is 90 out of 100.
"Collaborate" rewards NGOs with maximum decisional freedom
to adhere to, or depart from, its dominant "Negotiate" strategy; it
rewards the corporation with the opportunity to express its value-
structure through its business activities and through the actions
of the NGOs who are partnered with it. "Collaborate," in a real
sense, is a symbiosis: NGOs receive the opportunity to closely
guide the affairs of the corporation in service to their human
rights protective agenda, while the corporation reaps the internal
356. The sole exception is when NGOs play "Litigate," which practically
speaking is extremely unlikely against a corporation that plays "Collaborate."
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reward of being assured that it is behaving properly in accor-
dance with best human rights practices, as well as the external
reward of being deemed by NGOs as a model of the ethical cor-
poration. The only risk faced by the corporation that decides to
"Collaborate" is the market: it is unclear that "Collaborate" as a
strategy generates sufficient economic returns to allow a major
corporation, let alone a small- or medium-sized enterprise, to
remain in business, even if considerations of profitability factor
very little, if at all, into the equation of preferences for such a
firm. 57
IV. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY BUILDING
AND FUTURE RESEARCH
A. Findings
1. Stakeholder Theory Ascendant
At least in the issue-area of human rights, the shareholder
model lies all but vanquished, and corporations can no longer
profitably deny all responsibility for acts of torture, extrajudicial
killing, rape, or forced labor undertaken by the governments or
militias of the foreign countries in which they do business.
Human rights NGOs can claim much of the credit for
requiring corporations to assume protective responsibilities in
their spheres of operations and insisting that corporations infuse
the conduct of their business operations with considerations of
social and ethical obligations-strategies that may well be inde-
pendently less effective than negotiation. This is true even if, in
many instances, NGOs pursued these objectives by resort to dem-
onstrations, litigation, application of political pressure within the
United Nations and domestic governance spheres, and legislative
attempts to reform corporations as quasi-public entities with
human rights obligations akin to those of states. Although the
precise mechanisms whereby NGOs have succeeded in trans-
forming corporate preferences and behavior with regard to
human rights protection requires further research, it is clear that
NGOs have succeeded in painting corporations as untrustworthy
357. The Achilles' heel of "Collaborate" may be sufficiently threatening
to the survival of the corporation that employs it such that it renders "Collabo-
rate" a dysfunctional strategy. See, e.g., Ben Casselman, Why 'Social Enterprise'
Rarely Works, WALL ST. J., June 1, 2007, at B12 (reporting that the socially
responsible model of business has not proven the capacity to be profitable over
the last decade, and that corporations attempting to employ the model inevita-
bly require external support). It is also worth noting at this juncture that it is
likely, given the potential unprofitability of "Collaborate," that no durable cor-
poration employs a pure version of the strategy.
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and in stripping away much of the business goodwill of the cor-
porations they have targeted as CSR-unfriendly. 5  Corporations
seeking to regain credibility with their customers and with policy-
makers must now "turn ... to [NGOs] for 'lent trust"' in order to
achieve gains in their reputation, 5t and those corporations who
reject the need to appeal to stakeholders are left at a serious dis-
advantage in their strategic interactions with NGOs who, by vir-
tue of their non-financial and even altruistic objectives,"o are
trusted and admired by many members of the public who value
NGO objectives over corporate profits, regard themselves as
stakeholders, and, but for time and resource constraints, would
join NGO campaigns. 6
In sum, "Fight"-the strategy closest in provenance to share-
holder theory-fares so poorly because, at least in part through
NGO efforts, stakeholders exist in the market and demand that
corporations accept at least some threshold obligations to pro-
tect human rights.
2. Ineffectiveness of Involuntarism
The behavior of natural and legal persons can be regulated
in three ways: (1) exclusively by law, (2) exclusively by social
norms, and (3) by law and social norms.362 The first rests on the
political power of the state to impose rules; the second is the
domain of private, negotiated ordering; the third is a hybrid of
the previous two. A number of scholars and NGOs have con-
tended that corporate misconduct is the result of a missing or
failed market and that CSR can only be achieved through the
"uniquely powerful" and coercive mechanisms available to
states-specifically, laws."' Others have commented that the
358. See Duane Windsor, Corporate Social Responsibility: Cases For and
Against, in 3 THi. AcCOuUNTABLE CORPORATION: CORPORATE SOCIAL REsIONSmaII.
rfry, supra note 16, at 31, 46 (noting that NGO activities have rendered "[p]ublic
opinion in the United States ... distinctly cool, if not hostile, to large corpora-
tions and their managers" and damaged public trust in corporations).
359. ZADEK, supra note 268, at 46.
360. See Aguilera et al., supra note 30, at 852 (reinforcing the intuitively
obvious conclusion that most NGOs are motivated primarily by altruistic
motives, whereas most corporations are motivated primarily by profit motives).
361. See ZADFK, supra note 268, at 47 ("NGOs are able to mobilize and
sustain a sense of shared trust by resembling, in their active view and engage-
ment in the world, that part of people's visions of, or desire about, themselves
about which they feel most proud" but cannot actualize due to time or financial
considerations.).
362. See Steven Shavell, Law Versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct, 4 A-m.
L. & ECON. Rtv. 227 (2002).
363. SeeAguilera et al., supra note 30, at 848 (arguing that "[g]overnment
action[s]-both enacting laws and enforcing them-[are] . . . uniquely power-
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requisite standard for corporate transformation must be set so
high that only binding and enforceable law can possibly induce
it.364 Still others have suggested that NGO activism is so rooted
in considerations of pure ethics or even a nascent secular relig-
ion that it cannot be reconciled with corporate or market prefer-
ences and thus, if CSR is to be achieved, it must be engineered
through the instrumentalities of the central government.sm As a
consequence, NGOs, demanding more laws and regulations,
have lobbied legislative and transnational regulatory bodies in an
attempt to increase the supply of laws obligating corporations to
provide increased protections for human rights.
It is unsurprising that for much of the last two decades, law
has been the primary avenue of approach for NGOs and others
who seek transformations that would require corporations to
provide greater protection for human rights."' After all, "[t]he
role of the legal system . . . is to provide a framework or process
for conflict resolution and the development of legal rights,"3 6 7
and where interests conflict, rights are disputed, and a method
for resolving the conflict authoritatively is desired, it falls to law
to perform this function. Debates over public policy questions
generally tend to revolve around the question, "What legal
reforms are necessary to achieve the desired objective?", and CSR
is no exception. Consistent with the predictions of public choice
theory, corporations and NGOs do indeed contest within the
legal domain where decisions are made as to: whose interests are
to be deemed "rights" defensible by the state, whose values are to
ful because they can achieve broader coverage than voluntary initiatives, such as
the UN Global Compact . . . ."); Andrew King, Cooperation Between Corporations
and Environmental Groups: A Transaction Cost Perspective, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
889, 891 (2007) ("For many years [CSR] scholars followed the Pigouvian tradi-
tion that held that the problems caused by missing markets could only be
resolved through the actions of central government.").
364. See BRUMMER, supra note 28, at 185 ("[S]ocial activist theorists
believe that the standard of responsible corporate conduct is [much higher
than, as well as] independent of[,] the current expectations, demands and,
often even the current interests of the various groups of individuals served or
affected by management decision making.").
365. Id. at 185-87.
366. See Den Hond & De Bakker, supra note 51, at 918 (stating that, as
their primary strategy, NGOs have "traditionally acted politically in trying to
influence the diffusion, interpretation, and implementation of laws and regula-
tions, as well as in lobbying for the formulation of new laws and regulations"
before national governments and supranational bodies).
367. Warren J. Samuels & Nicholas Mercuro, The Role and Resolution of the
Compensation Principle in Society: Part One-The Role, 1 REs. L. & EOwN. 157, 166
(1979).
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dominate the decision-making process, and who is to make these
decisions.-"8
However, the present study reinforces more general
research in the fields of law and economics, compliance theory,
regulatory theory, and organization theory that has found that
the resort to state-centric strategies-litigation, regulation, and
legislation-does not always respond "more effectively to the
needs of public officials, politicians, and private citizens"3" than
does private ordering of relations between parties in the market-
place.37 1 Without question, law has limitations relative to private
ordering through negotiation: it is slower, less fine an instru-
ment, and less likely to secure compliance. 7 ' Few would dispute
that, in the case of the protection of human rights and ATCA,
Congress and the courts have been "unable to produce law that is
coherent, intelligible, or in a large sense, purposeful." 17  Moreo-
ver, the suppliers of law and regulations, both domestic and
transnational, have clearly proven uninterested in expanding the
supply of effective legal restraints on corporate conduct in the
issue-area of human rights, perhaps because powerful corpora-
tions have "captured" the regulatory state.
Strategies should be judged not by their legal content but by
the structure of the incentives they establish and the conse-
368. See, e.g., James M. Buchanan, Toward Analysis of Closed Behavioral Sys-
tems, in Theory of Public Choice: Political Applications of Economics 11, 12
(James M. Buchanan & Robert D. Tollison eds., 1972) (explaining and predict-
ing strategic interactions between self-interested entities competing for scarce
public goods).
369. SUSAN RoSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRE-SSIvE, AGENDA 8
(1992).
370. See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1
(1960) (theorizing from a Law and Economics perspective that so long as cor-
porations and their stakeholders can reduce transaction costs-locating each
other and negotiating and enforcing agreements-they can reach agreements
in the marketplace superior to those available through the state) (compliance
theory); Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities? 11 J.L. & EcoN. 55 (1968) (reg-
ulation); King, supra note 363, at 891 (management).
371. Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUn. 661, 665
(1998) ("[L]aw is, relative to [private ordering], a less effective constraint: [i]ts
regulations, crude; its response, slow; its interventions, clumsy; and its effect
often self-defeating.").
372. Louise A. Halper, Parables of Exchange: Foundations of Public Choice
Theory and the Market Formalism ofJames Buchanan, 2 CORNEIILJ.L. & Putn. Po.'v
229, 231 (1993).
373. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BvLL J.
EcON. & MGMT. Sci. 3, 5 (1971) (proposing a regulatory capture theory that
postulates that corporations have the "power to utilize the state ... to control
entry" and content of regulation and to see that it is operated primarily for its
benefit).
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quences of corporations and NGOs altering their behavior in
response to those incentives. Clearly, insufficient public incen-
tives exist to motivate the behavioral transformations demanded
of corporations by NGOs,"' and thus the value to NGOs of state-
centric strategies are simply too low to recommend them at pre-
sent and for the foreseeable future. However, there is reason to
believe that the importance of law and of the state has been over-
estimated, not only because of limitations inherent in the legal
enterprise and a lack of political will to provide sufficient incen-
tives, but because non-legal sources of normative influence are
more important sources of preference formation, behavior, and
enforcement.375 Indeed, an examination of voluntarism in the
CSR context suggests strongly that the market for CSR is neither
missing nor failed and that the objectives of NGOs can be
attained without state intervention.
3. The Virtues of Voluntarism
Compliance theory, and in particular its normative branch,
suggests that individuals and organizations will voluntarily com-
ply with social norms and customs, even in the absence of any law
compelling them to do so, in order to avoid ostracism, earn
higher social status, or fulfill internal needs regarding beliefs and
values about law and compliance. 7  Moreover, normative theo-
ries of compliance suggest that preferences about law are exoge-
nous to the law itself; thus, changes in the law alone are
insufficient to alter these preferences. According to constructiv-
ist theories of compliance, the following hypotheses explain how
and why corporations and their executives can be induced to
comply with the privately ordered and negotiated agreements
they reach with NGOs:
(1) Corporations are not solely material creatures but are
also ideational entities continuously reconstituted by the socially
generated values, morals, and ideas of the individuals and groups
who participate in their formation and direction; 77
374. See NIcHor.As MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE
LAw 261-62 (2d ed. 2006) (recognizing that "the institutional environment can
only do so much" to create incentives to alter behaviors and that private
arrangements are often necessary to create the desired exchange of value).
375. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw: How NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES 137-55 (1991).
376. For a presentation of the various theories of legal compliance, see
William Bradford, In the Minds of Men: A Theory of Compliance with the Laws of
War, 37 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1243 (2005).
377. See Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International
State, 88 AM. Poi.. Sd. REv. 384, 384-85 (1994).
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(2) Normative scripts of key individuals and groups-CEOs,
other top executives, and important stakeholders-are princi-
pally responsible for constructing corporations and investing
them with preferences;"'
(3) Normative scripts are flexible: individuals and groups
outside the corporation (such as NGOs), through patterns of
"persuasion, socialization, and pressure," can influence the nor-
mative perceptions and business agendas of individuals and
groups within the corporation, and vice versa;3" and
(4) Legal rules qua rules do not independently generate
compliance pull: laws are, in effect, restatements of social values
and norms, and corporations conform their conduct not to the
formal content of rules, but to a set of internalized norms that
may or may not be reflected in formal legal regimes."o
Although a detailed examination of the process whereby
corporate preferences can be transformed is beyond the scope of
the present work, in essence, constructivism suggests that the
non-legal sources of behavioral prescription and proscription
exert more direct influence upon corporations than do legal
sources, and that compliance is the end result of a process of
norm inculcation that over time reconstructs corporate identities
to embrace and reflect specific normative content as they evolve.
In turn, through the influence of such institutions as families,
churches, schools and workplaces, corporations and their manag-
ers are "constructed" by, or conditioned to adhere to, philoso-
phies of governance prescribing and proscribing certain
behavior even in the absence of formal legal rules.3 8'
Thus, so long as the proper normative content is inculcated
into corporate decisionmakers and expressed in negotiated, vol-
untary agreements with NGOs-a major undertaking to be
sure-the behavior of a corporation thus reconstructed will be
largely congruent with these agreements. In sum, corporate
preferences regarding the protection of human rights are not a
given, and corporate protection of human rights can be induced
378. See generally THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SEcuRrm: NORMS AND mDEN-
Trrr IN WoRLD PolITICs (PeterJ. Katzenstein ed., 1996).
379. MARGAR.T F. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTs BrYoNo BoRD.RS
214 (1998).
380. See generally H. L. A. HART, THE CONCI-' OF LAw (2d ed. 1994)
(stressing that compliance with law requires an internal attitudinal commit-
ment that in turn requires that rules be consistent with normative principles).
381. See Joseph Galaskiewicz, Making Corporate Actors Accountable: Institu-
tion-Building in Minneapolis-St. Paul, in THE NEw INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZA-
TIONAl.ANA.YIs 293 (Walter W. Powell & PaulJ. DiMaggio eds., 1991) (finding
that corporations and their executives act in socially responsible ways if norma-
tive institutions create incentives for such behavior).
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by altering the normative structure, and thus the preferences, of
corporations and the executives who manage them. 382 Under
these conditions, constructivism predicts a high rate of compli-
ance even where noncompliance in any given instance might be
a materially rational business strategy, because compliance serves
the enlightened (or boundedly rational) self-interest. Where
noncompliance occurs, it is sanctioned through a decentralized
enforcement process that swiftly and effectively imposes social
and economic sanctions not through the instrumentalities of the
state, but in the community and, above all, in the market."'
This is not to suggest that state-centric strategies are not use-
ful to NGOs: in fact, these statist strategies may strengthen pri-
vately ordered voluntary agreements between NGOs and
corporations,8 particularly if used to prevent defections from
these agreements, 85 and their content shapes the norms and
preferences that guide private ordering.38 6 Moreover, the exis-
tence of law, however marginal in its effectiveness, may serve an
important inducement in the first instance to goad corporations
into negotiations over private ordering arrangements with
NGOs. 87 It would be unfair to claim that in the strategic interac-
tion between corporations and NGOs over the issue of human
rights protection "[I] aw should understand . .. its own insignifi-
382. See Charles Handy, What's a Business For?, in HARV. Bus. REv. 49,
54-55 (2002) (concluding that corporations can be reconstructed to view com-
pliance with CSR as an ethical imperative and as an act that serves self-interest).
383. See Terlaak, supra note 63, at 968 (describing the enforcement of
private agreements between NGOs and corporations that have expressed nor-
mative preferences for socially responsible behavior).
384. See Campbell, supra note 46, at 955 ("Corporations will be more
likely to act in socially responsible ways if there are strong and well-enforced
state regulations in place to ensure such behavior, particularly if the process by
which these regulations and enforcement capacities were developed was based
on negotiation and consensus building among corporations, government, and
the other relevant stakeholders.").
385. See Marc J. Epstein & Kirk 0. Hanson, Introduction to 3 THE
ACCOUNTABLE CORPORATION: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBIITY supra note 16,
at vii, xii (recognizing that privately ordered agreements can be bolstered by
state-centric strategies, including regulation); see also W. RICHARD Scorr, ORGA-
NIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS 346 (5th ed. 2003) (con-
tending that whatever market solutions are devised, state-centric institutions will
remain necessary to ensure that corporations continue to be responsive to the
interests of stakeholders).
386. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 354 (1997) (discussing the interdependence
between law and the norms that govern private ordering).
387. See John L. Campbell, Why Would Corporations Behave in Socially
Responsible Ways? An Institutional Theory of Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 ACAD.
MGMT. REv. 946, 948 (2007).
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cance [and] ... should step out of the way."" Still, voluntarism,
encouraged by normative evolution and enforced via the market,
is, standing alone, superior to other strategies available to NGOs
seeking to induce transformations in corporate protection of
human rights.
4. "Civil Regulation": Harnessing Consumer Activism to
Increase the Market Power of NGOs
In brief, civil regulation theory ("CRT"), also described as
"New Governance""' in the literature, postulates that the rules,
norms, and principles embodied by voluntary agreements
between corporations and NGOs are "quasi-regulations"""n that
will, if breached by corporations, trigger boycotts and other
direct actions. The fall-out will sufficiently damage corporate
reputations and financial performance so as to induce corpora-
tions to behave as if these rules, norms, and principles were bind-
ing and enforceable law imposed via the state. 9 ' CRT postulates
further that these quasi-regulations create "civil partnerships"
between corporations and NGOs that can be more legitimate
and more effective in securing compliance than binding law to
the extent that they reflect normative commitments, both sub-
stantive and procedural, that corporations seek to fulfill in their
own material, as well as ethical self-interest.3 11
For a decade, NGOs have been gradually drifting away from
involuntarist strategies and toward civil regulation as the phe-
nomenon of "political consumerism""'" has matured. NGOs
388. Lessig, supra note 371, at 666.
389. See, e.g., Trubek & Trubek, supra note 167.
390. See generally Colin Scott, Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of
the Post-Regulatory State, in THE POLITICS oF REGUiATION: INSTITUTIONS AND REC-u
IATORY REFORMS FOR THE AGE OF GOVE.RNANCE 145 (JacintJordana & David Levi-
Faur eds., 2004) (employing the phrase "quasi-regulations" to describe the nor-
mative bases for voluntary agreements between corporations and NGOs).
391. ZADEK, supra note 268, at 56-57, 62-63.
392. See id. at 142-43 (describing the bases for corporate compliance with
"civil partnerships"); id. at 79-80 (describing "civil partnerships as "mutually
legitimizing"). The effectiveness of "New Governance" is the subject of a vigor-
ous debate, but many commentators acknowledge that under certain condi-
tions civil regulation may be more effective than state "command and control"
regulation in fostering deliberation, flexibility, innovation, partnerships, norm
development, and learning. See Trubek & Trubek, supra note 167, at 5-6.
393. See PoLITrics, PRODUCTS & MARKETS: ExiPLORING POITICAL CON-
SUMERISM PAST AND PRESENT 3-19 (Michele Micheletti et al. eds., 2004) (defn-
ing "political consumerism" as the coordinated use of consumer tactics-
boycotts, protests, and other market-based tactics-to bring irresponsible cor-
porations to heel).
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have improved in their attempts to harness constituents, 9 4 and
in particular those consumers who punish irresponsible corpora-
tions with boycotts and reward their responsible counterparts
with "buycotts"-deliberately increasing demand by spreading
positive information and urging members of consumer networks
to increase purchases from such responsible corporations.3 9 5 In
effect, NGOs and political consumers have exploited opportuni-
ties presented by the market to enter into private contracts, also
described as "relational contracts" or "civil partnerships," with
responsible corporations.3 9 ' These civil partnerships accomplish
a mutually beneficial exchange that confers one form of property
(quasi) rights-improved reputations and increased profits-
upon corporations in exchange for another form of property
(quasi) rights-funding and, more importantly, performance of
the desired socially responsible corporate behaviors presently
and in the future-upon NGOs. 3"7 Corporations-at least those
that have not chosen to "Fight"-have responded with varying
degrees of favor to entreaties to civil partnership, in part to inter-
dict more onerous state regulatory intervention, but out of con-
siderations of material and ethical self-interest as well.
Accordingly, through civil partnerships formed in the mar-
ket, the welfare of NGOs and their political consumer constitu-
ents, as well as responsible corporations, are enhanced: both are
better off than before the private agreement, long-term coopera-
tion is promoted through the "shadow of the future" interactions
between parties, and the outcome is Pareto-efficient.3 9 In short,
through market forces, CRT predicts that civil partnerships will
394. See Parker, supra note 50, at 81 (noting the magnification of NGO
power through networking and organizing made possible through
globalization).
395. See Den Hond & De Bakker, supra note 51, at 918 (discussing NGOs'
efforts to claim consumer activists as constituents in their strategic interaction
with corporations).
396. See Stuart L. Hart et al., Creating Sustainable Value, 17 ACAD. MGMT.
EXEC. 56 (2003) (describing the evolution of these relationships).
397. See Den Hond & De Bakker, supra note 51, at 909-11 (identifying
the benefits to corporations from civil partnerships, including material gain
from increased consumer purchases and reputation gains from positive public-
ity and cooperation).
398. See Campbell, supra note 46, at 955 ("Sometimes industry moves
toward self-regulation out of a concern that to do otherwise would eventually
result in state regulatory intervention.").
399. See King, supra note 363, at 893 (explaining that civil partnerships
structure relations as an ongoing process that encourages parties to deal hon-
estly in the present in order to gain the benefits of future cooperation); id. at
899 (citing research findings that civil partnerships increase social welfare
beyond that obtainable through state regulation).
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form, increase the supply of responsible corporate behavior
beyond what is possible through state intervention, and enhance
social welfare.4 00.. Indeed, civil partnerships are (as of 2011) the
primary NGO strategy for interaction with corporations."
Despite its benefits, civil regulation cannot be mandated,
however; it must be agreed upon by both parties. In practice,
then, the boundaries of corporate social responsibility are estab-
lished through negotiation.4 0 2
5. Negotiation: The Pathway to Civil Regulation
Conflict between corporations and NGOs over the scope of
corporate responsibility for the protection of human rights is far
from inevitable. Although the motives for corporations and
NGOs in seeking out civil partnerships may differ-the former
generally are driven by financial considerations, while the latter
act primarily out of ideological commitments 4 1a3-the formation
of enduring and beneficial civil partnerships does not require
ideological solidarity, and each party can pursue its own goals
within jointly agreed-upon frameworks.4 04 Analysis of the strate-
gies available to corporations and to NGOs, assisted by game the-
oretic modeling, reveals that for NGOs the dominant strategy is
"Negotiate." In practical terms, this means that NGOs, contrary
to orthodox understandings, can best accomplish their objective
of protecting and promoting human rights against violations
connected with corporations that seek out investment opportuni-
ties in countries with weak or brutal governance by negotiating
directly with corporations as constructive critics, advisers, and
400. See Gregory Adams, Corporate Social Responsibility and NGOs: Observa-
tions from a Global Power Company, in GL.OHALIZATION AND NGOs, supra note 47, at
187, 200 (reinforcing CRT premises that the market itself is the source of
socially responsible corporate behavior and that "[w]hile far from perfect, no
other approach or system has proven to produce results that are ultimately as
socially responsible . . . .").
401. Aguilera et al., supra note 30, at 851.
402. See ZADEK, supra note 268, at 162 ("The real boundaries of responsi-
bility of any organization are . . . essentially set through negotiation with those
stakeholders who can penalize a business for 'getting it wrong' and equally
those that can reward it for getting it right.").
403. Corporate motives, and to a lesser extent, NGO motives, vary. And
this variance is reflected across the range of strategies. In general, however,
corporations pursue financial self-interest while NGOs pursue ideological inter-
ests. See Aguilera et al., supra note 30, at 852 ("NGOs ... are more likely to be
driven by altruism-trying to make the world a better place-than by [finan-
cial] motives . . . . Conversely, . . . corporat[ions] . . . hav[e] a more complex
mix of motives . . . . [Some] undoubtedly . . . care about underlying social
issues .... ).
404. Parker, supra note 50, at 102.
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even, depending on corporate preferences, as full civil partners.
By entering into constructive dialogues that educate, instruct,
and transmit normative content in a manner that impresses upon
corporations the mutual private gains to be enjoyed through
alteration of corporate practices and the adoption and imple-
mentation of Corporate Codes of Conduct and other normative
statements of best practices, NGOs are more likely to achieve
their objectives than through the use of any other strategy,
including those that rely upon litigation, regulation, legislation,
or corporate delegitimation.
a. NGO Tactical Imperatives
i. Professionalization
The strategic success of negotiations toward civil partner-
ships, however, is dependent upon mutual tactical commitments
from both NGOs and corporations. NGOs must first enhance
their credibility as negotiating partners in order to gain seats at
the negotiating table. To do this, they must abandon the extra-
legal aspects of their direct action agenda and narrow the cul-
tural and social gulf between NGOs and corporations by increas-
ing the professionalism of their membership and developing
their own Codes of Conduct to demonstrate their reciprocal
acceptance of the principle of accountability to the stakeholders
on behalf of whom they propose to negotiate.405 Violent direct
actions and protests "may win battles, and [they are] indeed . . .
weapon [s] that cannot be surrendered, but [they] will not win
the war or the argument."406 Nor will threats to introduce inter-
national criminal exposure for corporate executives, accused on
what are essentially negligence theories of failing to protect
human rights, advance the prospects for civil partnerships.407
Furthermore, delegitimization tactics, and in particular threats to
revoke corporate charters, are similarly hostile acts that will only
convince skeptical corporations that partnerships are not possi-
ble with entities committed to their humiliation and destruction.
Dialogue requires each party to accept the right of the other to
exist and to be heard.
405. See Conley & Williams, supra note 31, at 19 (noting that corporations
have been insisting that "NGO accountability .. . be 'embedded' in the NGO,
from the top down . . . .").
406. Chandler, supra note 335, at 23.
407. See supra notes 182-84, 192-93 and accompanying text.
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By professionalizing their memberships, circumscribing
their more radical and violent elements, "' eschewing hyper-
bole," 9 and otherwise holding themselves accountable to stake-
holders, NGOs will show corporations that they are prepared to
break from their confrontationalism of the past4 1( and commit to
building social partnerships that will allow bargaining toward
more integrative solutions. In sum, professionalization will
enhance the trust upon which successful negotiation depends.4 1'
ii. Nurture Respect for Profit Motive
NGOs must remember that, save for those corporations
whose strategy is to "Collaborate"-and possibly for some of
these firms as well-profit is not a dirty word but is rather essen-
tial to their continued existence. NGOs and corporations gener-
ally use very different frames in understanding the complex
interplay between corporate conduct and human rights protec-
tion and in identifying problems and solutions."'" For NGOs,
protection of human rights is the paramount mission and pur-
pose, and every negotiation is a simple question of how to
increase protection; for most corporations, by contrast, profit is
the metric against which all corporate decisions are assessed.
Although their noble objective accords NGOs significant norma-
tive leverage,4 " NGOs would be wise to resist the temptation to
408. See Den Hond & De Bakker, supra note 51, at 917 ("The efficacy of
joint efforts by radical and reformative activist groups in [building civil partner-
ships] is enhanced if radical groups are constrained in applying tactics aimed at
material damage.").
409. See BuRKE, supra note 234, at 43 (noting that "the temptation for
[NGOs] to slant the news, embellish pronouncements, or even falsify informa-
tion" in order to achieve their objectives has injured NGOs' reputations and
complicated relationships with corporations).
410. See Id. at 37 (noting that NGOs have traditionally been "aggres-
sive . . . and sometimes hyperbolic" in their attempts to alter corporate
behavior).
411. See Peter Smith Ring & Andrew H. Van de Ven, Developmental
Processes of Cooperative Interorganizational Relationships, 19 ACAD. MGMT. Riv. 90
(1994) (finding that as NGOs become more professional they gain credibility
and status and are simultaneously more likely to trust corporations and to be
trusted by them with the result that dialogue is facilitated).
412. SeeJ. EDWARD Russo & PAUIJ. H. SCHOEMAKER, WINNING DFxaisIONS
21-28 (2002) (defining negotiating "frames" as "mental structures that simplify
and guide our understanding of reality" but noting that frames introduce bias
and the possibility of error and undesirable negotiation outcomes).
413. See G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE 44 (2d ed. 2006)
(describing "normative leverage" as the use of standards, norms, and moral
arguments that "the other party views as legitimate and relevant" to maximize
advantage in the resolution of a dispute).
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moral arrogance 41' and to recognize that corporations also fulfill
a noble purpose in providing goods, services, and productive
employment to society and that continuing to do so is also an
important dimension of corporate social responsibility.' 5
Thus, in the pursuit of their mission to enhance human
rights protection, NGOs must recognize that any take-it-or-leave-
it proposal that threatens to eradicate profitability threatens the
continued existence of the corporation with whom they are
negotiating and will thus be perceived as an existential threat.
Any alternative to such a "negotiated" agreement, including
abandoning the relationship, will be preferable to corporations
presented with socially irresponsible ultimata." 6 Corporations
will vigorously resist any efforts to convert them into defacto gov-
ernments with the full panoply of social welfare responsibilities.
They are profit centers, and not agencies or instrumentalities of
the state.
Accordingly, NGOs must live in the world of corporations as
they negotiate, understanding that, while they might wish for cor-
porations to grant them everything they desire no matter the
cost, the only feasible solutions are those that are jointly accept-
able because they deliver enhanced protection of human rights
without sacrificing profitability. Simply, if crassly, put, CSR, and
the protection of human rights, must pay for itself, and a corpo-
ration that provides protection but cannot secure a profit is not
only socially irresponsible but not likely to survive.41 7 The bar-
gain NGOs offer to corporations must be better than the alterna-
tives available to corporations outside of negotiation and must
include a mutual commitment to profitability and survivability.
If NGO intransigence or unprofessionalism erodes the benefits
414. See Parker, supra note 50, at 92 ("NGOs are trapping themselves by
claiming 'rightness' and moral authority" and this arrogance creates animosity
in the relationship with corporations with whom they seek to partner). Some
NGOs, out of moral disdain for corporations, simply refuse to talk to them
whatsoever, precluding all possibility of cooperation. Id. at 101.
415. See Adams, supra note 400, at 200 (" [F]or corporations and NGOs to
work together cooperatively there needs to be a respect and understanding of
the role of corporations in society in providing basic goods and services, and an
appreciation that this contribution can, in itself, be a socially responsible
one . . . .").
416. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 97-106 (2d ed. 1991) (defining a "best alterna-
tive to a negotiated agreement" ("BATNA") as the result obtainable from aban-
doning negotiating and theorizing; that the better the BATNA, the less a party
is compelled to negotiate).
417. See Carroll, supra note 16, at 22 (reminding all concerned that if in
behaving responsibly the corporation does not "strive to make a profit" it will
fail and no longer be able to behave responsibly) (emphasis removed).
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of negotiation such that corporations can accomplish what they
perceive as superior outcomes by defending against litigation
and lobbying against regulation and legislation, negotiation will
fail, despite its promise. The objective for NGOs, and for the
corporations that negotiate with them, must be not simply a
"deal" but a commitment that is durable and will be performed
reliably, even eagerly, by each party."' 8 To achieve this, NGOs
must come to recognize the corporate interest in profitability as
equally as valid, or at least as equally worthy of respect, as their
interest in human rights protection, and they must commit to
engagement with corporations as moral equals.
iii. Expand and Capitalize Upon Social Marketing
To make the protection of human rights profitable, NGOs
should work together with corporations to devise social market-
ing substrategies to bolster the reputations, and increase the
demand for the goods, services, and shares, of corporations that
protect human rights. Simply put, NGOs must undertake the
arduous and long-term task of educating and training consum-
ers, through a process known as "social cueing,""5 to come to
view themselves as persons who want and demand corporate pro-
tection of human rights, and thus place a greater value upon
those corporations that provide it than upon those that do
not."2 0 A detailed discussion of the specifics of this process is
beyond the scope of the present Article. It suffices at this junc-
ture to suggest simply that there is already "an increasingly
mobilized social group of consumers, often referred to as the
'ethical shopping movement,' with the capacity to impact brand
image and corporate reputation for the sake of the greater
418. SHEL., supra note 413, at 191. A more fully developed theory of
NGO-corporate bargaining on the protection of human rights must await
future research.
419. For a discussion of social marketing research and the technique of
"social cueing" in the related CSR context of environmental protection, see
generally Gert Cornelissen et al., Positive Cueing: Promoting Sustainable Consumer
Behavior by Cueing Common Environmental Behaviors as Environmental (Catholic
University of Leuven, Working Paper No. MO 0610, 2007), available at https://
lirias.kiileiven.be/bitstream/123456789/121057/1/MO_0610.pdf.
420. For a discussion of the utility of direct education campaigns in incul-
cating norms in and transforming the preferences of the educated to align
them with desired social outcomes, see generally Dorothee Schmidt, Mitigating
the Shadow of Conflict: The Role of Social and Human Capital for the Reduction of
Conflicts (Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods, Working Paper
No. 5, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
982343.
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good."4 21 If NGOs can draw upon and market their organiza-
tional knowledge, expertise, and energies to (1) reshape the way
consumers view themselves in relation to the protection of
human rights and (2) make the responsible corporation more
profitable, they can create a genuine synergy between human
rights protection and profit around the core of these "ethical
shoppers" that will likely be stable and self-policing.4 22 Moreo-
ver, they may well effect a more general transformation of social
and market norms and the construction of a more human rights-
protective global community that has the beneficial effect of
altering most corporations' preferences and payoff structures in
the direction of greater commitment to human rights protection.
In turn, the costs of monitoring and enforcement will decline
sharply as social accountability becomes encultured through dia-
logue, rewarded by the market, and "backstopped" by the fear of
loss of reputation and the economic value that attends it. In
other words, it is in the marketplace-for products and services
but even more importantly for ideas-that human rights NGOs
must devote their labors, working to win the hearts and minds of
consumers whose demand for corporate protection of human
rights has proven far more potent than any law, principle, or reg-
ulation. By educating their constituents and transforming con-
sumer demand, NGOs will alter corporate preferences, narrow
the zone of corporate alternatives, and improve the prospects for
negotiated agreements.
iv. Retain Capacity to Shift to Other Strategies
The decision to enter into civil partnerships and to apply the
aforementioned tactics, however, does not relieve NGOs of the
need to demand and verify compliance of their negotiating part-
ners. On the contrary, NGOs must insist on building monitoring
provisions into Codes of Conduct and other relational contracts
to provide the verification necessary to the maintenance of trust.
Moreover, NGOs should extend the sphere of voluntary agree-
ments to include partnerships with states and other corporations
that will further enmesh all parties in publicized commitments to
human rights protection. States, although leery of transnational
421. Aguilera et al., supra note 30, at 847.
422. This will not be easy, particularly if consumers associate the protec-
tion of human rights with behavioral costs like time, money, effort, and incon-
venience. Cornelissen et al., supra note 419, at 3. Transforming consumer
attitudes and behaviors toward human rights protection, however, is the key to
convincing corporations to voluntarily transform their own attitudes and behav-
iors, and may well be necessary to achieve traction in terms of other potential
strategies. In short, it is here that NGOs will likely win or lose their battle.
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regulation and calls for litigation, are quite responsive to this sort
of voluntarism. For example, the U.S.-U.K. Voluntary Principles
on Security and Human Rights ("Voluntary Principles"), urged
by NGOs, call upon corporate signatories to conduct risk assess-
ment and to "consider the available human rights records of pub-
lic security forces, paramilitaries, [and] local and national law
enforcement" in determining whether to do business in a given
foreign jurisdiction; signatories further pledge to "have an inter-
est in ensuring that the actions taken by governments, particu-
larly the actions of public security providers, are consistent with
the protection and promotion of human rights."4 23 Many of the
members of the Voluntary Principles are petroleum and mining
corporations that have, until their membership, elected to
"Fight" in their interactions with human rights NGOs.4 24 If pro-
fessional and accountable NGOs can accept the obligation for
corporations, even as they accept responsibilities for human
rights protection, to continue to be profitable, and agree to work
together with such corporations to achieve these joint outcomes,
it may well be possible to beguile corporations away from "Fight"
and into more cooperative strategies such as "Engage" or
"Accommodate" with outcomes preferable to corporations,
NGOs, and society. As Special Representative Ruggie has urged,
NGOs should work with states and international organizations to
eradicate the corrupt and brutal governments that lure and
"facilitate" foreign investment with weak, nonexistent, or out-
right oppressive legal regimes.4 25
Finally, NGOs should maintain the capacities, and hold
them in reserve, to "Litigate" and "Regulate" in order to disci-
pline corporations that pledge to "Engage" or "Accommodate"
only to violate their agreements. Legal intervention can provide
the discipline that encourages and rewards corporations to heed
the call of social and market forces that condition their conduct
423. See The Principles, THE VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLEs ON SECURITY AND
HUMAN RiGHTS, http://www.volitaryprinciples.org/principles/risk-assess
ment (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
424. Membership in the Voluntary Principles reads like a "Who's Who" of
the petroleum and mining industries and of the targets ofATCA litigation. The
following are the members: AngloGold Ashanti, Anglo American, Barrick Gold
Corporation, BG Group, BHP Billiton, BP, Chevron, ConocoPhilips, Exx-
onMobil, Freeport McMoRan Copper and Gold, Hess Corporation, Marathon
Oil, Newmont Mining Corporation, Occidental Petroleum Corporation, Rio
Tinto, Shell, Statoil, and Talisman Energy. The Participants, THE VOLUNTARY
PRINCIPLES ON SECURrv AND HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.voluntaryprinciples.
org/participants/companies.php (last visited Oct. 11, 2011)
425. See generally Kinley & Chambers, supra note 156.
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in ways protective of human rights.4 26 State regulation can pro-
vide the gist of actionable law and litigation at present or in the
future. However, NGOs must be far more savvy than they have
been: state regulatory efforts that attempt to seize a "bridge too
far" are more likely to be thrown back in defeat, and with them
the prospects for less ambitious, but more politically attainable,
civil partnerships.
b. Corporate Tactical Imperatives
The present study strongly suggests that, although corporate
preferences vary, the modern corporation must accept that the
political economy has changed and that corporate survival will
not be assured by a slavish devotion to shareholders and a con-
stant battle against the existence and interests of stakeholders,
but rather by engaging, and even accommodating, important
stakeholders whose interests can be served in such a way as to
enhance the corporate reputation and its profitability. For some
time, NGOs have urged corporations to initiate and implement
Codes of Conduct, to conduct social impact studies and audits
prior to making important business decisions, and to create and
staff in-house CSR competence. Corporations should heed
these calls and adopt all of these tactics as well as a fifth: they
must develop a presence in the academy, in domestic legislative
and regulatory fora, and in transnational bodies where their
interests are at stake.
i. Initiate and Implement Codes of Conduct
Corporations without a Code of Conduct should consult
with NGOs and implement a voluntary agreement that elaborates
specific and measurable internal guidelines and standards for the
protection of human rights, as well as voluntary reporting
provisions.428
426. One group of commentators independently reaches the conclusion
that negotiation, backed by efforts to shape social and market forces to reward
corporations that commit to upholding obligations under a CSR framework, is
presently more effective than legal interventions but that the role for legal
intervention will increase. See generally THE NEw CORPORATE AccoUNTABIUTY:
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAw (Doreen McBarnet et al. eds.,
2007).
427. BRUMMER, supra note 28, at 188.
428. See CRANE & MATTEN, supra note 64; Hepple, supra note 62; Kinley &
Tadaki, supra note 65; Litvin, supra note 68 (describing CCCs); Simaika, supra
note 66; Terlaak, supra note 63.
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ii. Formalize Dialogue
Over the last decade, formal and ongoing dialogues have
developed wherein corporations, NGOs, government officials,
academics, labor representatives, and community leaders meet to
discuss issues of common concern, including monitoring of, and
compliance with, CCCs governing the protection of human
rights.42 ' Such dialogues afford corporations valuable and low-
cost information as to the social expectations of important stake-
holders in a setting that enables the ongoing (re)negotiation of
the details of broadly-based norms and principles that constitute
civil partnerships. In exchange, NGOs acquire additional social
status, wealth, prestige, and access. Through dialogues, corpora-
tions can calibrate their practices, learn how best to uphold their
agreements, and retain the material advantages of identification
by NGOs as socially responsible. They can achieve these advan-
tages, however, only if they are as committed to listening as they
are to speaking.
iii. Perform Social Impact Statements and Audits
Corporations should independently perform a rigorous
"social audit" to ascertain the current status of their human
rights protective practices, the threats to human rights within
their spheres of operation, and the internal procedures available
to respond to change and rapidly emergent threats.13 0 Following
this, corporations should translate the results of dialogues into
action by drawing NGOs into a relationship, with the degree of
closeness a function of the strategy chosen, to "enhance the
sophistication of their decisionmaking" and "introduce alongside
analyses of the bottom line""3 ' analyses of ethical and moral
responsibilities, including the protection of human rights, that
they must fulfill to protect and enhance their reputations with
stakeholders-an increasingly important constituent of profit-
ability. With the inputs from NGOs, corporations will be able to
further refine their practices and enhance their capacities for
429. See, e.g., Mark Wade, A Commitment to Sustainable Development: The
Long Journey Begins, in 3 TUH ACCOUNTABLE CORPORATION: CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 16, at 133, 143 (discussing the evolution of round-
table discussions hosted by Shell for the purpose of harmonizing interests and
expectations regarding corporate performance in the protection of human
rights).
430. See Id. at 144-45 (describing the rigorous and searching process
whereby a corporation can determine its present practices and make authorita-
tive determinations as to modifications for the future).
431. DONALDSON, supra note 34, at 108.
BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL
compliance while reducing the risks of litigation and injury to
reputation.
zv. Create and Diffuse CSR Norms and Internal Capacity at
Headquarters and in the Field
Corporations need not and should not rely exclusively on
NGOs for expert guidance as to best practices in the realm of the
protection of human rights. They will need to expand or create
CSR departments staffed by executives-and perhaps even by
former NGO leaders-to provide in-house counsel to managers
and to boards of directors as to existing and evolving normative
standards, draft best practices and Codes of Conduct, and assess
whether corporate conduct reflects its commitments and its
intended strategy."' Such professionals will also work to facili-
tate the diffusion of normative commitments within their organi-
zations in order to increase compliance at all levels.
Specific proposals might include the creation of or con-
tracting with highly professional private security forces to provide
site security against threats in areas of operations; 4 33 whatever the
cost of such a measure, it is cheaper than reliance on the state
security forces in regimes known to violate human rights, and the
cost-at least in part-can be passed along to consumers.
Another method of reducing risk and enhancing compliance
with Codes of Conduct would entail the hiring and detailing of
human rights risk managers and legal advisers at corporate head-
quarters and at major field operations, with mandates to provide
detailed instructions to corporate personnel regarding compli-
ance with Code provisions protecting human rights and the
authority to make decisions, to include ceasing operations or tak-
ing any other measures reasonable and proper to ensure compli-
ance, on behalf of the corporation.
v. Proactive Presence in the Academy, Legislatures, and International
Agencies
Corporations should ensure that their CSR teams maintain a
forward and proactive presence in every forum and site where
their interests and obligations are debated and placed at stake: in
432. See Luo, supra note 29, at 223 (describing a proposal to create "CSR
auditors" with these functions).
433. Private corporations do in fact offer security consulting and security
forces to other private corporations in order to protect them against a panoply
of risks. Xe (formerly Blackwater) and DynCorp are two of the more prominent
private military contractors. See BLACKWATER USA, http://www.blackwaterusa.
com (last visited Oct. 11, 2011); DYNCoRP INTERNATIONAL, http://www.dyn-intl.
com (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
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the field, in negotiations with NGOs, in the academic and legisla-
tive debates about the reform of ATCA and corporate law more
generally,4" 4 in transnational institutions debating proposals
such as the Norms, and in the marketplace. The knowledge,
experience, and empathetic understanding of the NGO agenda
that CSR teams will acquire will assist corporations in identifying
options for mutual gain through integrative, rather than distribu-
tive, bargaining. At the same time, CSR teams may well come to
influence NGO preferences as well, at least in the sense that
NGOs may learn to empathize with corporate preferences for
profitability and become more willing to seek out integrative
solutions that deliver profit and protection simultaneously.
Moreover, corporations must be far more proactive in domestic
and international political and legal fora to ensure that the pol-
icy agendas and state legislative or regulatory proposals that
emerge despite the existence of civil regulations are consistent
with corporate interests and will allow them to achieve profit
while providing human rights protection. Finally, corporations
should take active roles in urging business schools, law schools,
and other relevant educational venues to assist in the institution-
alization and inculcation of the norms, principles, and values
that support CSR in the area of human rights and serve as the
training ground for future corporate decisionmakers and role
models.4 -5
B. The Commensurability of Corporate Profit and
Human Rights Protection: A Pretheory
The following narrative sketch of the relationship between
the explanandum-corporate protection of human rights-and
the explanatory variables, or explanans,436 is offered as a prethe-
434. The Global Compact specifically targets academics and universities
in an effort to "increase knowledge and understanding of corporate citizen-
ship." See Academic Participation, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.unglobalcompact.
org/HowToParticipate/academic-network/index.html (last updated July 14,
2010). Corporations should devise ways to participate in this and other discur-
sive arenas so that their interests are represented and considered as new norma-
tive frameworks are proposed and debated.
435. Few business schools have yet mandated a course in CSR for their
MBA students, in part because of low student demand and a lack of faculty
expertise in the field, yet many corporations are demanding that business
schools do so. See Ronald Alsop, Talking B-School: Why Teaching of Ethics Contin-
ues to be Lacking, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2007, at B7 (noting increasing corporate
demand for managers trained in CSR and explaining the lack of supply from
business schools).
436. POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND FOREIGN PoicY 248-49 (Valerie Singer
& Eric Hudson eds., 1992).
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ory of the commensurability of corporate profit and human
rights protection. It treats corporate protection of human rights
as a dependent variable caused by the presence of independent
variables in a chain of causation.
Corporations and human rights NGOs, although they tend
to possess very different motivations and may commence as
adversaries, can negotiate cooperative and even collaborative
relationships that increase the demand and the supply of socially
responsible corporate conduct in such a manner as to increase
the protection of human rights while preserving, and possibly
increasing, corporate profitability. To develop these civil part-
nerships, corporations and NGOs must eschew primary reliance
on inefficient and costly state-centric regulatory and legislative
contests and develop civil regulations buttressed by relational
contracts-Corporate Codes of Conduct, the Global Compact,
and other voluntary agreements that provide explicit standards
and monitoring regimes-and by market forces such as con-
sumer activism. Relational contracting will require negotiation,
which is the optimal strategy for NGOs based on available payoffs
in strategic interaction with corporations; by the same token, cor-
porations are best rewarded when they employ strategies-
"Engage" or "Accommodate"-that enhance their social capital
while facilitating integrative bargaining toward a Pareto optimal
solution set that includes both corporate protection of human
rights and corporate profitability.
To succeed in negotiation, both parties must commit to an
ongoing dialogue and to the concept of civil partnership, rather
than courts, legislative bodies, or the media, as the proper frame-
work for managing the relationship. NGOs must commit to
nonviolence, become more pragmatic with regard to the neces-
sity of corporate profits, assist in generating demand for the
offerings of socially responsible corporations, and learn to trade
their substantive expertise for corporate promises of good con-
duct and financial assistance. Corporations must openly commit
to an appreciation for CSR as a business and ethical imperative,
inculcate this norm throughout the organization, learn from
their NGO partners, and develop internal CSR capacity to per-
form social audits and devise tactics to bring their practices in
line with their commitments.
Both NGOs and corporations should view state regulatory
regimes and law more generally as a backstop to their strategies:
self-regulation has the potential to be much more effective at
lower cost, and all that is required from law is the prospect of
discipline if NGOs or corporations should breach their regula-
tory contracts and adopt strategies and tactics inconsistent with
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their civil partnerships.4 3 ' Efforts to add teeth to ATCA or imple-
ment state regulations or other restrictive legislation will erode
civil partnerships and produce suboptimal joint outcomes. To
the extent that exogenous variables are important in the enforce-
ment of relational contracts, they are to be found in the market:
activist consumers, investors, and others who demand additional
corporate protection of human rights will "consume" the
increased protection supplied in the form of additional
purchases of the goods, services, and investment opportunities
produced by the corporations that protect human rights.4 38
In sum, through civil partnerships that manage disputes
over the substance and procedures of relational contracts
through negotiation rather than resort to costly and ineffective
state-centric enforcement strategies that erode the basis for part-
nership, and which rely on market forces to generate a demand
for human rights protection that corporations committed to CSR
as a material and even ethical imperative can profitably supply,
corporate protection of human rights and profitability can
emerge and persist as a jointly beneficial outcome of strategic
engagement between NGOs and corporations.
C. Caveats, Criticisms, and Responses
First, it is important to note that the game developed here
and the findings that derive from the game are highly sensitive to
the assumptions about the payoffs that determine its solution. A
more robust theoretical basis for the proffered payoff structure
requires more empirical research as well as the use of methods
that will trace the chain of causation between preferences, corpo-
rate strategies, actions and tactics to implement the strategies,
and the costs and benefits associated with each strategy. Differ-
ent payoffs would lead to different solutions and to different
selections of strategies. The payoffs assigned are the product of
artful intuition and somewhat arbitrary determination; they are
not cast in stone.
437. See Campbell, supra note 46, at 956 (hypothesizing that
"[c]orporations will be more likely to act in socially responsible ways if there is a
system of well-organized and effective industrial self-regulation in place to
ensure such behavior, particularly if it is based on the perceived threat of state
intervention or broader industrial crisis and if the state provides support for
this form of industrial governance").
438. See id. at 958 ("Corporations will be more likely to act in socially
responsible ways if there are private, independent organizations, including
NGOs, social movement organizations, institutional investors, and the press, in
their environment who monitor their behavior and, when necessary, mobilize
to change it.").
BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL
Moreover, the game simplifies reality in ways that are not all
captured in the general assumptions. For some corporations, it
may be less costly to protect human rights than it is for others-
for example, petroleum corporations who do business in regions
of the developing world where governance is weak and brutal
regimes are the norm face greater costs and risks in protecting
human rights than do financial services corporations based pri-
marily in New York or London. Furthermore, some corporations
derive disproportionate gains from touting their human rights
records, while others, no matter how hard they attempt to pro-
mote themselves as responsible, find it difficult to convince con-
sumers. Ben & Jerry's is known at least as much for its
commitment to CSR as for its ice cream, while there is perhaps
little ExxonMobil could do to earn such a reputation after the
Exxon Valdez disaster, other major environmental incidents, and a
longstanding tradition of intransigence in the face of pressure
from environmental groups. Moreover, CSR is only one dimen-
sion of the corporate reputation: other dimensions include inno-
vation, human resource management, financial management,
investment strategy, and quality of products and services.4 39 In
the field of CSR, reputation-how it is acquired, how it adds
value and how much value it adds, and how it is lost-bears fur-
ther examination.
The game also presumes that the costs and benefits of strate-
gies are objective, transparent, private, and fixed. In practice, it
is exceedingly difficult to determine the costs and benefits of spe-
cific actions, particularly at the moment they are taken; thus, they
are subject to subjective determination. Moreover, the choice of
strategy by a corporation produces industry-wide effects and is
itself, at least in part, determined by expectations about the
behavior of other corporations, other industries, governmental
actors, and even the global political economy. Finally, revolu-
tions in legislative or regulatory affairs may rapidly and unexpect-
edly change the costs and benefits associated with given
strategies. In short, costs and benefits associated with the inter-
play between variables at different levels of analysis are very diffi-
cult to model.
Furthermore, in the "real world," corporations and NGOs
are "repeat players," meaning that the shadow of the future
looms over their interactions and has important effects on their
choices of strategies which have been addressed in some depth in
the analysis but not yet modeled in the present study. A player
439. See Anne Fisher, America's Most Admired Companies, FORTUNE, Mar. 19,
2007, at 88, 94 (ranking corporations along dimensions of reputation).
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might choose a strategy that is suboptimal in the present period
in order to inflict "punishment" on the other player in the hope
of conditioning the other player to behave differently in the
future, either by adhering to the implicit agreement that accom-
panies the playing of a particular strategy or to play a different
strategy. By the same token, a player might acquire knowledge
about how the other player intends to play-either through the
public pronouncements of the other player or through the use of
competitive intelligence4 4") or corporate espionage44 ' to gather
information-and thus might choose a different strategy that
leads to a higher payoff. Indeed, the recommendation that "Liti-
gate" and "Regulate" be retained in the NGO arsenal, and
"Fight" in the corporate arsenal, reflects the importance of deter-
rence and the need to be able to credibly inflict future punish-
ment if discipline is to be maintained and agreements are to be
honored in the present.4
With regard to strategies, the game assumes that no other
strategies are possible and that players must elect pure strategies
rather than mixed or randomized strategies that would allow
them, based on their assessments of the particular strategic inter-
action and the specific preferences in play, to draw from two or
more strategies-simultaneously or in sequence-to achieve
their highest possible payoff. In fact, there may well be any num-
ber of other possible strategies that are consistent with maximiza-
tion of payoffs for corporations that embody different
preferences than those that together constitute the basis for the
four corporate strategies developed in the present study.
Additionally, the model of the corporation developed in the
present study makes presumptions about the various groupings
of preferences that constitute and animate many contemporary
440. "Competitive intelligence" ("CI") is the ethical and lawful applica-
tion of industry and research expertise to analyze publicly available information
on competitors and to produce actionable intelligence that allows firms to
make informed and strategic business decisions. See Frequently Asked Questions,
STRATEIGIC AND COMPETITIVE INTELLIGINCE PROFESSIONALs, http://scip.org/
resources/content.cfm?itemnumber=601&navltemNumber=533 (last visited
Oct. 11, 2011).
441. "Corporate espionage" ("CE") is the illegal subspecies of CI whose
methods include "finding" lost documents, interviewing disgruntled employees,
eavesdropping in airports and trade shows, social engineering (misrepresenting
identities to trick people into yielding information), bugging offices, hacking
computers, and outright stealing proprietary information. See IRA WINKLER,
CORPORAT EsiIONAGE 66 (1997) (quoting Pierre Marion, former head of the
Directorate Generale Securite d'Etat-the French equivalent of the U.S. Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency and FBI).
442. See CRANE & MATTEN, supra note 253; DONALDSON, supra note 252;
Elkington, supra note 254; supra notes 96-98.
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corporations and in turn give rise to four particular strategies for
interaction with human rights NGOs. There are certainly more
typologies that can and should be assembled and tested. Even
more importantly, it is exceedingly difficult to ascertain empiri-
cally what any given corporation holds as its preferences. Again,
artful intuition, reliance on public statements and business prac-
tices, and other indicia are useful but imperfect indicators. The
same is true for human rights NGOs, who are grouped together
for the purpose of theory building but in fact represent a broad
range of opinion as to desirable ends and means in the protec-
tion of human rights and might well be disaggregated to much
benefit. More sophisticated tools-content analysis, survey
research, and other techniques-will increase the rigor of the
assignment process in future research.
Finally, game theoretic models cannot represent the human
dimensions that underlie decisionmaking and, accordingly, have
been criticized for this shortcoming."' Humans, and not corpo-
rations or NGOs, are the ultimate decisionmakers as to strategy
and as to courses of action, and a host of variables difficult to
reduce and integrate into the model of the firm as a "rational"
entity-beliefs, values, traits, norms, emotions, uncertainty,
etc.-are important determinants of strategy and thus deserve
significant research attention. The influence of CEOs in particu-
lar upon corporate decisionmaking must also be considered as
an important determinant of corporate preferences and, in turn,
corporate strategy.444
Nevertheless, the present study is merely an attempt to build
a theory. As such, it must rely on simplifying assumptions and
working hypotheses to construct a model with enough power to
organize existing knowledge and point out fruitful paths for
future research that will test the assumptions upon which the
model relies, render more detailed accounts of preferences,
extend the model to include considerations of the future and of
443. See, e.g., Robert C. Solomon, Game Theory as a Model for Business and
Business Ethics, 9 Bus. ETHICS Q. 11, 12 (1999); Note, supra note 256, at 1960
("To many, the use of game theoretic analysis seems dehumanizing and false; it
assumes that human behavior can be generalized and predicted by a series of
equations or matrices.").
444. See Aguilera et al., supra note 30, at 844, 846 (2007) (noting that
CEOs and other senior executives have direct power to influence and select
corporate strategy regarding CSR, and that the personality-level variables
account for at least some of the strategic variation between corporations); Don-
ald C. Hambrick & Sydney Finkelstein, Managerial Discretion: A Bridge Between
Polar Views of Organizational Outcomes, 9 RFs. ORG. BEI-Av. 369 (1987) (finding
that CEO personality-level variables play a critical role in influencing and deter-
mining corporate strategies and actions).
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mixed strategies, and undertake other tasks the better to fully
capture the complexity of the strategic interaction between cor-
porations and NGOs in the issue-area of human rights protec-
tion. It is heuristic, designed to investigate whether corporate
profits and human rights are commensurable, rather than in ten-
sion as many have previously presumed, and not yet a fully elabo-
rated theory.44 5
D. Directions for Future Research
Interdisciplinary research that draws upon the theoretical
insights of psychology, law, economics, sociology, and organiza-
tional studies is needed to challenge assumptions and to better
understand the chain of causation postulated by the pretheory as
linking various independent variables to the independent varia-
ble of simultaneous corporate protection of human rights and
profitability.
First, it is essential to enhance the taxonomy of strategies by
aggregating empirical data about corporate performance in the
protection of human rights and developing a more sophisticated
protocol for determining corporate strategies.44" Next, it would
be useful to validate preferences against this data and to ensure
that preferences and payoffs align with strategies.
Second, it would be beneficial to derive strong empirical
support for the claim that CSR is rewarded by the market, partic-
ularly in the issue-area of human rights. Much of the work in this
subfield has treated the phenomenon of CSR rather broadly, and
environmental protection has received far more attention than
has human rights. Do consumer activists value human rights pro-
tection enough to demand that corporations supply it? If so,
how specifically can this preference be reinforced and magni-
445. The theorist attempting to build a theory involving the strategic
interaction of entities against the backdrop of law must "accept the fact that
arguments . . . are going to be well short of rigorous and try to do the best one
can despite that." DAVID D. FRIIDMAN, LAw's ORDFR: WHAT EcoNOMICs HAS TO
Do WITH LAW AND WHY IT MATriRs 87 (2000). The first step in such an enter-
prise is to "think through the logic of the games we are likely to encounter to
learn as much as we can about possible outcomes and how they depend on the
details of the game." Id. It falls to subsequent research to refine and add rigor
to the emerging theory.
446. A number of scholars have contributed casuistic studies of CSR as
applied in various geographical regions and industrial sectors to assay a univer-
sal set of best-practices. See, e.g., GLOBAL PRACTicEs OF CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBIITY (Samuel 0. Idowo & Walther Leal Filho eds., 2009); CORPORATE
SOCIAL. RFS'ONSIBIirrY: A CAsE STunY AiPROACH (Christine A. Mallin ed., 2009).
However, empirical scholarship remains primarily descriptive, with a handful of
exceptions. See Orlitzky et al., supra note 275.
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fled? If not, can it be created through social marketing, and will
it provide benefits sufficient to offset the costs corporations will
incur in delivering human rights protection? If it cannot be cre-
ated, then are NGOs, in demanding that corporations provide
greater human rights protection than is required by law, simply
seeking to impose a de facto tax upon corporations without the
benefit of the political process, and does it not stand to reason
that corporations would be better served by playing "Fight"
against such a gambit? The answers to these questions bear on
whether voluntarism in the protection of human rights is indeed
feasible.
Third, the importance of reputation must be investigated
further. It would be valuable to determine whether in fact all
corporations are equally susceptible to reputational effects, or
whether some-especially in extractive resource industries-bear
the burden of bad reputations no matter how much protection
they provide to human rights while others already endowed with
good reputations can do no wrong in the eyes of stakeholders
even as their performance lags behind. If a corporation cannot
achieve a benefit no matter how much additional protection for
human rights it provides, then it does not stand to reason that it
should ever choose a strategy that is dependent upon civil regula-
tion. Rather, it should elect to "Fight" and to ensure that state
regulations and laws are crafted in such a manner as to allow it to
remain profitable.
Fourth, corporations and NGOs will learn from experience
and adapt to each other's strategies, and as each become more
skilled in the strategic interaction, preferences, strategies, and
tactics may change, as may answers to the following questions: Do
corporations that choose to "Accommodate" achieve advantages
over those that merely "Engage"? In other words, are there bene-
fits to deepening civil partnerships with NGOs beyond the
"Engage" strategy, or is "Engage" sufficient to yield simultaneous
outcomes of profitability and human rights protection while
doing so at a lower cost to corporations? Furthermore, can some
corporations become more efficient than others in protecting
human rights regardless of their choice of strategy, and can they
thus acquire a competitive advantage? Is there a mixed strategy
for either corporations or NGOs that yields better payoffs? Can
NGOs improve upon "Negotiate" by crafting more sophisticated
state-centric regulatory regimes? Can corporations improve
upon "Engage" or "Accommodate" by leveraging their wealth
and power to craft state-centric regulatory regimes more
favorable to profitability than anything achievable through civil
partnerships? As corporations become more knowledgeable
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about market preferences and about how to provide human
rights protection, will they need NGOs as partners any longer?
Finally, can corporations that "Collaborate" truly be profitable in
the long-run, or will they be selected against by the market?
Fifth, it will be necessary to disaggregate the corporation,
and to examine inputs from levels of analysis including individ-
ual, small decision group, organizational, industry, markets, and
communities (both local and transnational) to determine pre-
cisely how corporate preferences regarding the protection of
human rights are formed and how these preferences are
expressed through the selection of corporate strategies. Perhaps
the most difficult task will be the examination of the role that the
personality of the CEO plays in developing normative prefer-
ences, beliefs, values, and understandings about the social role of
business, and in inculcating those constituents of personality
within organizations. At the same time, variables from other
levels of analysis-small groups of top executive strategists,
boards of directors, major shareholders, regulatory agencies,
communities, and even states-exert independent influence
upon the preferences of CEOs, and this influence may well be an
important determinant of the strategies they select for their cor-
porations. In short, harnessing more explanatory and predic-
tive power requires creating and testing more complex and
detailed representations of the strategic and repeated interaction
between corporations and NGOs in the human rights issue-area.
V. CONCLUSION
By spring 2013-even before pretrial discovery is complete-the
plaintiffs in the case of IRATE v. ExxonMobil, et al., reach a settle-
ment with all the defendants except ExxonMobil. The terms require each
of the settling defendants to adopt a detailed Code of Conduct committing
the corporation to a series of measures protective of the environment,
447. A multivariate approach to tracing the linkages between corporate
preferences and strategies is necessary, and a powerful explanatory and predic-
tive model will require inputs at levels of analysis including top executives, cor-
porate culture, corporate financial resources, and community expectations. See
RobertJ. Bies et al., Corporations as Social Change Agents: Individual, Interpersonal,
Institutional, and Environmental Dynamics, 32 A(An. MGMT. Riev. 788, 792 (2007)
(suggesting that important future research in the field of CSR will center up the
role of leadership in the emergence of social change activities and the relation-
ship of corporate culture and values to corporate preferences regarding CSR as
both ethical and strategic imperatives); Campbell, supra note 46, at 962 (con-
tending that "economic conditions-specifically, the relative health of corpora-
tions and the economy and the level of competition to which corporations are
exposed-affect the probability that corporations will act in socially responsible
ways").
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labor, and human rights, as well as provisions consenting to NGO moni-
toring and reporting and to membership in the Global Reporting Initia-
tive. The defendants also agree, under the terms of the settlement, to
continue periodic discussions with NGOs in which their performance will
be assessed and recommendations made for adaptations to enhance imple-
mentation. Finally, each settling defendant agrees to pay into a victims'
fund, with each victim eligible for monetary damages up to $50, 000;
total liability for all the defendants thus does not exceed $100 million.
Neither the NGOs nor the former defendants have any immediate com-
ments, but from a review of their faces as they huddled together on the
steps of the courthouse one might conclude, as does the lead story in the
Houston Chronicle, that all save for ExxonMobil are satisfied with the
result.
On the announcement of the settlement, the share prices of the set-
tling defendants rise several percentage points, while the share price of
ExxonMobil dips slightly as investors factor in the slight probability that
ExxonMobil may be found liable at trial, given proposed legislation before
Congress to strengthen ATCA as well as in a new wave of lawsuits
rumored to be filed by NGOs in connection with ExxonMobil operations
in Asia and Africa, where civil unrest in oil producing regions is
ongoing.
The results of the present study, illustrated and given a con-
crete if somewhat fanciful form by way of a hypothetical scenario,
offer evidence that corporate profitability and the protection of
human rights are not mutually exclusive and may even each be a
necessary condition for the attainment of the other.448 Markets
and morals can coexist; shareholders' and stakeholders' interests
can be harmonized; public and private sectors can collaborate;
and efficiency need not come at the expense ofjustice. Through
negotiation based on considerations of self-interest and anticipa-
tion of the best strategy available to the other party, and through
the use of tactics that support the optimal strategy combination,
it may well be possible for corporations and NGOs to produce
jointly satisfactory outcomes that protect human rights while
increasing profitability and maximizing social welfare. The rela-
448. Research suggests that environmental protection and corporate
profitability may well be mutually necessary conditions, at least in the case of
developing economies. See, e.g., Giovanni Bella, A Blueprint for Optimal Intertem-
poral Consumption Under Environmental Constraints: The Modified Green Golden Rule
(2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=936
879. The same relationship may well obtain in the case of human rights and
corporate profitability-opening up the way for a blue golden rule (where blue
is the color representative of the United Nations, font of much of the codifica-
tion of the international human rights regime, and gold is the color of money).
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tionship is, or should be, interdependent, rather than conflic-
tual; a partnership, rather than a battle. To reach this state of
interdependence, it is useful to advance the theoretical debate
beyond simple characterizations of NGOs as good and corpora-
tions as evil-a claim some academic literature has been fond of
making since the mid-nineteenth century-and to recognize that
the contemporary political economy requires profit to protect
human rights, and human rights to protect profit. Ultimately, we
can, and must, have both, or we shall have neither.
